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Title:

A Comparative Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in
Iran and The Philippines

APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

This paper is a comparative analysis of U.S. foreign
policy towards Iran and the Philippines. The question which
prompted this research topic was simple: why was the outcome
for the United States so different in terms of subsequent
relations with each state after the downfall of the Shah and
Ferdinand Marcos? Both leaders were important U.S. allies in
strategic states that had benefitted from foreign aid.
Opposition groups in each state resented this support of
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their repressive leaders. Unlike Iran, good relations with
the Philippines continued during the Aquino presidency,
without the resentment and mistrust which prevented good
relations after the Shah's departure.
In order to explore this question, the U.S.
relationship with each state is divided into an examination
of two time periods. The tenure period encompasses the point
from which each leader assumed power until the start of the
events which ultimately led to the end of their regimes. For
the Shah, this was from the 1953 coup overthrowing Mossadeq
until to the visit from President Carter in 1978. For
President Marcos, this was from the Presidential election of
1969 to the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983. The
crisis period begins from the end of the tenure periods to
the departure of each leader. For the Shah this was November
4, 1979; for President Marcos, February 24, 1986.
While the crisis period comparison relies primarily on
an examination of events, the tenure period uses a framework
developed by Barry Goldstone in an essay entitled
"Revolutions and Superpowers." Goldstone asserts that

in

modern neopatrimonial regimes such as Iran and the
Philippines, dictators centralize power around themselves in
patronage networks, and use foreign aid to support their
regimes. The assertion is that foreign aid is used by the
United States to augment the resources of these regimes, in
order to maintain leaders which are sympathetic to U.S.
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interests. Ultimately, these leaders rely too much on U.S.
support, and fail to develop the mass support needed to
maintain their regimes. Leaders become over identified with
United States, being perceived as relying on U.S. support to
maintain their positions.

This framework provides a way in

which to compare different states using a consistent
measuring stick in terms of U.S. foreign policy and regime
failure.
The use of two time periods is augmented by a
comparison of four additional elements: the historical
relationship with the United States, the U.S. presence in
each country, the pressure role of religion in politics, and
the role of miliary training

provided by U.S. personnel.

They were chosen because they seemed to provide important
points of comparison, which might prove to be crucial
differences in how each state related to the United States
during each regime.
The analysis concludes that the timing of foreign aid
was more important than long-term U.S. support of each
leader. Marcos and the Shah became over identified with the
United States because support was given during a period of
regime consolidation. However, the legacy of the long-term
relationship with the U.S., in terms of tolerance for U.S.
influence in Philippine affairs moderated the response of
the Aquino regime. Also, there was little understanding
regarding the nature of the Iranian revolution and radical

4

position of Khomeini's followers.

In both states, the

relationship created during the tenure period affected the
range of choices that policy makers were aware of during the
final crisis, and the amount of leverage that the United
States could use successfully.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United states has confronted a dilemma in its longterm

relationships with

support

authoritarian Third

for authoritarian

regimes

World states.

may benefit

the United

States in the short-term, ensuring

access to trade and

maintenance

regime

of

a

non-communist

security considerations.
the

United

States

However,

becomes

government, blamed for

the

in

addition

the
to

when these regimes fall,
scapegoat

of

supporting a corrupt and

the

new

repressive

rule which sacrificed the interests of the citizenry.

As a

result, the United States finds itself unable to effectively
pursue

a satisfactory relationship with the new government.

These forfeitures are especially important when they involve
states

of strategic

importance.

cause immediate difficulties, a
prestige of the United States as

While occasional

losses

series of them damages

the

a superpower. This pattern

of supporting repressive regimes, which are replaced by nonfriendly regimes has

been evident from Vietnam

to Iran, El

Salvador, and Nicaragua.
Long-term support, outside of active intervention by the
CIA,

has involved

official transfers

of large

military and financial aid for three purposes.

amounts of
First, it is
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in

U.S.

interests

regimes

stable, since

policies

that

Financial

are

weaken a

they

from

a lack

regimes are

initially

charges

support

keeps these

interests.

in the capability

resources; such

leading

gaps

to instability.

control of

maintained

by opposition

lives,

economic

their

the states they

the

own power

groups that

regimes alive
United

have
bases.

united states'

far past

States

can

Second,

that these authoritarian leaders

created and

Despite

U.S.

can fill

of

authoritarian

military and

to benefit

in de facto

govern, in the sense

friendly

pursue

perceived

leader's power,

political

these

and military support

gaps resulting

these

to keep

their natural

cannot

authoritarian leader who manages that support

create

an

to ensure his

political longevity.
Finally,

the

proved to be an
and the

U.S.

dictators are

strategy

of

containing

communism

overriding concern for U.S.
has

taken the

position

preferable to communist

has

policy makers,

that

authoritarian

regimes.

It

argued that U.S. policy makers perceived the Cold War

can be
world

in zero-sum terms; the loss of an ally

meant a gain for the

u.s.s.R.

be justified because

Third

In addition,

World states

stage; modern

were perceived

in

a pre-modern

economic development would lead

to political

development. Democracy
support

and

support could

protection

to be

would prevail, with
from

communist

result of the modernization process.

enough economic
influences, as

a

3

Another

aspect of

States changing
balance
began

of

this

support

perception of commitment, and

bargaining power.

when the

involves the

Many of

weaker parties

progressed,

were unable

authoritarian

leader

importance

to

u.s.

with

policy

U.S.

developed
pattern

a

two

became

things
more

makers.

Second,

of the relationship

a

However, as the

aware

and better

with

to effectively

occurred.

interests

familiarity

the relative

these relationships

exploit their importance to U.S. interests.
relationship

of

the

The
state's

able to negotiate

U.S.

policy

particular

became a

United

makers

leader;

the

known and calculable

quantity, enabling policy makers to better calculate current
and future support for U.S. interests.

THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Given

these factors,

is there

any

way to

avoid the

dilemma of short-term support incurring long-term costs?
explore the question, this paper will
analysis of U.S. intervention
the

reign

of

Shah

Philippines during

Mohammed

execute a comparative

and influence in Iran
Reza

To

Pahlavi,

the rule of President

and

during
in

the

Ferdinand Marcos.

When the Shah fell from power, the United States

was forced

to

after

terminate

diplomatic

hostage crisis, and was

relations

with

Iran

unable to negotiate any

the

successful

relationship with the successive regimes. The United

States
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was blamed by the opposition for keeping the Shah
and accorded

responsibility

Shah's secret police.
maintained

for training

s.A.V.A.K.,

the

In the Philippines, the United states

good relations with

despite the fact

in power,

the new

that the United

Aquino government,

states was blamed

by the

opposition for keeping Marcos in power through large amounts
of military and financial aid.
There

are

differences in
provide

a

U.S.

central

the

outcome

religious

questions.

actions before

better explanation

Second, was
cultural,

two

or

or

First,

during the

of these

crisis

opposite outcomes?

determined by an
historical

did

factors

accumulation of
that

made it

difficult to mitigate the opposition to the United states?

THE CASE FOR COMPARABILITY

In terms of comparability, these states
very little in common.

First, each has a

appear to have

distinct culture,

religious orientation, and traditions. The Philippines was a
former colony while Iran was not,

although both experienced

occupation during World War II, albeit by different sides in
the conflict.
very

Also, the Middle East

different geopolitical spheres.

powerful state,

and South Pacific are
Iran was

economically and militarily,

a far more

and dominated

the region for these reasons. The

Shah actively pursued the

role of regional leader for Iran.

The Philippines, on the
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other hand, had been continuously engaged in a long
battle against
continued

different

Communist insurgent

to host two large United

It had no plans

States

running

groups,

and

military bases.

to be a regional leader, except in terms of

being the leading regional u.s. ally.
However,

both states

have

important similarities

terms of their relationship with the
Iran and the Philippines
Philippines' geographic
of Subic Naval

Union,

location is ideal for

Base and Clark

it

infiltration.

was

would cost

recreate elsewhere.

perceived

its border
as

Iran's importance

Iran was

with the Soviet

vulnerable

evolved

The

the presence

Air Field, which

important because of

and

First,

are strategically important.

the United States millions to
initially

United states.

in

as

it

to

Soviet

became

a

regional leader in the Middle East where it supported United
States' interests. Iran became an exporter

of large amounts

of oil to the United States, and the Shah was leader in OPEC
where the United States badly needed representation.
Second, each

state was ruled

whose regimes were marked

by authoritarian leaders

by corruption, repression, and

continuing lack

of development.

Marcos promised

economic and political reform,

was that little happened
or power sharing for

While both

in terms of wealth

the Shah

a
and

the reality

redistribution

the masses. Systems of corruption

and

patronage prevailed, and were reinforced. Also, both leaders
spent

large amounts of

money on

developing their military
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forces at the expense of domestic expenditure; each made
the short-fall in different ways, but
The rationale for the

up

the economy suffered.

military build-up in the

Philippines

was on counter-insurgency, while the purported focus in Iran
was on outside threats from states like

Iraq. However, both

the Shah and Ferdinand Marcos relied on the military as part
of their power base.

Each state devoted at least 15\ of the

state budget towards military development towards the end of
their regimes at

the expense of social

investments such as

housing and education.
Third,

U.S. perception of

these states

very similar, particularly given a Cold
During
bipolar

the relevant

time period, it

zero-sum situation existed.

ally meant a

War foreign policy.
can be

argued that a

In effect,

gain for the other side, even

A high U.S. priority was

and cultivation of non-communist allies.
more critical in terms of strategic

loss of an

if there was no

official alliance with the u.s.s.R. following
pro-u.s. regime.

is arguably

the fall of a
the maintenance

Later the loss was

and economic interests,

rather than the zero-sum, Cold War calculus. In terms of the
Philippines, the

loss of the

bases would have been

Clark and subic

Bay military

irreplaceable, particularly after the

Soviet Union established naval operations in cam Ranh Bay in
Vietnam. In terms of Iran, the loss of a
ally in

the Middle East that was

introduced

another type

friendly, powerful

also powerful within OPEC

of uncertainty

into

Middle East
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relations, and pushed the United states to more strongly

in

accordance with other anti-Israeli allies.
While

some

similarities
rulers, the

of

between
focus

the

comparability

developing states

of this

study is

differences in U.S. treatment
believed that
with

rests

and

on

the

authoritarian

the similarities

of each regime.

Both

and

states

they participated in a "special relationship"

the United States, while the United States pursued the

most advantageous course according to Cold

War dictates, as

well as strategic and economic interests.

THE RESEARCH METHOD

The analysis

will

first encompasses the

examine two

time in off ice

the point when the crisis began.

time

periods.

of each leader

The
up to

The second encompasses the
\

period of crisis up until the point where the new government
is
will

installed, or diplomatic
be referred

period.
to

the crisis

The reason for examining these two time

periods is

during the

whether

the tenure

Hereafter they

period and

determine

to as

relations end.

something in

tenure period

or the

the

u.s. relationship

crisis period provides

a

better explanation of the eventual outcome.
In the case of Iran, the tenure period begins
restoration of

the Shah to power August,

with the

1953 to the state

visit of President Carter January 1, 1978. The crisis period
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begins with
January

the demonstrations

7, 1978

in

and concludes

departure of the Shah.

the holy

city of

January 16,

Qom,

1979 with

The extended period of

the

unrest prior

to taking the hostages on November 04, 1979, ls also briefly
discussed,
Khomeini

in

order

to

demonstrate

actually mobilized

the

the scope

and

nature

important

in

terms

of
of

the
lost

the

Ayatollah

citizenry, including

The slow realization by

bureaucracy.

that

the

U.S. policy makers of

revolution

may

opportunities

have
for

been
better

relations.
For the Philippines, the tenure period

begins with the

election of Marcos to the presidency on November 9, 1969 and
ends

prior to the Aquino

begins

assassination.

with the assassination

The crisis period

of Benigno

Aquino on August

22, 1983, and ends with the departure of Ferdinand Marcos to
Hawaii on February 24, 1986. Although the crisis time period
is

much longer,

the events are

no less

dramatic than the

year of violence preceding the Shah's departure.
The
doing a

problem in
comparison of

states that

examining
the

the tenure

u.s.

ensures the same

relationship with

perspective will

examine U.S. relations with each state.
the

assumption that each

period involves
the two

be used

to

This analysis makes

state fell within

the same class

from the U.S. perspective: countries that were strategically
as well as symbolically important in the context of the Cold
War, were

led

by authoritarian

regimes

supported by

the

9

States,

United

of

examination
developed

and

the tenure

by

"Revolutions

experienced

dissolution.

period relies

Goldstone,

in

Superpowers."l

The

Jack

and

rapid

on a

an

The

framework

essay

entitled

Goldstone framework

provides a way to look at how foreign aid works as a type of
U.S. intervention into Third World states.
Goldstone

describes

characteristics

the

of

modern

neopatrimonial regimes, including in this category both Iran
the

and

Philippines.

regimes

Neopatrimonial

are

characterized by elite and urban based

support, rather than

the

While

mass support

democratic

of the population.
such

forms

political power

is

group.

are

There

as

four

a power broker among

highly

to

active

parliaments,
a small

elite

new professionals, and

and bureaucratic elites.

chief

and

actually restricted

traditional oligarchs,

this

congresses

they may have

A central

depends

segments:

the military

chief executive acts as

these different groups.

executive

elite

primarily

on

Furthermore,
a system

of

personal patronage and coercion to maintain state authority.
While the state may have legislatures and political parties,
real power is wielded by the central dictator.
However,
these

in acting as

different

dispense resources

groups,

the central
the

valued by the

chief

power broker among
executive

elite groups.

needs

to

These are

1 In Superpowers and Revolutions (Ed) Jonathan Adelman,
(Praeger Publishers) 1986.
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chiefly

money

development
political

(the

aspects

lucrative

project in
prestige

town,

someone's
(becoming

of

locating

for example)

responsible

of such projects, for

example).

ways in

which

a leader's

can be

through

foreign

encourages
gives

aid.

resources
Goldstone

overreliance on

such massive amounts,

asserts

foreign aid;
the need for

and

for

administration

a

the

One of the

augmented
that the

because

ls
U.S.

the U.S.

the executive to

build a non-elite support base is eliminated.
In addition, the U.S. may demand certain quid pro

quos

for their money which antagonize the nationalist feelings of
elite groups.
perception
his

only

Reliance

that the
support

on foreign aid can also lead to the

chief executive is
is

from

the

United States;

legitimacy through overldentificatlon
Finally, if
support at

economic

growth

the same time he

the political

he

loses

with a foreign power.

falters, he
ls unable to

the patronage machine which is his
economic and military aid

vulnerable because

may

lose

donor

provide fuel for

means of support.

can be particularly important

life of these

leaders, and in

Thus
in

the political

aftermath for the United States.
In

using this

first question

is

framework to
whether the

foreign aid to maintain

analyze U.S.
Shah and

policy, the

Marcos relied

on

their regimes. The other aspect

to

this question is whether the opposition perceived this to be
the case, thus affecting their desire

to maintain relations
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on the same terms with the United States once the old regime
had fallen.

Also, did the United States demand onerous quid

pro quos

that antagonized opposition

may have

changed over time, as each

to

exploit its strategic

groups?

If

so, this

regime was better able

and symbolic value

to the United

States.
The final question is
U.S. aid

provided

whether the amount and

allowed these

leaders

responsibility, to such an extent that
legitimacy. When the economic
for both

states, there

type of

to avoid

they destroyed their

downturn occurred, as it

was nothing to

fall back

on.

addition, pressure from new classes, a power shift
group to
regime,

another, or
may

have

dissatisfaction

been

more

fiscal

with the

important

in

did
In

from one
repressive

the

eventual

downfall of each leader, and the new government's opposition
to the United States.
In addition to

this framework, I propose to

also look

at some other factors. These include:
-historical relationship with the United States
-U.S. presence in the country
-the pressure role of religion in politics
-the role of military training provided by U.S.
personnel
These factors may

be important in

states was perceived by the public
each

country.

For

terms of how

the United

and opposition groups in

example, S.A.V.A.K.,

the Shah's secret

12
police, had benefitted from C.I.A. training,
States was

widely blamed by
the

Iranians for its

brutality.

In

Philippines,

resentment

against

surrounded

the U.S. military

agreements

created an extraterritoriality

the

and the United

squalor

there
and

was

creation and
a

lot

prostitution

bases. In

of
that

addition, the base
which was widely

resented by many Filipinos.
The second part of the analysis
the period
look at

of crisis and regime change.

what the U.S. response was

whether the U.S.
old

concerns events during

regime

or

sought to preserve
encouraged

the

It is important to

to regime breakdown and
the status quo

establishment

of the

of the

new

regime. The method of comparison will involve an examination
of the historical record of events, which encompasses visits
made by special envoys,

State Department officials, embassy

reports and Presidential responses.
of statements

made

by those

In addition, the survey

groups

of individuals

assumed power during the regime change is a record
perceptions of the United States and its role in
the departing leader or the new regime.
support may

which

of their
supporting

Such perceptions of

have significantly influenced the future course

of relations.
In order to understand the context in
States began to provide military and
a large-scale basis after World War
historical account

economic assistance on
II, the following brief

describes the perceived

-./

which the United

uses and perils
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of

foreign

aid

discussion

transfers

for

focuses primarily

the

on

United

economic

States.

The

aid, since

the

security nature of military aid, and its role

in containing

counter-insurgency are fairly obvious.

REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN AID

The United States has always had a security orientation
towards

their aid

programs.

While this

military assistance programs, it is not
with economic
allies

with

nominally
supposed

aid.

The United

economic

as

is obvious

as readily apparent

states has

well

as

with

long supported

military

assistance,

for development purposes. Economic assistance was
to

promote

U.S.

security

strong and politically cohesive

because

economically

states were less likely

to

be vulnerable to subversion or external intervention. 2 T h e
concerns about intervention began
war U.S.
1947.
Kingdom's
against

aid began
The aid

with the

proposal

after World War II.

Greek-Turkish aid

was in

response

to

Post

program of
the United

inability to support the Greek government's fight
guerrillas believed

satellite states. 3

to be

Aid was also

supported

given to

by communist

Turkey for

2 Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign
York: Macmillan and Company, 1968), p. 13.

the

Policy (New

3 Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 27.
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same purposes. 4

This aid package

was the

beginning of

a

policy which, in Truman's words, stated his belief that " we
must assist free peoples to work out their own
their own way.
through

I believe

economic and

destinies in

that our help should be primarily

financial aid

which is

essential to

economic stability and orderly political processes. 115
In keeping
authorized

with this belief, the Truman administration

the

second

European Recovery

foreign

major

aid

program,

Program, otherwise known as

the Marshall

Plan. It remains the most successful foreign aid program
history.

$17 billion

dollars was appropriated in

for the European Recovery Act in March of 1948.
billion dollars under
been

achieved. 6

Much

budget, almost all
of

the

Marshall

the

in

Congress

By 1952, $4

of the goals
Plan's

had

success,

however, can be attributed to the fact that economic aid was
being

given

sophisticated

to

states

which

economic systems and

already

possessed

the

the technical expertise

to rebuild them. 7
The need for the Marshall plan, as well as increases in
the foreign aid program, arose

from the failure of post-war

4 David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign
Policy a Documentary Analysis (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 23.
5 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 26.
6 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 34.

7 Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the
States (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 95.
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institutions

such

Reconstruction
Monetary

and

provide the

(ITO),

International
(I BRD),

and

and

the

also

of

since

had
most

already been
Western

Bank

for

International

International
private

capital for rebuilding

Eastern Europe
Union;

the

Development

(IMF),

Fund

Organization

as

investment

war ravaged
dominated

European

Trade

economies.

by the

states

to

Soviet

already

had

communist parties, U.S. policy makers believed

it was vital

that

be

restored

to

and Soviet

hegemony

in

economic

prevent

stability

further

Communist

and

prosperity

gains

Europe. 8 Hans Morgenthau identifies the fifteen weeks in the
spring of 1947 to the armistice of the Korean War as a phase
of

realization and

adaption by

expansionist Soviet Union. 9 The
this response

U.S. policy
Marshall Plan

to the perception that the

makers

to an

was part

of

"political health

in Europe depended on economic medicine." 10
The views of U.S. policy makers
Plan

have been

explored

by Gilbert

regarding the Marshall
Winham

in a

content

analysis of speeches by fourteen key policy makers involved

8 Packenham, Liberal America
33-34.
9 Morgenthau, A
States, p. 84.

lOPackenham,

New

p. 34.

and the

Foreign Policy

Third World,
for

the

p.

United
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in creating and advocating the Marshall Plan. 11 His research
confirms that economic considerations were most important to
these decision makers.

World economic health was

perceived

as of prime importance, and this

could only be done with an

economically

healthy

After

interest was

the

Europe.

most

common theme

this,
to

the national

emerge;

security

considerations in terms of invasion or war with the U.S.S.R.
became

important

Czechoslovakia
considerations

after

the

February

in

rate last as

Communist
of

takeover

in

1948.

Humanitarian

an important

reason to extend

economic assistance.
During his
the rationale
program

inaugural address of
for

with the

his

1949, Truman outlined

enlargement of

Point Four Proposal.

four, Truman discusses the

the

financial

aid

In points three and

arrangements that had been

made

to "provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of
the

free

quarter" 12 ,

countries

to

referring

resist
to

armed

attack

the Rio Pact and

from

any

the soon to be

finalized NATO agreement. This was the beginning of a web of
treaties,

designed

to

thwart

Soviet

aggression

through

11 Gilbert R.
Winham, "Developing Theories of Foreign
Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid" Journal of
Politics, 32(1) (February, 1970) 41-70.

12 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign

60.

Policy, p.

17

physical encirclement. 13

Truman also made explicit

planned

to provide military

nations

which will cooperate with us

peace and

security"14.

goal to create

advice and

equipment to "free

in the maintenance of

Truman also made

a new program

the U.S.

an explicit

to assist the

U.S.

less developed

states, referring to the poverty that existed in much of the
world.

thesis

Truman's

was

that

democracy

could

only

He stated

flourish where people had hope of a better life.
that

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to
stir the peoples of the world into triumphant
action, not only against their human oppressors,
but also against tneir ancient enemies---hunger,
misery, and despair .
The important
linkage

between peace,

The belief that
strong

aspect

reliance

of Truman's

democracy and

the provision of
on

technical

poverty, thereby reducing the
more

distinctly

progressed.

expressed

Point

Four is

economic prosperity.

U.S. foreign aid,
assistance

would

with a
reduce

appeal of communism would
as

The appropriation in

the

his

Truman

1950 for

be

presidency

all foreign aid

13 Besides the Rio Pact and NATO, the United states was
a signatory of ANZUS in 1951, and SEATO, 1954, and also the
reconfiguration of the Baghdad Pact into CENTO, 1959.
14Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign

Policy, p.

15 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign

Policy, p.

61.
62.
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was a modest
$155.6

$34.5 million.16

million

compared

to

although

1953;

budget 17 ,

defense

development

to

cure

Economic development

problems.
economic

the

on

reliance

by

The amount was increased

prevention

as

an

this
it

was

does

antidote

negligible
indicate

potential

would provide
for

to

a

political
an ounce of

the

appeal

of

communism.
In the
as a

1950s, aid to underdeveloped

Truman's Secretary of

security measure.

Acheson, in

a report

Relations in
orientation of

1950,

nations continued

to

the Senate

made even

more

foreign aid. Acheson

State, Dean

Committee on
explicit the

Foreign
security

specifically links the

economic security of the Third World and U.S. security.
Increasing numbers of people no longer accept
poverty as an inevitable fact of life. They are
becoming aware of the gap between their living
standards and those in the more highly developed
countries.
They are looking for a way out of
their misery. They are not concerned with abstract
ideas of
democracy or communism.
They are
interested
in practical
solutions to
their
problems in terms of food, shelter, and a decent
livelihood.
When the Communists offer quick and
easy remedies for all their ills, they make a
strong appeal to these people. 18

16 Thomas A. Bailey,
American People (New York:
805.
17 Thomas

A. Bailey,
American People, p. 805.
64.

A Diplomatic History of the
Apple-Century-Crofts, 1964), p.
A

Diplomatic

History

11 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign

of

the

Policy, p.
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He continues on that the appropriations for foreign aid
"in

foreign aid
much

of

sense .•• a

real

very

a

security

amounts were not

the aid

to

measure"u.

large compared to

Southeastern Asia

and

are
While

the 1960s,

Latin America

continued to be justified in this fashion.
Essentially,
differ

in

its

accomplish,
military

Eisenhower

perception

of

Instead of

every one

a

administration
economic

what

however, it reversed

aid.

dollars to

the

the ratio

ratio

military

aid

could

of economic to

of four

aid dollar,

didn't

economic

aid

the amount

of

military aid was on average twice the amount of economic aid
for the

remainder of the

of 1951 created and
Cooperation
Program

Mutual Defense

military

Assistance

as well

was created

The

agencies provided mutual security
as

countries".21

Administration

Technical

Economic Cooperation Administration.

activities of these three

"friendly

Security Act

governed three agencies: the

Administration, the

and the

by ensuring

decade 28 . The Mutual

economic advancement
The

in

constituted

seventy

percent was

defense support.22

Foreign

1953; direct

percent of

the
The

to

Operations
military

budget, while
idea was

19 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign

aid

twenty

to create

a

Policy, p.

64.
28 Packenham, Liberal America,

p.49.

21 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 50.
22 w.w. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 91.
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periphery beyond which the Soviet Union
venture, as

it did

communism would not

War. 23

in the Korean

two years later, and responsibility was

It

was abolished

subsumed within the

State Department.24
With

the

Kennedy

significant changes

administration,

the fundamental
The goal
for

each

legislation which

country

that

commodity assistance.26

a coordinated program

technical,

Countries

their entire social structure and

order to

enable

growth. 27

reach the

It was

interests to

increase

absorbed

internal political

in

the pace

likely to look for external
to

fall

prey

to

in

and

way of life, in

"take-off" into
the

of

capital

needed to modernize in

terms of

them to

Act as

programs. 25

governed aid

involved

A

The Foreign

1961 replaced the Mutual Security

was to make assistance into

sustaining

of

occurred in the foreign aid program.

much greater emphasis was put on economic aid.
Assistance Act of

number

a

United

self-

States best

development. A

development would

nation
be less

scapegoats, and was less likely

internal

subversion

or

external

23 Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid, p. 91.
24 R.D. Mckinlay and A. Mughan, Aid and Arms in the
Third World ( New York: st. Martin's Press, 1984), p.34.
25 Packenham, Liberal America,

p.60.

26 Packenham, Liberal America,

p.62.

27 Packenham, Liberal America, p.62.
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intervention. 28

Also,

growing wealth

offered

a

greater

opportunity for trade and investment.2 9

During Johnson's Presidency, the priorities
program

differed

in

administration, AID

two

Like

aspects.

pursued the same

of the aid
the

Kennedy

goals: self-help, the

coordination of aid programs

within a state to receive

the

maximum

for

and

benefit, incentives

private

rather than grants. 30 However,

loans
use the

withdrawal of

aid

as a

investment,

Johnson was willing to

stick to

threaten

those

states which pursued policies counter to U.S. interests. 31
The second difference was in Congress' growing interest
in

political

amendment

to

specifically
such

as labor

development

issues.

Foreign

the

charged AID

Assistance

unions, community

Title

Act,

IX

Congress

organizations

action groups,

involving them in

and other
development

It was an attempt to use aid to build "democratic

institutions,"
influence

the

with strengthening

voluntary organizations, and
projects.

With

or in

other words,

internal politics

redistribution and

democratic

in

to use

terms of

foreign aid
promoting

development.32

to

power

However,

it

28 Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 13.
29 Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, p.13.
JO Packenham, Liberal America,

p. 86.

31 Packenham, Liberal America,

p. 89.

32 Packenham, Liberal

Ameri~a 1

p.100.
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had very little effect on actual AID policy. 33
The
United

Nixon/Kissinger years
States from foreign

emphasized disengaging

entanglements, in

relinquish the roles which were perceived
U.S.

interests.

ideological,

The

approach

and stressed

other states.

an effort to

as detrimental to

pragmatic

the need

Economic aid

to share

instead

Military aid

of

burdens with

was increasingly given

multilateral institutions.34
support and reward

was

the

through

was used

as

a

for allies, as in the case of Iran where

the Shah was given a carte blanche for arms purchases.
Economic aid from AID

had been increasingly given

to

Vietnam in support of displaced peasants and general support
of

military

negotiated

strategy.
its

affected the
support in

This

withdrawal

AID program.
the

name of

continued

from Vietnam,
As

until
but

the

it severely

AID funds were used

development,

U.S.

for war

a "credibility

the Foreign Assistance

Act was

gap"

emerged.

In 1973,

passed

into law.

AID as an agency remained intact; however, it was

severely restricted by Congress, which required two detailed
budgets

per

year

and

exercised

33 Packenham, Liberal America,

a

line-item

veto

over

p. 107.

34 James Howe and Robert Hunter, United States Aid
Performance and Development Policy" in Aid Performance and
Development in Western Countries: Studies in U.S., U.K.,
E.E.C. and Dutch Programs,
(Ed.) Bruce Dinwald, (New York:
Praeger, 1973) p60.
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expend! tures. 35
The

Foreign

strategy,

at

the expense

involved

a

that AID

money

Act mandated

of

was

effort.

increasingly given

oversight, allowing them
wished. 36

they

a

developmental

state-wide planning

without any
whatever

Assistance

However,

basic

programs that

Eberstadt charges
to

local

to use the

at

needs

the same

leaders
money for

time,

the

amount of aid money given bilaterally had already started to
decrease.

There

was a realization,

achieved several of its goals, such
takeover,

promoting democracy,

that U.S. aid

as preventing communist

decreasing the gap between

the less developed countries (LDCs) and the First
buying influence

over the

had not

long term. 37

Instead,

World, or
economic

development had created even greater discontent as societies
mobilized with
concomitant

better

economic

health and

more

improvement

for

education, but

no

the

of

majority

individuals.
After
states relied

the

1973

oil

price

increasingly on private

increases,

developing

commercial banks

to

l5Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1988), pp. 34-36.
36 Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose
(Washington, o.c.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1988), pp. 38.
37 James Howe and Robert Hunter, 'United States Aid
Performance and Development Policy" in Aid Performance and
Development in Western Countries Studies in the U.S., U.K.,
E.E.C. and Dutch Programs edited by Bruce Dinwiddy (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 65-66.
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provide

loans

to

cover

prices. 31

It

economic

assistance

was

deficits

also in

development aid.39

by

generated

response
other

to

a

oil

contraction

governments

The perception of

by high

in

terms

U.S. banks and

in
of

other

investors was that governments were a good loan risk because
it

was

impossible for

them

to default

on

loans

in the

accepted sense. States like the Philippines started took the
initial steps towards a spiralling problem of borrowing more
to finance larger debts, which would need to be
more

borrowing.

The world

growth as

developed

economies

of less

second oil shock
years

of world

recession slowed

states imported
developed

of 1979, the

less,

states. By

the

financed by
down economic

effecting

the

time of

the

world had sustained

economic recession.

States

reliant on foreign loans, despite the

several

were extremely

reality of increasing

interest payments, and extremely large debt amounts.ti
When

the debt

assisted in two ways.

crisis became
First,

apparent 1982,

the U.S.

the Federal Reserve put a lot

31 Catherine Gwin,
"The I.H.F. and the World Bank:
Measures to Improve the System"
in Uncertain Future:
Commercial Banks and the Third World, edited by Richard
Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick: overseas
Development Council, 1984), p. 112.
"Gwin, "The !.H.F. and the World Bank: Measures to
Improve the System" in Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks
and the Third World, p. 89.
40 Benjamin J. Cohen, "High Finance, High Politics" in
Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World,
edited by Richard Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab
(New
Brunswick: overseas Development Council, 1984), p. 112.
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of

pressure on

finance

the

U.S. lenders to

already

large

governments were subject
the

debt.

At

to austerity

Initially

lenders.

keep lending,

grateful

in order to

the

same

time,

measures imposed
for

short

term

by
loan

assistance, Latin American states in particular increasingly
viewed

austerity

development,

measures

as

the

cause

increased unemployment,

of

"retarded

and declining

living

standards" as well as increased political instability. 41
The other

change was

finance these debts
United States
demands for

as a

front.

amount

of

Special

loans to

U.S.

bilateral

Drawing

on the IMF to
Rights

In February of 1983, SDRs went from 61
The IMF, being a

impose

austerity

The

were increasingly met

The U.S. put strong pressure

to 90 billion.
could

IMF

amounts of

through the IMF.

domestic economic reform

the

available 42 .

were to be made

used the

with hostility.
increase

that large

moneys
billion

multilateral institution,

measures

the

without

political

backlash and charges of interventionism that would be hurled
at the

United

States by

political

opposition groups

governments within the recipient states.
"Any

effort

to

impose

unpopular

and

Cohen states that

policy

conditions

on

troubled debtors would undoubtedly have fanned the flames of

41 cohen, "High Politics, High Finance", p. 116.
42 Special
to lenders on
their limit of
continuing need

Drawing Rights or SDRs are moneys available
a short-term basis when they have reached
IMF funds available to them, but have a
for money.
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nationalism, if not revolution, in many countries."43

ECONOMIC POLITICS/POLITICAL REALITIES

The transfer

of

large

amounts of

foreign

aid

from

richer to poorer nations, is a relatively recent phenomenon.
After

World

War

decolonization

II

approach

widespread

the

and

rapid

of much of the world, it became evident that

newborn states would
either quickly

and

not be able to

attain economic growth

or easily. In the 1950s

the problem of

speeding up

economists began to
economic development,

and the ways and means to accomplishing this end.
Walt Rostow was

the first to create an economic theory

of development, one in which foreign aid occupied a specific
function
important

in developing
judgements

about

"underdeveloped" constituted in
as

whole. U

a

These

He

economies.

what

made

a number

"developed"

terms of the world

judgements

inf or med

of
and

economy

the

debates

surrounding both political and economic relationships to the
Third World. He

created a yardstick

by which to

measure a

state's position and progress. Governments in both donor and
recipient states would

need to intervene

to insure a

more

rapid economic growth.
43cohen, "High Politics, High Finance", p.119.

H

Roger
c. Riddell,
Foreign
Aid
Reconsidered
(Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) p.
87.
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Rostow identified
reached

an "era

going through a

developed states as those

of high

mass consumption,"

process of "take-off" into

which had

achieved

by

self-sustaining

growth.

Certain social and economic conditions needed to be

created

for

"take-off"

to

occur.

significant increase in the rate of
one of the
rate;

manufacturing sectors

third, there

must be

First,

there

must

a

net investment; second,
must have

a high

an "institutionally

environment to ensure that the impulses

growth

favorable

derived from growth

are transmitted throughout the economy."45
Underdeveloped countries

could reach

the "take-off"

phase more quickly by infusions of two types of foreign aid:
capital in terms
consumer

equipment

goods allowing them

resources to
course,

of

they

knowledge and

development
would

and supplies, and
to direct

and away

also require

skills.

from

more of

their own

consumption.

transfers

Rostow and

food and

fellow

of

Of

technical

economist

Max

Milliken estimated in 1957 that states should only need this
type
offer

of support

from ten to

no rationale

for the

fifteen years
choice of

(although they

this time

period).

Rostow's work was attractive to policy makers because it fit
so well within
the

the short-term time

Marshall Plan.

The aim was

frame of programs

like

to give a hand up, but not

45 The discussion that concludes this section relies on
that of Roger Riddell in his book Foreign Aid Reconsidered,
pp. 88-92. It is the concise and yet comprehensive for those
concerned with the economic theory behind foreign aid
allocations.
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to become a substitute for autonomous economic growth.
Hollis Chenery and Alan
theorists

to

theory.

They outlined

accelerate

make

a

Strout were the next

significant
precisely

growth in the

impact

on

how aid

economic

development

would

work to

underdeveloped economies

.

They

specified five preconditions for the creation of a developed
economy:
of

"an increase in human

investment and saving,

technology,

changes

in

skills, a rise in the level

the adoption
the

of more productive

composition

of

output

and

employment, and the development of new institutions."
However, in trying to achieve all these preconditions,
states will
skills

face "bottlenecks;" specifically,

and organizational ability, constraints on achieving

required levels of domestic
inadequate
These

shortages of

supplies of

imported commodities

are characterized by

resources:

saving and limits arising

two different

investment-limited

growth,

from

and services.

gaps in domestic
where

skills

and

savings are in short supply; and trade-limited growth, where
foreign exchange is in short supply, because export earnings
are

lower than

import needs.

Foreign

these bottlenecks by supplementing

aid can

help ease

capital and savings,

or

import needs, or both.
It should be noted from the preceding
term "development"

outline that the

took on a very specific meaning in these

theories. It involved market economies with governments that
made

rational

economic

interventions

based

on

adequate

29

information
Keynesian

about

the

state's

economy.

theory and practice,

advocating socialist economics,

important role to states in
However, they ignored
in terms

of

politics,

the

and

recession.

with

While

these theories give an

managing their own economies.

the nature of Third World governments

patrimonial orientation

the

line

governments would intervene

to alleviate problems of unemployment and
not

In

effect

of

donor

of

and

Third

World

recipient

aid

bureaucracies in the allocation of capital and technology.

AID AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Chenery
which

and Strout

reference

considerable
premise:

still provide

is

made,

debate and

that foreign

aid, given

for

aid,

production

he

resulting

work

there

has

around their

also

be put into

of

a

country. 47

can

was taken

out

increased

that

increases

capital

consumption.

would

in
not

More available
Ultimately,

principal factor of development was not aid per se,
citizens

basic

While he emphasized a positive

pointed

from

been

certain conditions,

necessarily lead to an increase in savings.
cash could also

theory to

A more cautious approach

by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1961.
role

although

further

speed up development. 46

the core

Rosenstein-Rodan

4'Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, p. 92.
41 Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered p. 91.

the

but the
advocated

30

organizational
savings as

change along

with demonstrated

He believed that

a criteria for aid donations.

recipient states needed to
administrative

and

adequately cope

increase in

demonstrate an overall level

developmental organization

with aid disbursements

in a

that

of

could

macroeconomic

perspective.48
However, Third World governments
with the macroeconomic

do not use aid

picture in mind.

Aid

funds

can represent

many goods for Third World bureaucrats and politicians.
macroeconomic view of
data,

recipients is affected

uncertainties regarding the

commodities

for

export,

The major

by a lack

of

prices and quantities of

and political

uncertainty

of violent I unpredictable

d'etat, or other types

The

function of aid is perceived

(coup

change).

to be the reduction

of these uncertainties. 49
In addition,
the public

sector

the bureaucratic
budget

may be

structure is
dispersed

boards or other local authorities controlled
government

which

may

be

unable

to

by

such that
statutory

by the central

challenge them.

For

example, aid may be dispersed by farm boards or loan boards,
which

become

autonomous

interest group. 58

Mosley

and represent
writes that

a

single powerful

"in most

developing

48Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, p. 92.
49 Paul
(Lexington:

Mosley, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform
The University Press of Kentucky, 1987) p. 89.

50Mosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p. 90.
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countries a

high

expenditures are
are

not

proportion, often

over

half, of

incurred by autonomous agencies

included within

the central

public

and hence

government budget 11 • 51

In other words, the process gets coopted by powerful elites.
This is

in

direct

conflict with

Goldstone's

picture

of

foreign aid and its uses and its uses by a dictator who

has

become the conduit for foreign aid rewards.
More
the

significant from

non-centralized

may not

department of

know what money the other

perspective is

within

decision-making

The treasury

government.

a macroeconomic

the

central

a recipient state

ministries have spent or

what aid contracts have been entered into for over a

year. 52

Mosley claims that over fifty percent of recipient states do
not

have

a

central

disbursements. 53

There

agency
is

to

also

monitor aid
a

vertical

which occurs; several ministries may have
an aid

project before it will

repetitive

and

fragmentation

to "sign-off"

be approved.

budgeting--aid amounts

inflows

on

This leads to

are recorded

in several

different budgets. 54
From

a political

power perspective, the

receiving states are primarily
much aid

as

possible,

ministers of

concerned with receiving

provided there

are

not

too

as
many

51 Mosely, Foreign Aid Its Defense and Reform, p.91.
52 Mosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p. 91.

53 Mosely, Foreign Aid.i Its Defense and Reform, p.91.
54 Mosely, Foreign Aid.i Its Defense and Reform, p.91.
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strings attached

which constrain

their freedom

Politicians have

an interest in so far

of action.

as it affects their

sector or region.

"How the money is spent may be critically

affected by where

the power lies,"

politician seeks
determines the

to

reward. 55

selection

of

enjoy showy projects because
committed to modernizing

constituents

want,

Political

postpone

individual

patronage

beneficiaries. 56

often

They

also

it demonstrates that they

the country.

recipients. 57

both donor and

and who the

This holds

Aid can
price

are

true for

pay for services that
increases

and

loosen

crippling foreign exchange constraints.SI
Furthermore, civil
provides,

such as access

the office, etc. 5'
want as

servants enjoy the
to vehicles,

Like any bureaucracy,

much aid as

they can get

perks that aid

air conditioning in
different agencies

so they can

become more

important.
The

important

bureaucratic
twofold.

aspect

this

of

and internal politics

First,

used in the ways

it shows that
in which it is

description

in recipient

foreign aid

states is

is not always

intended at the outset

55Desmond McNeill, The Contradictions of
(London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981) p. 91.

of

by

Foreign Aid

56 McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 68.
57McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 55.
SIMosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p.93.
5'Mcneill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 56.
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donor states.

There seems to be little evidence

bureaucracies

allocate aid

stated

intention

bureaucracies or
opposite would
urged

different.

empowering

enriching

states

elite

of

wealth.

Those

who

projects have

power.

to

the

recipient

In

fact,

the

donor states have long

However,

inequalities
the

money

They use that

monies with

groups.

address

have

and

entrenched

seem to be the goal;

recipient

distribution

of

projects

that donor

or

effect

in

the

is

control

much

over

aid

power to further their

own interests, which frequently means staying

in off ice and

maintaining the status quo.
The second point involves

leverage.

Despite the

fact

that the United States or other bilateral donors may control
the purse strings, recipient states do not passively receive
money and let

themselves be told what to do.

The previous

discussion of bureaucratic politics above mitigates the view
that bilateral aid gives a donor state unlimited leverage in
the affairs of the recipient state.
Iran

and the

bargaining

for

Philippines, however,
as

much

economic

In terms of states like
each leader
and

played at

military

possible, and gradually emphasized their assets

aid

as

in order to

achieve greater leverage.
It will become evident, however, that both the Shah and
Marcos

centralized

power

around

themselves

to

a

large

degree, but their regimes were debilitated by corruption. In
the

sections analyzing the tenure periods in each state, it

34

will

become evident

Iran relied on
ennable

that the

foreign aid on

Philippines, much

more than

a long-term basis.

This did

the United States to assert

more leverage, but not

enough to make Marcos reform his corrupt government.

CHAPTER II

THE MARCOS TENURE PERIOD

This chapter outlines Philippine-u.s. relations prior to the
Marcos presidency.
understand the
Marcos

came

The

purpose

context of
to

demonstrate that

power.

help

the

reader

Philippine-u.s. relations
In

addition,

the

when

history

will

the use of economic aid to keep Philippine

presidents who favored the
with

is to

the Marcos regime.

U.S. in power did
The U.S.

not originate

forced many concessions

from the Philippines that were important to its own security
interests and business interests. What existed
Marcos regime

constituted

a pattern

of

prior to the

U.S. support

for

Philippine presidents; foreign aid was used as a reward, and
withholding

promised

aid

was

used

as

a

threat

and

punishment.

EARLY U.S./ PHILIPPINE HISTORY

The

history of

U.S.

involvement in

the

Philippines

begins with Admiral Dewey's defeat of the Spanish in
Bay on

Hay 1, 1698.

There was an

Manila

indigenous revolutionary

group, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, which had fought the Spanish
and was prepared to create a sovereign government.

However,

36
the United
and

was

states sought
awarded

December,

colonization of

ownership

1898. '8

Soon

Philippine Republic,
Philippine forces.

by

the

after

fighting

the Philippines,

Treaty

Aguinaldo

broke out

of

Paris

declared

the

between U.S.

There followed a bloody two year

in

and

war to

suppress the revolutionary forces led by Aguinaldo, in which
atrocities
capture

were

committed

by

parties. 61

both

After

his

on March 23, 1901, the United States proceeded with

a relatively benevolent and short-lived colonization.
In 1902,
Thomasites

more

because

than
they

400 school
arrived

teachers

on

(known

the steamer

presaged a long process of education and public

as

Thomas)

health work

intertwined with a conscious effort to prepare Filipinos for
self-rule; the goal was to

backward people. 62

help the supposedly
government

was

introduce democracy to Asia

the

United

republic and separation

colonization gained ground in

The model for proper

States,

of powers.

and

with

its

democratic

However, opposition

the United States, which

always a philosophically reluctant colonizer.
Philippine Commonwealth was established

to
was

In 1935, the

as a result of

the

60 Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen R. Shalom, The
Philippines Reader (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 6.
61 A.
James Gregor,
Crisis
(Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public
page 3.
62 Frank
H.
Filipino Views of
Ltd.,1986), p. 20.

in the
Philippines
Policy Center, 1984)

Denton
and Victoria
Villena-Denton,
America (Washington,D.C.: Asia Fellows
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Tydings-Mcduffie
would occur

Act,

in 1946.

which determined
In the

that

independence

meantime, the Philippines was

prepared for democracy, with a

governmental system modelled

on the United States.
World War
when the

II intervened in

Japanese attacked Clark Air Base

as the attack
U.S.

the decolonization process

on Pearl Harbor.

forces

in

the

The

Japanese.
republic,

and

Japanese 63
Hukbalahap

Philippines

Japanese

This

period

resistance

By May

of 1942, the

last

had

surrendered to

the

established

many elite

at the same time

a puppet

Filipinos collaborated
also

created

movement,

the

the

1950s.

was

split between collaboration

punishment of
because

so

collaborated,

the war for

later

or

had

in

the

labeled

independence era, the elite

the

family

of

intervention in

and resistance.

collaborators never amounted to
many people

with the

core

which was

communist and was one of the targets of CIA
As in

Philippine

post

members

Post war

much, simply

war government

had

who

so.

had

done

Rigorous prosecution would have severely depleted the number
of available and qualified politicians. 64
General

Douglas MacArthur

returned

to liberate

the

63 For a brief outline of elite collaboration and Huk
resistance, see Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and the
Philippines (Philadelphia: Institute for the study of Human
Issues,1981), p.1-3.
64 David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in
World War II,
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1967) as
reproduced in Shirmer, The Philippines Reader, p.79.
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Philippines

on

October

devastated by the battle to
was

second only

estimated one
against the

to

Japanese.

in terms

died while

"

The

Philippines

was

defeat the Japanese, and Manila

Warsaw

million

with confidence

1944.

20,

war damage. 65 An

of

fighting

The Philippines

with the
looked

U.S.

forward

to American aid with the task of rebuilding

their country.

RECONSTRUCTION AND INDEPENDENCE

The Philippines achieved independence on July

4, 1946.

However, the transition from commonwealth to sovereign state
was

by

marked

The

disappointment.
U.S.

economic

profound

aid

Filipino

cause concerned
given for

frustration
the small

purposes

of

and

amount of

reconstruction

versus Filipino expectations, and the conditions attached to
receiving it.

The

Rehabilitation Act which authorized

the

aid was signed by President Truman of April 30, 1946.
The legislation resulting
by the U.S.

from the hearings

House Committee on Insular

Affairs resulted in

$120 million to the Philippine government for the
roads, port and harbor facilities and

conducted

repair of

other public property

65Robert Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 11.
66 Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 11.
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and

$100

million worth

of

property. 67

surplus U.S.

remainder of the funds provided was

provided to individuals

for the restoration of private property. 61
million was

paid

to private

to

reconstruction

the
would

Ultimately, $400

individuals and

The reasoning behind the relatively small
transferred

The

Philippines

was

create investment

businesses."

amount of payment
the

belief

opportunities

that
for

private U.S. capita1 78 •
Towards this

end, passage

of the

Rehabilitation Act

was contingent on acceptance by the Philippine government of
the Bell Trade Agreement.

Briefly, the trade agreement tied

the Philippine economy to the United

States by establishing

a system of preferential tariffs and amending the Philippine
Constitution to allow up to 100% ownership by U.S.
utilities

and

resources. 11
"parity
quotas of

investment

in

exploitation

This preferential treatment is

clause." 12
certain

oil, rice, cigars,

As well,

the

raw materials

firms of

of

referred to as

agreement

provided for

(sugar, cordage,

etc.) that could

natural

be sold to

61

Stephen R. Shalom, The United States
Philippines (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1981), p. 35.

coconut

the United
and

the

61 shalom, The United States and the Philippines, p.36.

69 shalom, The us and The Philippines, p. 36.
70 shalom,

The United

States and

the Philippines,

39.
11 schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p. 87.

12 schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p.87.

p.
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without

States

duty

until

1954.73

After

that

time,

increasingly larger percentages of the allowable quota would
be

subject

to

duty. 74

it

AlsD,

allowed

unlimited

importation of U.S. goods duty free into the Philippines for
eight

years, followed

by only

partial tariffs

for twenty

years. 75
The State Department opposed trade preferences, arguing
that

the United states

markets, and
without

didn't need them

would benefit

discriminatory trade

other hand,

responded to

tariffs and quotas
Philippines,

more from

to protect U.S.

the effect

a world

barriers. 76
special

was to

to secure foreign
wide system

Congress, on the

interests, and
industries. 77

reestablish the

sought
For

the

sugar and

other agricultural industries that comprised the elite power
structure of Filipino society

and political life, and

both

governments acknowledged that preferences would re-establish

1lsummary of the Bell Trade Act, from Treaties of the
and Other International Agreements of the United States of
America, 1776-1949 by Charles I. Bevans, compiler,
(Dept.
of state publication 8728, washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974, vol 11) p7-18;
as reproduced by
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p 88.
74As reproduced by Schirmer, The Philippines

Reader, p

88.

75 William Chapman, Inside the Philippine
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 38.
76 shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 38.
77shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 40.
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41

the pre-war status
the

quo. 11

What is

degree of intervention

economy
fact

this allowed

that

the

significant, however, is

and presence

to United

arrangement

in the Philippine

States investors,

was

the

necessary

and the
price

of

independence.
The

other

important

piece of

legislation involved military
aid.

Filipinos

have

post-war

independence

base agreements and

strongly

resented

the

military

bases as

an

infringement on Filipino sovereignty and their existence has
created ongoing tension in the U.S.-Philippine relationship.
Essentially

the Roxas government

states, leasing sixteen bases

acquiesced to

the United

including Clark Air Base

Subic Naval Base for a period of ninety-nine years
to get

U.S. military

authority over

any

aid. 79

U.S. military

crime committed

on

in order

commanders had

the bases

between Filipino citizens), and any crime

and

(except

committed off the

bases between members of the U.S. armed forces or during the
act of

performing a military duty.

extraterritoriality

was the

allies in Western Europe

same

While the condition of
as that

governing

(where U.S. forces were

NATO

present),

the base agreement also prohibited the Philippine government
from

granting any

other state access

to the

bases or any

71 shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 44-45.
19 chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p.40.
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other

base

rights

United States was

U. s.

without

consent. BO As

given the right to

well,

the

recruit Filipinos for

U.S. military service.11
Military aid was viewed in 1947, with the first

of the

base agreements, as partial payment for base rights, by both
the

U.S.

benef itted

and

Philippine
the

because

governments. 12
aid

was

The

Philippines

primarily

intended

strengthen internal security; this orientation
creation of the Joint United States
(JUSMAG).
assistance

Besides

provision

fostered the

Military Advisory Group

of

with planning, JUSHAG

to

military

training

and

was specifically designed

to occupy the field of military planning to the exclusion of
all other states, and

to support the political

orientation

of the Philippines toward the United States. 13 Yet
acknowledgement that
the

bases

didn't

military aid
lessen

the

was partial

fact

of

the

the tacit
payment for

overwhelming

'°"Military Bases: Agreement Between the United States
and the Republic of the Philippines, March 14, 1947," in A
Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic documents, 19411949, printed as Sen. doc. 123, 8lst Congress, 1st sess.,
1950, pp. 869-81, as reproduced by Shalom, The US and the
Philippines, p. 62.
11 shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 62.
12 shalom The

us

and the Philippines, p. 64.

13 Adjutant General, War Department, to Commander-inChief, AFPAC, 9 October, 1946, p.2, enclosure 6 to U.S.
Military mission to the Philippines, History of United
States Military
Advisory
Group to
Republic of
the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1 July 1946 to 30
June, 1947,
unpublished, available at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., as
cited in Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 66.
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military

presence of

another country, even

if it

was the

U.S.

THE HUKBALAHAPS, U.S. INTERVENTION, GROWING NATIONALISM

The
amount

years following
of CIA

independence

intervention into

The suppression of the

saw a

Filipino

considerable

political life.

Hukbalahaps (a.k.a. Huks) from

1946

through the Magsaysay presidency, who were viewed by the CIA
as being communist

insurgents, is one

instances

intervention.

of this

of the most

In addition,

States attempted to control the selection
Presidential
of buying

visible

the United

of candidates for

off ice through the traditional Filipino method

political

Since

loyalty.

corrupt, it was really a matter

all candidates

were

of which one would prove to

be the strongest U.S. supporter.
Ramon

Magsaysay,

first

as

defense

president Quirino, and then as President,
defeating the Huks.
Lansdale, a
ordered

In reality,

CIA station

to

chief in

involved
Off ice,

in

as

which

Group (JUSHAG). 84

coordinating

the

us

an

he was

advisor

on

with the joint

U.S.

Lansdale was

Philippine

sponsored propaganda

84 shalom, The

by Edward

the Philippines;

counterinsurgency techniques nominally
Military Advisory

under

was credited with

he was advised

Philippines

the

minister

Civil

campaigns

actively
Affairs

against the

and the Philippines p. 79-79.
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Huks. 85

He and Magsaysay

were responsible for coordinating

the campaign against the Huks, and shared a room together at
JUSMAG

headquarters. 86

helping
him

Lansdale

Magsaysay to attain

both

in

New

instrumental in

the presidency;

to foreign correspondents

honored

was also

York

he introduced

and arranged
city

and

for him

to be

Washington,

o.c.87

Lansdale arranged for $500,000 in clandestine campaign funds
to

be

funneled

frequently

into

charged

the
that

campaign coffers.88
the

United

Magsaysay

States

had

lost

confidence in Quirino, and that U.S. aid would be cut off if
Quirino was re-elected.89
The Huks

had

not worked

coordinated

by

the

occupation.

Instead,

United

with
States

they had

the resistance
during

the

been labelled

forces
Japanese

a communist

organization, because their military leaders were communist.
Most of

the rank

and file

were not. 96

When

the war

over, a concerted effort was

made to hunt them down

insistence of

feared agrarian reform. 91

the

Huks,

landlords who
the

struggle

against

the

85 Shalom, The US and the PhiliQQines, p.

was

at the

Japanese
78.

86 Shalom , The US and the Philippines p. 77.
87 shalom The US and the PhiliQQines, p. 88.
88 shalom The us and the PhiliQQines, p.88.
89 shalom The US and the PhiliQQines p. 89.
96 Chapman, Inside the PhiliQQine Revolution, p. 58.
91 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 61.

For
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45
landlords

collaborationist

was

directed

now

against

exploitative landlords. 92 The Philippines was experiencing
new

type of

agriculture, which

was profit

a

oriented. This

meant that instead of the old paternalism, peasants received
a

smaller

part

obligations
haciendero

of

that

the

harvest,

without the
the

characterized

system. 93

The rebellion

pre

Magsaysay's

since early in
modest

War

II

by a revitalized

by Magsaysay, fatigue on

the Hukbalahaps fighting
because

World

sputtered and died from

a combination of effective military action
Filipino military led

reciprocal

the part of

World War II,

reforms

what

were

and
most

conservative peasants wanted. 94
Philippine land tenure
system,

reflecting 400

oligarchy

owned large

patterns follow the

years of

Spanish

plantations as

haciendero

colonization. An

the source

wealth and formed the core families of the elite.
provided

the money

to bribe

political

candidates,

discovered

methods

of

and

or

buy the

elected

preventing

of their
Oligarchs

constituents for
officials

stringent

land

always
reform

legislation. JUSMAG and CIA assistance in suppression of the
Huks essentially ended any chance of power redistribution or
alteration of the post-war

status quo, because land

tenure

92Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 64.
93 Peter Bacho,
"Rural Revolt in the Philippines:
Threats to Stability?" in Journal of International Affairs
Winter/Spring 1987, Vol. 40, no. 2, p. 261.

' 4 "Rural Revolt in the Philippines," p. 261.
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patterns and the control of wealth remained static.
The evolution

of

CIA

involvement in

the

choice

of

electoral candidates in the post-independence period stemmed
from

several

rebellion
bastion

pressures.

The

itself. Second,
of

democracy

authoritarian
Republic

of

the
in

(Republic

first

an

Third,

Philippines as a showcase for

from

Philippines was
Asia

of China)

China) . 95

came

or

that

the

a valuable
was

political
income

regimes."

life,

concern

for

keeping

distribution,

with
was

the

democracy led to concern over

The

coupled

either

communist (People's

the incredible corruption of the both the Roxas and
presidential

Huk

amount
the

of

corruption

extreme

recognized

Quirino
in

inequities of

as

a

worrisome

combination.
In addition to these problems, according to Daniel Bell
(the

State Department's

who led

a

leading expert on the

special mission

in June 1950),

facing financial collapse. 97
economic
to

the state

was

receive additional

assistance, however, the Quirino government agreed

reforms recommended

increase in
exchange,

In order to

Philippines

by the

tax receipts,

a

the enactment of a

Bell Mission,
tax on

the sale

including an
of

foreign

minimum wage law, land reform

95Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 13.

"

Gabriel Kolko, Confronting
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 63.

the Third

97 shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 82.

World (New
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and improving and
U.S.

makers

policy

advisors,

because

otherwise. 99

administration. 98

reorganizing the public
pressured

Quirino

they believed

The $250

million

Truman administration to get

accept

to

it would

U.S.

be "dissipated"

package was

bribe

by the

Quirino to pursue reforms

and

accept U.S. advice and supervision.10 8
United
the thought

States policy makers

in 1951

of

in

Quirino

winning

considered an opportunist of
couldn't

be

determined

Washington, Vincente

Madrigal's war

damage

1953,

since

the first order whose

with

any

Quirino's offer to withdraw in favor
to

were dismayed at

Madrigal,
claim would

degree of

he

was

loyalty

certainty.101

of Filipino ambassador
on the
be

condition

paid off,

that

"further

estranged" U.S. policy makers.102
Magsaysay
Minister

was

originally

in Quirino's

ambassador Myron

appointed

cabinet, at

M. Cowen. 183

as

the

the urging

His speeches

Defense

of American

were written by

the CIA10 4 , which also played some dirty tricks on Quirino's
" Shalom The US and the
from the Bell
Report,
pp.
95,101,105.
"shalom, The

us

Philippines, p.
83, quoting
1 (quote),
3-5,
59,
81,

and the Philippines p. 83.

108 Shalom, The US and the Philippines
101 Shalom The

us

and the Philippines, p. 87.

102 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 87.
183 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 76.
104 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 76.
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campaign such

as

doping

the drinks

of

Quirino's

speech

makers. 105 Magsaysay's death on March 17, 1957 was a blow for
U.S. policy makers since no candidate was ever as completely
devoted to U.S. interests or as manipulable.
One of Magsaysay's important achievements during office
from

the U.S. perspective

involved the

Laurel-Langley agreement,
on September 6, 1955.

negotiation of the

which replaced the Bell Trade Act

The new agreement extended

parity to

other industries besides raw materials and utilities, giving
U.S.

investors

economy. 106

In

opposition,

a

much

order

parity was

entrepreneurs,

better
to

path

placate

the

scrupulously

the tie-in

of the

into the

Philippine

vocal nationalist

extended to

peso to

the

Filipino
dollar was

eliminated, as well as absolute quotas except

for sugar and

cordage . 107 In addition, the agreement allowed

each state to

impose restrictions on the

imports of products that

harmed

domestic production .108
The

two

developments

of

the

Garcia

and

Macapagal

presidencies involved continuing corruption in politics, and
growing

nationalism

intelligentsia.

from

an

emerging

middle

class

James Burkholder Smith, a covert action

105 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 91.
106 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p.97.
107 Shalom The US and the Philippines, pp.96-97.
108 Shalom The US and the Philippines p. 96-97.

and
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specialist

with the CIA,

was stationed

during Garcia's presidency.

in the Philippines

He has written that

Garcia hadn't been in office six months before false
bills of lading became standard at the Manila harbor,
copra was being smuggled out of the southern islands in
huge amounts, and a payoff system was put into effect
for condufiJing any sort of transaction with
the
government 8
In terms of growing nationalism,

Claro M. Recto, who ran as

candidate in the 1957 presidential election, was one
leading nationalists
removing

U.S.

of this era.

bases

from

He advocated

Filipino

soil

for foreign attack.HO

election,

During

completely

because

infringed on Filipino sovereignty and because
magnets

of the

they

they acted as

the 1957 Philippine

when Recto ran for President the CIA again played

"dirty tricks" to prevent his election. 111
In

terms

of

foreign

aid

politics, foreign aid was used

and

control and

internal

consciously as both a carrot

and a stick prior to the Marcos presidency. The Trade Act is
one

example of

this, but others

include a

Truman administration

of $250

aid in

Quirino's agreement

exchange

for

promise by the

million dollars
to

of economic
accept

U.S.

economic advisors, pursue tax reform and agree to pursue the
reforms called for by the Bell mission.

10 '
James Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Coldwarrior
(New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1976) as quoted in The
Philippine Reader, p.149.
110 The Philippines Reader, p. 152.

111 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 104.
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MARCOS REGIME PRIOR TO MARTIAL LAW

Ferdinand

Marcos was elected

president on November 9,

Former

President Diosdado

Macapagal, who

1965.
election

to

corruption

CIA

support,

within

the

had

done

Philippine

estimated in 1965 that one-third of
were consumed by corruption.112

exchange

trade

combat

government.

It

was

all government revenues

a continuation of the
In

system.

to

As well, Macapagal had been

supported because he advocated
Philippines

little

owed his

controls, Macapagal won

return

for

U.S.-

lifting

$300 million

all

in U.S. and

I. M. F. aid . 113
The CIA
since both
however,

reportedly

Macapagal

stayed out

and

soon after his

of

the 1965

Marcos were

pro-u.s.

election, Marcos

measure to send 20,000 engineering corps
and

authorization to

military

bases

as

allow the

upon

o.c.

Johnson's

and

Philippines,
additional

President

responded with
$39 million

for

1966,

troops to Vietnam,

United States

Marcos visit
return

$38 million
expenses

In

pushed through a

logistic centers. 114

Johnson administration,

election

to use

the

In

return, the

to

Washington,

visit
in grants

incurred in

112 Confronting the Third world, p.187.
11 3 Kolko, Confronting the Third world, p. 187.
114 Kolko, Confronting the Third world, p. 188.

to

the

and an
sending

51

Filipino troops to Vietnam. 115
knew it would have to

"The Administration (Johnson]

reward him with significant aid

that it would be channeled into

and

Marcos's political coffers-

--perhaps even in his pocket." 116
Marcos had run on a campaign slogan of "rice, roads and
schoolhouses." 117
the

Philippines

distribution
inadequate,

Prior to
had

had

his election,

deteriorated.
increased,

and those

private armies .111

who could

Freedom

the situation in

Inequity

police

into "wild journalistic license and social

income

protection

afford to

of expression

in

do so
had

was

created

degenerated

anarchy began to

threaten individual liberty." 119
Despite his campaign

promises, Marcos did

very little

to ameliorate the inequities in Philippine society. However,
there

were other

forces

Marcos, as for any leader.
demographic

changes

which

creating

difficult problems

for

The Philippines was experiencing
included

population

growth, a

diminishing amount of land available to small farmers, and a
trend toward

the mechanization of farming.120

As a

result

115 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 188.
11 6 Kolko, Confronting the Third World , p. 188.
11 7 Theodore Friend, "Marcos and the
Orbis, vol. 32, no. 4, Fall 1988, p. 571.

Philippines,"

lll Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines", p. 571.
119 Fr lend, "Marcos and the Phi 1 ippines", p. 571.
120 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 90.
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farm peasants

no longer had the same

and

longer

many

occurred,

no

and it

colonies first

had jobs.

is

Migration

during the

appeared,

value for hacienderos

1960s

to

the

that the

growing from

60,000

cities
squatter

to

800,000

during that decade .121
Also,

a split had

those who wanted
personal

to continue

aggrandizement, and

policies designed to
pursue

developed within

more

122

fraudulent

political office

those

who

wished to

sever ties with the

protectionist

election which

to use

the elite between

returned

economic

Marcos to

To finance

for

pursue

United states and

policies.
power

The

1969

was violent

his campaign Marcos

and

raided the

national treasury to such an extent that it caused inflation
ranging

from 15\ to

United States
allegedly

also helped Marcos's reelection

allowing

employees in
in Hong Kong.

three years. 123

20\ over the next

large

sums

paid

U.S. dollars to be sold

to

u.s.

The

campaign, by
government

at black market rates

The money was then routed

to Marcos, and it

may have been as much as $200 million. 124
However, Marcos' problems worsened in his new term.
121 Chapman, Inside the Philippines Revolution, p.90.

122 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p.93.
123 Kolko, Confronting the Third World , p. 249-250.

124 w. Scott Thompson, "U.S. Role in the Philippine
Transition," in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, edited
by Hans Binnendijk. Washington, o.c.: U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of
Foreign Affairs, 1987. p.307.
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in

Late

1969,

Nationalism
Philippine

Movement

the

(MAN)

was

societyl25.

created
The

the

for
to

middle

Advancement
cure

help

class and

a

of

"sick"

landowners

became increasingly fearful

of communist rural

revolution,

despite the

New

(NPA),

the

party,

had

military

fact
wing

that the
of

the

approximately 390 members

People's Army

Philippine

communist

in 1969,

and dropped

to 379

1971.12' However, Marcos expertly played on the fears of
middle

class,

and

blaming

agitation

and

rebellion

in
the
on

communist machinations .127
In addition,

from

January to

March,

1970,

student

protests known as the First Quarter Storm commenced, serving
as

a

focal point

for

widespread dissatisfaction.

Philip

Shabecoff, writing for the New York Times, reported that:
The oligarchy also is accused of using its
political
power to concentrate
more of the
national wealth into its own hands.
Almost daily,
the Manila newspapers carry
articles
of scandals
in which
friends and
relatives of Government officials are awarded huge
Government contracts or loans for economically
worthless projects.
Meanwhile, small farmers are unable to get
loans for seed and fertilizer from their local
rural banks because the Government does not have
enough money to distribute to these banks.
Crime and violence have been getting out of
control. Political
murders are
almost daily
occurrences. Politicians and businessmen
hire
professional gunmen for protection. In the hills
of
Central Luzon,
Communist insurgents
and
125 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 92.
126

Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 251.

12 7 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 92.
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Government forces intended to ?uell
each other in acts of terrorism. 12
In

addition

these

to

Convention was

convened

constitution.

Marcos

representatives

to

in 1971

eliminate

enough

were

convention

Constitutional

revise the
bribed

the amendment

to

Also,

interests.
ownership
since

that

decisions
Briefly,
of

1946.

sectors of

the

override
in

the

August

of

1972,

that

the

the Quasha and

strongly

Quasha

decision

held

land

had been

Lustevco decision

the

nationalist

were

private agricultural
The

several

limiting

Philippine Supreme Court issued two rulings,
Lustevco

country's

although it wasn't certain

votes

members .129

to

a

reportedly

had

presidency to eight years,
there

pressures,

them outdo

against

decreed that

U.S.

that U.S.
illegal
firms in

the economy reserved to Filipinos could not have

foreigners as directors

or management personne1. 138

Gabriel

Kolko writes that
It was clear now that Laurel-Langley would not be
renewed when it expired in July 1974 and that U.S.
investments with a book value of $640 million in
1979 (but a market value esn1mated at three times
that) would be jeopardized.

121

Philip Shabecoff,
"Protest
Movement
in
Philippines Widening Rapidly," New York Times, March
1970, p.10.
1"

Shalom, The Philippines Reader, p.164.

130 Shalom, The US and the Philippines, p.169.

131 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 251.

the
12,

55

MARTIAL LAW

Martial law
In

the

was publicly announced September 23, 1972.

preceding

around

Marcos

Manila.

September

months, several

22nd,

there

blamed
was

bombings

had

occurred

communist subversives.

an

On

unsuccessful assassination

attempt upon the life of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.
During the revolution Enrile revealed that the assassination
attempt was engineered by Marcos as a

pretext for declaring

martial law. 132
The stated goals
Marcos termed the

of martial

law were

to create

New Society and to restore

what

order. Marcos

ostensibly sought to root out corruption, redistribute land,
and

break

the

power

controlled Philippine
martial law,
corruption

the

the

was

was just as severe;

by Marcos

landed

oligarchy

However,

politics.

economy

corruption centered
funds

of

in a

worse

the end

position,

of
and

the difference was that the

around the misuse and

cronies,

by

that had

and by

Marcos

appropriation of
himself and

his

family.
Theodore
law when

Friend points out

martial law

"surprisingly

light;

was first
real

that opposition to martial
declared the

resistance

was

reaction was
almost

132 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," p. 572.

nil;

56

considerable. 11133

unexpressed relief

Marcos was

successful

in coopting members of the left such as Luis Taruc, a former
Huk leader, and Blas Ople, leftist labor leader. 134

Hundreds

of thousands of weapons were confiscated, demonstrations and
were

strikes
introduced

prohibited,

to

attempted

deal

with

summary

and
street

procedures

were

Marcos

also

er ime .135

ambitious projects including road building, rural

electrification, land reform and irrigation.13 6
On the financial

front, Marcos created a

new class of

technocrats to manage the economy.

While the Laurel-Langley

expired in

Lustevco decisions

the Quasha

1974,

Marcos

overturned.
investment

to

a

and

opened

up

considerable

the

economy

degree,

and

implement policies that would change the
from

economy
growth. 137
banks
of

import

Legislation

substitution

capital,

providing

tax

foreign

proceeded

to

orientation of the
to

was introduced

to foreign investment,

to

were

export-oriented

opening commercial

guaranteeing the repatriation
incentives,

and easing

entry

133 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines" p. 572.

134 Friend,

"Marcos and the Philippines, P· 572.

135 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines,
P· 572.
136 Friend,

"Marcos and the Philippines, p. 572.

137
A.James
(Washington, D. C. :
p.39.

Gregor,
Crisis
Ethics and Public

in the
PhiliJ2J2ines
Policy Center, 1984),
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requirements
Marcos

for

foreign capital

consolidated

and

and

assigned

sectors of the economy to trusted
only

cooperation and

skills . 138

management

As well,

of critical

loyalists, convinced that

coordination

between

major

sectors

could help the Philippine economy.13 9
However, the reforms failed spectacularly. The external
effects of the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks were devastating for
the

Philippine economy, which had begun to pursue an export

oriented strategy.
debt crisis hit

The world wide

recession and subsequent

the Philippines hard.

External debt

went

from $2.3 billion in 1973, to $3.8 billion in 1975, to

$8.4

billion in 1979.lU
Philippines

had

In addition,
misrepresented

the Central
the

amount

Bank of
of

both

the
its

foreign exchange reserves, and understated the amount of the
external

debt of

the Philippines

to obtain new

loans and

credits.

When pressed by foreign lenders in 1983

(a 90-day

moratorium on payments had been requested because of alleged
massive

capital flight after

the Aquino assassination) the

external debt was reevaluated at $25 billion. 141
The massive
the Marcos

borrowing also was

government

to

caused by the

save industries

that

need of
had

been

138 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 40.

139 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p.46.
140 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 257.

141 Frank Golay, "Cause for Concern in the Philippines"
The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XLV, no. 5, p.940.
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monopolized by the government or that had experienced a high
degree of
from

government intervention,

the effects

of crony

and which

had suffered

capitalism. Frank

Golay writes

that
Inefficient enterprises managed by inexperienced
entrepreneurs, men who were close to Marcos and
interested
in acquiring
business experience,
crowded out high-productivity activities.
the
cost of inefficiency and waste may be seen in the
steady increase in the capital to output ratio in
the Philippine economy.
Increases
in gross
domestic product per capita in ASEAN countries
other than the Philippines averaged 5.1 percent
over the 1960s and 1970s, whereas thfi Philippine
growth rate averaged only 2.8 percent. 42
There

is convincing

evidence

of

which

significantly

impaired

the

large scale
economic

corruption,
program

and

ultimately support for the government. 143
However, the amount of intervention was more extensive.
An analysis

done by economists

Philippines

tabulated

Letters

of

government

688

Instruction
intervention in

from the University

Presidential
which

Decrees

represented

the economy. lU

a

of the
and

283

form

of

Marcos issued

exclusive rights to import, export, or exploit certain areas
of activity; authority to collect large funds that were then
privately
certain
142

expropriated;
firms in

and

an industry

Golay, "Cause for

preferential
to extend

Concern in

treatment

new credit

or to

the Philippines," p.

938.
143 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 46.
lH

of

Golay, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 938.
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restructure credit.145
January 17, 1981.

Martial law was officially lifted on
However,

Marcos kept

acquired

under

Benigno Aquino,

most

martial
who

of the

law.

had been

martial law period, had

political power

he had

Liberal opposition

leader

imprisoned for

for

May

of the

1984,

National Assembly

hoping

assassination on August
populace.

Two

procession. 146

to

unify

21, 1983,

million

He

returned in

elections scheduled

the

opposition.

galvanized the

people

to

attended

His

Filipino

his

funeral

Massive street demonstrations encompassed all

socio-economic

groups,

afterwards . 147

From

increasing

the

been given permission to travel

the United States for needed heart surgery.
anticipation

most of

that

pressure from

and

continued

point

on,

the United

for

Marcos

month

a

came

under

States regarding

the

abuses of his presidency.

145 Golay, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 938.
14 6 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines,"
147 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People of the
Philippines (Stanford:Stanford Alumni Association, 1987), p.
16.

CHAPTER III

THE SHAH'S TENURE PERIOD

THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP

Unlike the
with the

Philippines, Iran had

United States

prior to

very little

World War

II.

contact
A treaty

regulating commerce and navigation between Persia (as it was
referred to by the West) and the United States was signed in
1856. In the next
were

dispatched

century, two separate financial
in

response

assistance with the management
1911,

and again

States would
country,

in 1921. It

to

the British

requests

for

of state finances, first
was believed

not aggrandize itself

unlike

Persian

missions

or

at the

in

that the United
expense of

Russians.148

the

The first

mission, led by Morgan Schuster in 1911, was unable

to make

significant reform of the state's finances. To do this would
have challenged powerful bureaucrats, the Persian elite, and
Russian and

British

interests

as well.149

The

Russians

14 8 Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, editors, The United
States and Iran A documentary History (Frederick: University
Publications of America, 1980), p.1.
149 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (New
Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 10.

York:

61
successfully intrigued unti 1 Schuster was dismissed .1 58

The

second mission, headed by an economic advisor with the State
Department,
because

Arthur

Millspaugh, came

Millspaugh

wasn't

to

willing

to

an

end primarily

compromise

fiscal

responsibility for Reza Shah's political ends.lll
During

World

War

uncomfortable position
foreign
States.

powers, the
The

II

Iran

found

itself

British, the

reasoning

for vital

Second, Iran
was

Russians and

behind the

U.S.

goods to

reach

possessed valuable oil

controlled

created, with the

the

of being occupied by three different

August

the United

1941

invasion

rested on two facts: first, Iran provided the surest
line

in

by the

British.153

British in the

the

supply

Soviet Union. 152

fields, and production
Occupied

zones were

south and the

Soviets in

150 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 11.
151 This is my
own conclusion based on
reading
correspondence from U.S. Ministers to Iran, Joseph Saul
Kornfeld and Hoffman Philip, Charge d'affaires Wallace Smith
Hurray, and the memorandum of an interview between Minister
Philip and Reza Shah Pahlavi (the father of the contemporary
Shah), dated April 14 1927. Reza Shah, in a discussion of
the matter with Minister Philip, complains that for all his
good points, Millspaugh 's "disregard for the dignity of the
government" was enough to obliterate all his good work. As
cited in
Alexander and Nanes, p.43 Despite the friction
(which it appears was often the job of the State Department
to smooth over), Millspaugh managed to considerably improve
the finances of the state from 1921 to 1927. He returned to
Iran during the war to head a second financial mission;
however, he was perceived as being in collusion with the
British, and was unable to have the same success.
152 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 18.
153 Rubin, Paced with Good Intentions, p. 18.
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the north.
era,

This arrangement mimicked

when

agreement

the
in

British
1907,

and the

carving

the pre World

Russians

had

state

into

the

War I

signed

an

areas

of

influence . 154
Reza Shah was pressured into abdicating in favor of his
son, Mohammed Pahlavi, who
the throne . 155
Allies,

He had little

real power, which

assumed

suited the

and the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs was

"directly

subjected

forces." 156
assist

was only twenty when he

to

the

dictates

The Iranians appealed to

them in attaining

of

assurances from the

British and

war had ended . 157

from the United States, an agreement was

signed by all three states in January of 1942,
withdraw

occupying

the United States to

Soviets that they would withdraw after the
Thanks to pressure

the

not later

than six

months after

promising to

the end

of the

war .158
However,
continued
occupation

to

the Soviets
occupy

in 1941,

didn't leave

northern

Iran.

the Soviets had

free entry, and instituted a

on

schedule, and

Shortly after
closed their

the

zone to

number of political and socio-

154 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,
P· 19.
155 Amin Saikal, The Rise and
Fall of the
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 26.
156 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 26.
157 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 19.
158 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, P· 19.

Shah
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economic

changes,

reactivating

the

including
communist

farming

measures

party. 159

Tudeh

It

and

became

increasingly clear that the Soviets hoped to include Iran in
their

plans for post-war

become increasingly
during

World

interest as

aware

War II,
a

Union.1' 8 Cordell

expansion. The
of Iran's

as

Hull,

strategic

a source

valuable regional
in

United States had

of

ally

oil

importance

and strategic

against the

correspondence

with

soviet

President

Roosevelt dated August 16, 1943, wrote that
Since this country has a vital interest in the
fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic
Charter and the establishment of foundations for a
lasting peace throughout the world, it is to the
advantage of the United States to exert itself to
see that Iran's integrity and independence are
maintained and that she becomes prosperous and
stable. Likewise, from a more directly selfish
point of view, it is to our interest that no great
power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite
the importanfi American petroleum development in
Saudi Arabia. '1
The Soviets

had also been

Iran, along with
the Iranian

seeking an

oil concession

from

Great Britain and the United States, which

government,

led by

Prime

Minister Sa'ed

had

1~

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 27.
Although he doesn't go into a lot of detail, Saikal does
mention that certain estates were confiscated and then
established as model farms with the help of the Red Army.
Also, new regulations were created favoring the peasantry
over landowners in crop-sharing, as well as the compulsory
purchase or confiscation of large amounts of grain for
government use.
160 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 30.
161 Alexander and Nanes, Iran a

104.

Documentary History, p.

64
refused to

give to any of the

the war. 1'2
plot

The Soviets believed

coordinated by

Despite

the

British,

occupying forces until after

Tehran

the British

and the

Declaration

of

the Soviets and

skirmish between

refusal was

1943,

in

which

the

had pledged to

Iran's independence and unity

the

situation provided

post-war

rivals

a

United States.16 3

the United states

work together to preserve
wartime allies, 164

that this

in the

a

as

preliminary

Cold

War

which

emerged after World War I I. us
A

crisis

pressure

as

was
well

Minister Qavam. 1"
partially

averted,
as

the

withdraw the

protests

of

maneuvering

Iranian

U.S.
Prime

Soviets offered to
in northern

reinforcements

The

brought

Security Council,

States would

of

strong

Iran observed
Iranians
and the

represented by Secretary of State Byrnes,
United

with

troops still stationed

withdrawals. 168

to the

only

On March 2, 1946, the

Iran. 167 However, Americans in
instead

but

do everything

their

United States,

asserted that the

possible to

compel the

1'2 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 31-32.
1'3 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 32.
1'4 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 23.

165 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.29.
16' Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.33.
161 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 32.

lU Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.33.
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to leave Iran. 169

Soviets

At the

Qavam seemingly gave in to

same time, Prime Minister

Soviet wishes, and negotiated an

agreement whereby

Soviet troops would

and

agreed to

the Iranians

Iranian-Soviet oil
ownership.no
agreement

a joint

Soviets receiving 51%

Iranian parliament,

soil; this

all foreign

meant

that

considering

the

departed . 112

Unfortunately,
along

Majlis. 171

the

had expired, and by its

be elected until

continued

of

However, the Soviets agreed to approval of the

Fourteenth Majlis

Iranian

the establishment

company, with the

by the

couldn't

withdraw completely,

agreement

the

the

with further

decree a new one

troops had departed
new Majlis

after

The

Soviet

unrest

agitation

would
troops

be
had

Azerbaijan

in
by the

communist

Tudeh party, which had been considerably strengthened during
the Soviet occupation.
A

memorandum of

ambassador

a

conversation

Hussein Ala and

between the

Dean Acheson,

1946, reflects that the situation had
Iranian

perspective; elections

Minister Qavam
number

of

at a

Tudeh

had

time when it

deputies

would

Iranian

dated October 8,

deteriorated from the
been called

was likely that
be

elected,

10

Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p.198.
110 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 198.
171 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 198.
172 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 198.

by

Prime
a large

and

the

(Pittsburgh:

66

ambassador

felt

that the

state

was in

infiltration, evidently because Qavam
of appeasement. 113

danger

of Soviet

had followed a policy

The Iranians hesitated to

send troops to

reassert control in Azerbaijan Kurdistan because they feared
a

negative reaction by

signed

the order

to send in

The resistance easily

Prime Minister Qavam

the Soviets.
troops on

collapsed, because

to abstain

from· any material support. 114

that

resulted

this

realization by
not bluffing

from

strong

the Soviets chose
The Shah believed

U.S.

pressure, and

the Soviet Union that the
in its support

December 10, 1946.

the

United States was

of U.N. members

threatened by

aggression. 115
In

an

effort to

cope

with the

unifying and regaining political

difficulties

in re-

control, the Iranians

requested more post-war aid, particularly to

had

be included in

the Point Four aid program on the same footing as Greece and
Turkey.

These

assistance

expectations

during the

were

heightened

Soviet occupation

by

after the

U.S.
war.176

173 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the
Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs
(Minor)
[Washington,] October 8,
1946.
Reproduced in The United
States and Iran A Documentary History, edited by Alexander
and Nanes, p. 180.
174 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of
State, Tehran, December 17, 1946, 2 p.m. as reproduced in
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 188.
11 5 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of
State, Tehran, December 17, 1946, 2 p.m. as reproduced in
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 188.
176 Rubin, Paved with good Intentions, p. 36.
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However,
should

the

Truman

administration

be restricted

First, Iran

to token

had a high

calculated

levels

development plans, and it appeared unlikely

Iranian

army

did

not

to

sophistication

and uncertain
that they would

use economic aid. 118

be unable to effectively

have

absorb

the

large

aid

reasons.11 7

for two

degree of corruption

that

Second,

training

and
of

amounts

the
the

military

equipment, although the Shah

pressed for funding to

create

his own large-scale military

deterrent. Instead, he ignored

U.S. advisors, and seemed obsessed with military hardware.11 9
The principal

threat

to Iran,

like

the Philippines,

was

perceived by U.S. policy makers to be internal revolution. 180
As well, Congress was reluctant to give more aid;

corrupt Kuomintang were defeated

after the

in China, the feeling

that it was better to demand performance in terms

was

of reform

first before giving aid .181
In

addition

Department
appearance

was aware
of

imperialism, and

these

to

that many

U.S.
Iranian

considerations,

the

Iranians would

imperialism
politicians

resent the

replacing
feared

State

to

British
make

an

177 Rubin, Paved with good Intentions, p. 39.

17I
p.251.

Ervand Abrahamin,

Iran Between

Two

Revolutions ,

179 Abrahamin, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 251,
UO Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 38.

181 Arahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.251.
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obvious alliance
preferring a

either

the U.S.

traditional "balance"

superpowers. 182
Four

with

or

in

1950,

the

$25 million

loan

amounts

were very

from the Export-Import

Cottam has written that this policy
United

the two

included in Point

amounting to $500,000 for technical assistance 183
a

U.S.S.R.,

policy between

While Iran was eventually

allocations

the

small

as well as

Bank. Richard

actually benefitted the

states, because it argued against ability of Iran to

manipulate

the

U.S.

whenever

confronted

with

Cold

War

concerns were mentioned.184

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND MOSSADEQ

The nationalist movement and the era

of Prime Minister

Mossadeq must be seen interpreted against

the background of

oil concessions,

and

particularly the

AIOC

crisis.

The

18 2 The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the
Embassy in Iran, Washington, January 3, 1948, 1 p.m. as
reproduced in Alexander and Nanes' Iran a Documentary
History, p.189-191. The traditional "balance" policy refers
to the Iranian strategy of playing one opponent off the
other, which was the modus operandi in dealing with the
British-Russian rivalry during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
Also, the Iranians emerged from the postcolonial period intensely distrustful of any influence by
outside powers in internal Iranian affairs, since both the
Russians and the British had actively engaged in intrigue to
enhance their interests.
113 State Department Announcement of Point Four Project
in Iran October 19, 1950. Reproduced in Alexander and Nanes,
Iran a Documentary History, p. 211-212.
184 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.209.
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
on Iranian
it.

(AIOC) maintained the

oil, allowing the

British to refine

concession
and export

This was a common arrangement for many of the oil

states; they didn't possess

the technology to refine

own crude, or have the necessary supply
it. However, the

division of profits

quasi-colonial relationship
The last

agreement had

involved 20% of
shillings

and was

was a remnant

from a

extremely inequitable.

been negotiated by

ton sold or

their

routes to transport

the dividends on ordinary

for each

rich

Reza Shah,

shares, and four

exported going

That agreement had been a considerable

and

to Iran.115

improvement over the

previous one.
When the Iranians refused a Soviet oil concession, they
perceived it as a good
with AIOC as
which

time to renegotiate their

well, and pursued

Aramco and

the Saudis

agreement 116

a 50/50
had

agreement

benefittea.18 7 The

from
other

demands, such as training more Iranians, and equal treatment
by

AIOC

of

Iranian

and

Royal

unreasonable. 188

However, the

agreement,

angered

which

committee in the Majlis

the

Navy

markets,

British

were

refused the

Iranians,

not

50/50

particularly the

appointed to consider the

issue. 119

115 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 204.
186 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.204.

187 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 51.

ua

Cottam, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 204-205.

18'

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 38.
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The

committee

was

led

by

Mossadeq,

Mohammed

who

had

consistently argued for greater control by Iran over its own
resources. 190

In

his

response,

committee

recommended

nationalization, which further antagonized the British.191
While

the current

prime

minister, Ali

Razmara,

had

attempted to persuade the Majlis that Iran could not run the
industry on its own, he was
nationalist

religious

assassinate the Shah. 192

assassinated March 7, 1951 by a

group,

which

also

threatened

to

While some writers label Razmara as

a "British stooge" in his attempts at conciliation, 193 others
maintain that he was perceived to be supported by the United
States

as well, thanks to the actions

American embassy .194

He

was

of one member of the

favored by the

United States

because he was perceived as a tough minded reformer, who was
also wise enough to make a deal with the British to maintain
the

revenue the

assassination, it

state

needed.

In any

was too late for the

case,

with

his

British to agree to

the 50/50 concession.
Mossadeq was elected

as Premier in

May of 1951,

just

after the Majlis completed passage of law nationalizing AIOC

uo

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 37.

191 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 38.

1'2 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 38.
U3 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions,

194 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 209.
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(Apr i 1 3 0,

19 51) . 195

longer refine

This

meant that

and distribute oil for its

calculated that

they could easily

through their other concessions,
of oil would probably prompt
Iran to

assets

privileges

from

and
the

agreement with

other oil

agreement with

Iran

dropped from 241.1
1952; the

AIOC

the short

fall

shortage

the United States to

pressure

of

of 1952, the
had

and

conversion
attained

to enter

AIOc.197

Oil

million barrels in 1950
revenue this

British had

frozen

England,

companies not

replacing

loss of

no

own profit.

make up

advisors,
Bank

AIOC could

and a world wide

conciliate. 196 By the end

withdrawn

in

the

an

into any

production

to 10.6 million

entailed put

a severe

strain on Mossadeq's budget for promised economic reforms. 198
While
aspirations,
the

sympathetic
United states

growing strength

of the

to

nationalist

Mossadeq's

policy makers also
communist Tudeh

recognized
party, which

Mossadeq naively believed he could manipulate. 1" By the time
195 Rubin
Paved with Good
Intentions, p.51. The
nationalization resulted in the well-known Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company Case, which was submitted to the International Court
of Justice on May 26, 1951 by the United Kingdom on behalf
of AIOC ( the British government owned 35% of the stock).
However, the court declined the case on the grounds that
Iran had not consented to its jurisdiction. Gerhard von
Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1986), p. 240.
196 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 61.
19 7 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.41.
198 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.41.
199 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.60.
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the Majlis approved nationalization, 12,000 oil workers were
on

strike

and

demonstration

the
that

Tudeh

party

turned

scheduled
to

out

Mossadeq was unable to compromise with
despite

the high

and he

created aspirations

aid,

although

million in 1951,and to
just enough

30,000

Day

strong.200

the British, because

nationalization was

could not possibly be satisfied. 281
United States

May

an

extremely

His supporters might literally tear him to

popular action.
pieces,

cost,

be

a

expectations that

Neither could he rely on

it had

increased

from

million in 1952. 282

$23.4

to pay the military and

enough to replace

and

the lost oil

$1.6

This was

civil service, but not

revenue, in order

to force

I ran into some type of settlement. 203
Relatively

late in

the crisis,

as the

United States

played honest broker, the Truman administration had tried to
orchestrate
However,

purchase

of

Iranian oil

companies.

same companies with violation of

Sherman Anti-Trust regulations.
intervene, claiming

investigation,

The State Department

that petroleum constituted

national security interest,
the

U.S.

the Attorney General was in the midst of preparing

a case which charged these

to

by

tried
a vital

and President Truman terminated

concluding

that

for

all

200 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.63.
201 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 61.
202 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.61.
203 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.62.
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purposes, oil operations were
in

these

states. However,

instruments of foreign policy
time

ran

out for

the

Truman

Administration, and it was unable to organize U.S. petroleum
companies to break

the blockade, and

thus put pressure

on

the British. 284
Furthermore,

the Shah

was

actively plotting

against

Mossadeq, since Mossadeq believed in limiting his power, and
anti-Mossadeq groups clustered around the monarchy. 285 As the
situation

became polarized

camps, the prime
order

to

into

pro-

minister made two

regain

control

of

and anti-

Mossadeq

fateful decisions.

the

military, around

In
which

support for the Shah converged, Mossadeq tried to assume the
Shah's constitutional role

of commander-in-chief, bypassing

the Majlis, and declared

emergency powers legitimized by

referendum. 286

brought

confrontation

This
with

Mossadeq

conservative forces,

into

and

a

direct

he alienated

supporters with by taking dictatorial actions.20 7
Mossadeq's
Eisenhower

in

communication,

second miscalculation
a

letter

dated

May

was in
28,

appealing to

1953.

In

the

he hinted that Iran could become pro-Soviet,

and might be ripe

for Soviet take-over if more aid

was not

204 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 74-75.
205 Saikal, The rise and Fall of the Shah, p43.
206 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.43.
207 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.44-45.
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extended to

meet the economic

crisis.~ 8 Eisenhower refused

to assist Mossadeq with more aid, recommending that he reach
an agreement
seemed

with the British. 209

stronger than

ever; a

demonstration

1952, attracted between 50,000 and
From the

perspective

of the

regime

had

lost the

indeed

seemed ripe for

In addition,

July 21,

100,000 demonstrators.no

United

ability to

on

the Tudeh

States, the

control the

communist take-over.

Mossadeq

country, and
Mossadeq had

made enemies among the conservatives, the royalists, and the
parliamentarian groups. 211
The Eisenhower administration made its decision to take
covert action

on

June 22,

1953.

President

Eisenhower's

reply to Mossadeq's letter of May 28th, refused requests for
more economic aid. 212

The Shah was informed on August 1st by

Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA operative in Iran, during a secret
meeting,

that

decided

to take

the

the

United

States

and

Great Britain

covert action. 213 The Shah

country after issuing

two decrees

had

agreed to leave

that Mossadeq would

~• Exchange Between
Prime Minister Mossadegh and
President Eisenhower on the Oil Dispute and the Problem of
United States Aid to Iran, letter from Dr. Mossadeq to
President Eisenhower dated May 28, 1953, as reproduced in
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 232-233.
209 Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 233-234.
210 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.225.
211 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 78.
212 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p 81.

213 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 82.
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not comply with, one dismissing Mossadeq,

and one replacing

Fazlol lah Zahed i. 214

arrested Colonel

him

with

Nematollah Naslri, when he
decrees,
radio

and proceeded

fled

attempted to deliver the

to claim

royalists had

that the

Tehran

Mossadeq

on August

16

a coup

attempted

Shah's

via Tehran
d'etat.215

exploded with communist demonstrations, and the Shah
to Italy

in protest.216

By

August 18,

soldiers had

started to demonstrate in the street in support of the Shah,
and gradually
threat

of a

the

tide

turned against
takeover. 217

communist

Mossadeq

While

the

and

the

CIA

had

organized demonstrations to support the Shah, they were much
larger

than

anything

indicating an

the

underlying

masses. 218 By August 19,

agency

could

support for

have

the

paid

Shah among

Falzollah Zahedi was

able to

for,
the
come

out of hiding and assumed power.
The United
regime;

States

$900,000

quickly moved

came from

Kermit

to

Roosevelt's

Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson promised
Four

aid and

to arrange a

Mossadeq was arrested

support the

$45 million

new

safe, and

to continue Point
emergency grant. 219

charged with treason,

and imprisoned

214 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 82.
215 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.84.
216 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.84.
217 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.85.
218 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.87.

219 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 87.
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in solitary confinement for three years.220

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

The Shah depended on the United states for his regime's
survival

after

Mossadeq's

removal

from

surprisingly, Iran allied itself with the
the

West

against the

consolidate his

Soviet

Union.

power as quickly

power,

groups

Nationalist

in opposition
Front

intellectuals,
class, the

to

Shah

moved to

as possible, so

that the

including the

organized

tribes in southern

the

(Mossadeq's

The

Shah: the

party),

There were
Tudeh,

the

the

non-partisan

bureaucrats and

professional

clergy, and

Iran. 222

not

United States and

Majlis couldn't limit the power of the crown.2 21
five

and

The

finally
Shah acted

anti-monarchist
to outlaw

the

National Front in 1957; used martial law, military tribunals
and a 1931 decree against collectivist ideology to crush the
Tudeh;
to

allowed provincial governors

control

elections to

the

Majlis and

finally created two parties, led by
were

known colloquially

as

to use the gendarmerie
the

Senate; and

trusted courtiers, that

the "yes"

and

the "yes

220 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.45.
221 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.46.
222 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 47.

sir"
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parties. 223

He then moved to have the

the quorum needed

Maj lis which lessened

to pass legislation, and

allowing him to

veto financial bills.224
The intelligentsia and
intimidated

by

middle class were

S.A.V.A.K.,

the

Shah's

increasingly

secret

police.

Officially created in 1957, the organization benefitted from
training

by both

intelligence. 225
its

networks,
and

ministry,

the

CIA

and

FBI, as

well

Using infiltration techniques,
created

trade

scrutinized

unions
anyone

through
recruited

as

Israeli

it expanded
the

Labor

into

the

university, large industrial plants, or the civil service.2 26
Its first leader, General Taimur Bakhtiar, became
for his brutality and corruption.
Iranian

society

is

Cottam,

and expert

kind of Gestapo, 227

hard to

The role of S.A.V.A.K. in

adequately

on Iranian

notorious

describe; Richard

politics describes it

and the degree

to which

as a

it infiltrated

Iranian society and the intelligentsia was formidable.
The

psychological

perhaps the
nature of

effect

largest aspect

of

of

the

was

because of

the

its power,

the extended family in Iran.

223 Abrahamian,

organization

Iran Between Two

Every time someone

Revolutions, pp. 329-

420.
224 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.420.
225 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.419.
226 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 420.
227 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 288.
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was arrested and questioned and/or killed

family unit. 228

affected the entire extended
organization
individuals

was

able to

than

incurred

the

punished

those

the

enmity

target,

the

suspected

in

the

frequently
released

general

used brutal
only if

but

entire

of

petty

dissident activities, resulting in
terror

This meant the

effectively influence

actual
of

by S.A.V.A.K., it

that

family.

it

as well

a kind of all

torture, and

The

also

S.A.V.A.K.

offenses

population. 2"

they or their

many more

as

pervasive

organization

prisoners were

family promised

often

to become

informers. 230
The
Between

United States
1945

to

includes military
million,

also

1952,
as

total

well as

supported the
grants

and

economic) to

Shah's regime.
credits
Iran were

$29

about half in loans. 231 In 1953, that amount jumped

to $52 million in grants, and reached $65 million
in 19 54. 232

(this

Along with

the aid,

the

in grants

United States

sent

technical advisors, to assist with economic planning and the

228 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.177.

229 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.178.
230 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 177.

231 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1960. (81st edition) Washington, D.C.,
1960. p.872. Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts
are in dollars from that year.
232 Statistical Abstract of the US 1960, p.872.
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dispersal

of

economic

aid. 233

In

terms

of

military

assistance, three different groups were present: ARMISH, the
United States advisory mission to the Iranian Army, GENMISH,
the advisory mission to the Imperial
the

Mi 1 i tary

Assistance

Advisory

Gendarmerie, and MAAG,
group. 234

The

Shah

constantly pressed for higher and higher amounts of military
aid, believing that Iran
Turkey

occupied a comparable position

in terms of strategic support for U.S.

to

security. In

1953, a National Security Council memo admitted that
military
aid
to Iran
has
great political
importance apart from its military impact. Over
the long term, the most effective instrument for
maintaining Iran's orientation toward the West is
the monarch, which in turn has the Army as its
only real source of power.
U.S. military aid
serves to improve Army morale, cement Army loyalty
to the Shah, and thus consolidate the present
regime and provide some assurance that Iran's
current
orftintation toward the West will be
perpetuated.
However, it was the

opinion of Eisenhower and

that Iran didn't need military expenditure
the expense

of the economy. 236

could never develop

Allen Dulles

and expansion at

Their belief was

a large enough

that Iran

army to repel

a Soviet

233 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.32.
234

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 54.

235 United

States Policy toward Iran: A Report to the
National Security Council by the N.S.C. Planning Board
December 21, 1953, as reproduce by Alexander, Iran A
Documentary History, pp. 265-267.
236

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,97.
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invasion, and shouldn't drain its resources in trying. 237
The

Shah

however,

and he

embattled
France,
Iraq

was

responding

had

a

number

with Nasser at

a

coup

Lebanon

in

1958,

and

there

Canal crisis

in

withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.

1958, and

were

armed

$183

1960 prices

and

increase the

200,000 between 1953 and
from $80 million to

exchange rates>. 2"

United States also increased its military
in 1956,

to

struggle and the

Shah to

to raise the military budget

million (at

subsequently

These threats, combined

led the

forces from 120,000 to over

1963, and

in 1956.

Nasserist attempts

with the imperatives of internal political
his power,

was

Syria and Egypt threatened

overthrow King Hussein of Jordan.23 8

consolidation of

Egypt

threatened by Britain,

the Suez

d'etat

instability,

of concerns.

its helm,

and Israel during

suffered

regional

to

the United States gave $23

million

and in 1958 $104.9 million. 240

coup in

Iraq, deliveries of

The

and economic aid:

million, in 1957 $82.5
After the July 1958

promised aid were

speeded up,

and $28.6 million of economic aid was converted for military
purposes,

and U.S.

authorization was

given to

expand the

237 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.98.
238 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.98.
239 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 420.

240 Mark Gasiorowski,
"Security relations between the
United States and Iran, 1953-1978" in Neither East nor West
edited by Nikki R. Keddie, and Mark Gasiorowski, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990), p.152.
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size of the Iranian army by 37,000 troops.241
However,

congressional

Operations Subcommittee in

hearings
1956 and

before

the

1957 found

corruption and mismanagement of aid funds. 242

Foreign

widespread

This combined

with growing economic problems and dissatisfaction with
lack of

democratic institution,

makers to reduce
1960, a

military aid

decision which

and

prompted U.S.

to Iran

policy

during Fiscal

greatly angered the

Shah, who

been pressing for larger amounts of military aid.

the

Year
had

After the

Kennedy administration came into office, it was decided that
the emphasis would change

from military to economic

and this was consistent with the creation of the
International

aid,243

Agency for

Development (A.I.D.), the Peace Corps and the

expanded Food for Peace program, which were creations of the
Kennedy administration.

THE WHITE REVOLUTION

To

understand the Iranian-u.s. relationship during the

1960s, it is necessary to briefly discuss the Shah's program
for development and modernization, announced in
White

Revolution as

opposed to

red revolution

1963 as the
because it

241 Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, p. 152.
242 Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, p. 152.
243 Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, p. 152.
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would be accomplished without bloodshed and
the

alternative explanation

from

a communist red

reform program was

is that

it was

revolution. 245 The

the way in

the early

economic crisis.

1960s,

Iran

importance of this
a certain

U.S. policy makers.

was

To implement an

or

distinguished

which it cemented

perception of the Shah in the eyes of
By

violence, 244

in the

midst

of

an

ambitious Seven Year Plan

for development, the state had resorted to deficit financing
and heavy borrowing. 246 A bad harvest in 1959-1960 aggravated
the

problem,

and

confrontations. 247

strikes

increased,

The Kennedy

ending

in

Administration responded

offering $85 million in aid, on the condition that
bring liberals into his cabinet and
reform; the Kennedy administration
into naming Dr.
reform

from 1955 to 1958,
companies.
unpopular

244

In

the Shah

also pressured the

with allies

Shah

Amini was a

among the

Front as well as the more traditional groups in
Washington was familiar with

by

pursued meaningful land

'Ali Amini as Prime Minister.

minded aristocrat,

bloody

National

the Majlis.

him as the Iranian

ambassador

and as a negotiator in 1954 with the oil

Washington's perception he was

decisions, and he

had a

able to make

long-term commitment to

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 80.

245 Gary Sick, All
1985), p. 10.

Fall Down (New York:

Random House,

246 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 421.
247

Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.422.
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land reform.
However,
refused to

his

tenure

support

was brief;

him because

he

the

National

would not

Front

disassemble

S.A.V.A.K. 248 , and after he dismissed parliament he failed to
schedule

future

elections

constitution. 249
forced on

Iran by the United

States refused
over

need to

United
the

however,
maintaining

violation

of

the

measures

States and the IMF,

which he

very unpopular. 258 Finally, the United

to support

the

blamed the

direct

Also, the stringent fiscal reform

implemented, made him

Shah

in

Amini when
cut the

States

United

military

for not

States

that aid levels

he clashed

budget. 251 Amini

providing

rejected

enough

this

averaged the

with the

aid;

assertion,

same compared to

the preceding four years. 252
Of
reform
or

waqf

greater interest,

perhaps,

is

that Amini's

land

policies involved redistribution of religious lands,
lands

which

charitable purposes,
protester against

and

generate

revenues

Ruhollah Khomeini

primarily
was an

for
active

land redistribution. 253 Khomeini began

openly protest in 1962, denouncing the Shah's regime for
248 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.423.
249

Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.303.

250 Abrahamin, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 424.

251 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.424.
25 2 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 77-78.

253 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 109.
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living
off
corruption,
rigging
elections,
violating the constitutional laws, stifling the
press and the political parties, destroying the
independence of the university,
neglecting the
economic needs of
merchants workers peasant,
undermining
the
country's
Islamic
beliefs,
encouraging gharbzadegi---indiscriminate borrowing
from the West---granting
'capitulations'
to
foreigners, selling oil to Israel, and constantlsr
expanding the size of the central bureaucracies.
He was

arrested in

June

and held

by S.A.V.A.K.

for

two

months, and then was returned to the holy city of Qom, where
he

was

speeches

held

under

denouncing

house

arrest. 255

the Shah's

States and denounced the

alliance. 256 He was

and

thereafter

Iraq. 251

went

continued making

dependence

power of the

U.S.-Iranian
shortly

He

Khomeini's arrest in

the United

army as well as

exiled to
to

on

the

Turkey in 1964,

lecture

June of 1963

in theology

in

sparked three

days of rioting in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashad, and
Tabriz, 258 in which riot police

killed at least hundreds and

perhaps thousands. 2 ~
The

Shah

Revolution.
time to

was

now

free to

Explanations of

pursue reform differ.

announce

why the
Some

his

own

Shah decided

White
at this

authors, such as James

254 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 425.
255 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111.
256 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111.
257 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111.
258 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p. 10.
259 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.426.

85
Bill, argue

that it was an attempt

rural class to

to create a traditional

counter the urban middle

class that refused

to support the Shah. 260 Ruhollah Ramazani ha-s argued that the
goal

was to finally free

influence

internal decision making from the

of external political

development. 261

Amin

influence through economic

Saikal sees it

as an

attempt by

the

Shah to achieve two objectives: to widen his base of support
through
have

carefully controlled mass

the effect

of lessening

mobilization; this would

his reliance

on the

United

States, which would further strengthen his position. 262 These
are possible explanations,

but what is also

of interest is

that from this period that the United States began
on the Shah

rather than other

to focus

politicians or groups.

The

Shah consolidated his power and began to assume the image of
a strong, independent, and decisive leader.
The White Revolution had

six goals: comprehensive land

reform; nationalization of forests and pastures; public sale
of state owned factories to pay for the purchase of land for
redistribution;
franchise for

workers'
women;

and

profit sharing

in

industry; the

the formation

of

the

literacy

260 James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above:
The Case of Iran" The Journal of Politics, vol. 32(1)
February, 1970, pp. 19-40.
261

Ruhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's 'White Revolution': A
Study in Political Development" International Journal of
Middle East studies vol 5, 1974, pp. 124-139.
262 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 80.
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corps. 263

The Shah's

referendum was considered a sign of

popular support for his reforms:
the White

Revolution

99% of the voters endorsed

program, but

the

percentage of

the

population that voted was only roughly 25%. 264
There were doubts within both the CIA and the Bureau of
the Budget about the capacity of Iran to develop
as the White Revolution
simply

didn't exist

plan predicted; the

to support

envisaged. 265

The Bureau

critical study

of the

of

White

the

and that

and economic
peasantry

without the

support,

into

the

Budget

infrastructure
of modernization
wrote a

Revolution in

inept application of land reform
production,

the type

highly

1963 that

the

might lead to reduced farm
necessary administrative

Shah would

another support

as rapidly

group

fail
for

to

make

his

the

regime.266

Under these circumstances, he would rely increasingly on the
support of the
some

progress

mi 1 i tary. 267 Also,
by

downsizing

while the
his

army,

relationship with Moscow and providing greater
urban workers,

the CIA

disinclined to

follow

concluded
through on

that the
his

Shah had
easing

made
his

benefits for
Shah would

reforms, since

263 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 82.
264 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 82.

265 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 112.
266 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 112.

267 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.112.
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White Revolution was inadequately planned.268
The effect of

land reform was successful

that almost all large landholdings were

in the sense

eliminated, and the

landlords' traditional power base, separating the
the

rural

population

was

landlords did use their
as the Shah had hoped, 270

eliminated. 26'

Shah from

Also,

compensation to invest in

former
industry

however there was still resentment

at the loss of position by landlords including the clergy. 271
Educational and other reforms were

impeded by red tape, and

the overstaffed and inefficient bureaucracy.2 72
hand, the creation
went

out

into

educated youth

of the Health and

the

country

into support

to

Literacy Corps, which

promote

of the

On the other

both,

mobilized

Shah and his

goals. 273

Also, provision of security benefits for industrial workers,
such as

the legislation of

insurance policy,

a minimum

wage and

increased the Shah's urban

social

support where

he had been traditionally weak.274
While the Shah mobilized large parts of the population,
there was no concomitant avenue for political

participation

268 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.112.
26' Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 85.
270 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p. 131.
271 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p.134.

272 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p. 132.
273

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.88.

274

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.87.

88

created. 275

Land reform

holdings of

most of the

the government created
to

had ultimately failed, because
beneficiaries were too

the land reform laws which
to keep

traditional

institutionalize

Also, there

of

of land, thus

power. 277

the gains

The

he had

political parties.

Shah

failed

to

the Majlis

with two official

Those groups, brought in to the

formed another source of support

among

maintaining a

made, since

continued as a rubber stamp organization,

1967

were loopholes in

allowed the royal family,

large tracts

base

small, and

state-run farm corporations in

alleviate the problem. 276

others,

the

Majlis,

for the Shah and political

dissent was effectively suppressed by S.A.V.A.K. Traditional
politics continued,

with the Shah at the

center of a great

web, refusing to build any institution that might weaken his
power.

OIL REVENUES, MILITARY PURCHASES, AND THE APPEARANCE
OF ABSOLUTE CONTROL

Much of

the Shah's

increasing

independence from

the

United States, and his ability to build a large army, can be
attributed to

the steady

rise in

oil revenues.

U.S. economic assistance to Iran was terminated

Official
in 1967, as

275 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.427.
276 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 429.
277

Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 429.
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oil revenues continued

to climb.

Oil income hit

a record

$555 million in 1963-1964, and had increased to $958 million
in 1968-1969, $1.2 billion in 1970-1971, $5 billion in 19731974, and

nearly $20

1976. 278 Between 1974

billion by

and

1977, cumulative oil revenue topped $38 billion.
The combination of consolidation

of power at home

increased oil revenues allowed the Shah
to

begin

pursue

the

role

of

and

to look outward and

regional

leader.

increasingly took policy positions that were

He

not in perfect

alignment with the United States, such as his state visit to
Moscow

in 1965,

which garnered

two economic

and military

agreements. 279 The first involved supplying the

Soviet Union

with

in

$600 million

exchange,

the

in natural

Soviets

gas, beginning

agreed

to build

Isfahan, construct a pipeline from the
Iran, and
second

build

agreement

armored troop
return

a machine

for

carriers,
natural

criticized the

gas

from

United States for

in

million

trucks, and

steel

Shiraz.280
dollars

Nasser had started

worth of

Iran. 281

The

food aid to

Shah

supplying rebels

in

also

Egypt, since
in 1960,

in Khuzistan with

278 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.427.
27'

The

antiaircraft guns

Iran and Egypt had broken off diplomatic relations
and

mill in

Caucasus to northern

tool plant

garnered $110

a

1970; in

Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95.

280 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95.

281 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95.
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weapons, in addition to troop maneuvers on Iraqi soil. 282
Another

was

factor

the

assessment

the

by

State

Department that it was important to supply allies with arms,
since

the Soviet

allies. Despite

Union was
the

already doing

fact that

in

Defense Department's International

this

for their

the assessment

of

the

Security Agency Iran was

spending too much money on arms, the United States continued
to

supply Iran

with

sophisticated

military equipment

in

order maintain the relationship. 283
The

so called two

pillar policy

that designated Iran

and Saudi Arabia as regional security enforcers began during
the Johnson administration.

The United States was

heavily

involved in the Vietnam war at the time the British withdrew
from

the Middle East,

burden of

and was

regional security.284

unwilling to

It was unlikely

states would trust another Western power,
allied

with Israel. 285

Iran provided

the real

The Saudi

undertake the

role was

strength. 286

that Arab

certainly not one
symbolic, while

The Shah

wanted both

superpowers out of the gulf,

and believed that

Iran should

be able

interests by

to protect

its own

maintaining free

282 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 117.
283 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 119-120.
284 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 125.
285 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.125.
286 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 126.

91
passage through the vital Straight of Hormuz. 287
After the 1972 meeting between Nixon, Kissinger and the
Shah, military purchases reached new dimensions.
Nixon

designated

Middle

East,

in

disengagement.
maintain

the Shah

as

accordance
Towards

this position,

blanche on arms sales. 218
to purchase arms

the regional
with

the end

the

In effect,

power

Nixon Doctrine

goal of helping

the United

in the

States

Since the Shah

of

the Shah

provided carte

needed no prodding

anyway, billions of dollars

were spent on

military equipment.
For

the United states,

was crucial.
and the
of oil

a good

The United States

relationship with Iran

needed an advocate

Shah helped the United States

Kissinger's

to maintain a supply

1973 28 9.

despite the embargo of
shuttle diplomacy

in the

Also,

other justification used for massive arms

which was severely
along with

the rest

despite

accord. 290

The

purchases in Iran

dollars into the U.S. economy

affected and had
of the

he supported

Middle East

Arab criticism, and promoted an Arab-Israeli

was that it helped repatriate

in OPEC

slid into a

world.

By

recession

1970, the

United

States had become a net importer of oil, and supply from the
Middle

east was

vital to the

national economy

287 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 126.
288 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p.15.
289 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,p.140.

2'0 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.140.

as well as
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national security.
It is difficult
were

to comprehend the amount

purchased. In

meeting, $9

billion

delivery.

initiatives.

first four

worth

Secretary

Nixon) attempted

several

the

of

of equipment

Iranians
dispatched

not

more

met with

sophisticated
operate

Richard

Hallock,

a

for

two

the

Shah on

needed more

trained

weaponry

service. 291

or

ordered

Schlesinger (under

that Iran

couldn't

1972

restraint through

privately

occasions, arguing

personnel,

some

after the
was

Defense James

to introduce
First, he

years

of arms that

highly

which

the

Second,

he

regarded

military

procurement and management analyst and a former colleague at
the

Rand Corporation,

Shah. 292

to provide

to the

Hallock's position was a delicate one, since he was

to advise the Shah as well
the Shah's views
was

technical advice

also

as keep Schlesinger informed

and problems as they

independently on

retainer

occurred. 293 Since he
as

consulting company to the Government of

part

of his

on,

questions

were

raised

about

Ultimately, there was very little that
while Kissinger

remained in

the White

291 Sick, All Fall Down, p.15.
292

Sick, All Fall Down, p.16.

293

Sick, All Fall Down, p.16

2'4 Sick, All Fall Down, pl6.

own

Iran, Hallock ended

up balancing three important sets of interests, and as
went

of

his

time

actions.294

Schlesinger could do
House.

During

the

93

course of

his meetings with the Shah,

Schlesinger tried to

dissuade him, but his orders were to approve any

item short

of nuclear weaponry if the Shah insisted. 295
While the scale indicates the Shah's

monomania and the

manner in which they were purchased indicates

the extent to

which he had centralized power around himself.

Essentially,

a very small group determined security

expenditures and the

military budget was exempt from audit procedures. 296 The Shah
decided what he wanted, and the loans to purchase such items
were automatically approved
receiving any

information

by the
about

Shah's cabinet
the

equipment

without
itself. 297

However, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG)

believed that purchases were made without a consideration of
long-term

needs, were

construction schedules,

not synchronized
and

that

as a

with

training and

result,

Iran

was

getting less value from its purchases than a better prepared
state. 291
Despite the fantastic oil wealth, Iran was still a poor
country. The Shah stopped the rural

investment program, and

encouraged migration to the cities.

Those who stayed in the

countryside felt

the Shah did

nothing for them,

and those

295 Sick, All Fall Down, p15

296 Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 55.
297 Ball, Security
55-56.

and Economy in

the Third

World, p.

2'8 Ball, Security and Economy in Third World, p. 79.
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who went to the cities were unable to find jobs and lived in
slums.

The

average

Iranian

purchasing power was
food.

This

wealthy elite

technicians, who
their
believe

quite

poor,

and

his

eroded by inflation, particularly

kind of
and

was

life was

the large

in direct
number of

lived completely

own complexes.
that Americans

It was

apart

contrast to

the

U.S. advisors

and

from Iranians

difficult for

were exploiting

for

people not to

them, just

Russians and the British had a century before.

in

as the

CHAPTER IV

TENURE COMPARISON

This chapter compares the tenure periods in each state.
The comparison is divided into two parts. First,

each state

will be reviewed to determine how well Goldberg's
fits

the particular situation.

how much

influence

the

The point

United States

framework

is to determine

wielded

over

each

leader, and whether U.S. influence, in terms of foreign aid,
caused these leaders to become too dependent on the U.S. for
foreign aid

and

Also, U.S.
aid

may

over identified

with

demands for actions as quid
have

antagonized

the

the United

States.

pro quo for foreign

nationalist

opposition groups, making it difficult for

feelings

of

them to maintain

control.
Second, an assessment will be made of the other factors
included

for

comparison,

relationship with

the

presence

country

in

the

specifically

United States,
and

political life. These factors
two states in

the

the
role

the

historical

amount of
of

U.S.

religion

will be compared between

order to evaluate

their impact prior

in
the

to the

crisis period.
Before commencing the comparison and analysis, a review
of

Goldberg's

framework

may

be

helpful.

Goldberg
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hypothesizes
examples

the

Shah

both

constitute

which has

certain

Chief among these is the centralization of

characteristics.

the ruler,

popular

and

neopatrimonial regime,

of the

power by

Marcos

that

support,

urban based
and

the

support rather than

presence

of

congresses

mass
and

parliaments with little real power. Also, the leader acts as
a

power

broker

oligarchies,

among

new

bureaucracy. The

four

elite

professionals,

groups:

the

traditional

military

neopatrimonial leader plays one

and

the

group off

of another to maintain power.
The neopatrimonial leader depends primarily on a system
of

patronage

patronage

and

system must

prestige awards.
by the

coercion

to

maintain

be fueled,

authority.

however, by

Foreign aid solicited,

monetary or

won, and dispensed

leader can provide the resources which are necessary

to maintain his power. However, there are two costs
dictator. First, leaders develop an
aid at
Second,

The

the

expense

the United

of building

for the

overreliance on foreign
mass

States may demand

political
quid pro

support.
quos which

irritate the nationalist feelings of elite and other groups.
Over identification
legitimacy,

being

can

occur,

perceived as

United States. Finally, if

and the
a

leader

puppet or

tool

lose
of the

economic growth falters, he

not be able to provide fuel for the patronage
is his means of support.

can

may

machine which
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THE PHILIPPINES

Although the
very

Philippines generally fits

well, there are some

discrepancies between it and the

Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos.
much better

Also, the fit

becomes

after martial law was imposed in 1972, although
are some significant variations.

again, there
martial

the framework

law

centralize

provided

power to a

Marcos

with

much greater

the

Essentially,

opportunity

degree; previously, he

was constrained by the Congress, despite the fact that
could be
restraint

bribed to his advantage.
can be seen

in Marcos'

trying

to

make

sure

that

many

A demonstration of this
uneasiness regarding the

Constitutional Convention. Although he spent a
in

to

a provision

lot of money
limiting

the

president's term to eight years wouldn't be upheld, he could
not

be sure.

The nationalist

opposition was

individuals (like Benigno Aquino)
almost as powerful

that were as wealthy

as he was. Undoubtedly,

convention

members who

beliefs in

limiting

were

comprised of
and

there were also

completely sincere

presidential

tenure

and

groups

Goldstone

in
power,

their
who

couldn't be bought.
The

four elite

oligarchy,

military,

varied in

strength.

political

entity

bureaucratic

elite

that

bureaucratic

and

identifies---

new professional

The military as a separate influential
didn't
to

exist,
a

and

significant

neither
degree.

did

the
The
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professional

class

entrepreneurial

was

split

group and

comprised of the

between

the old

professional and

a

newly

expanded

liberal intelligentsia,
entrepreneurial part

the traditional elite. The

bureaucracy as a separate

isn't

Marcos did

discussed, although

fill it

loyal to him.

The real strength in Philippine

in the landed

aristocracy.

The

of

class

with people
politics lay

reason for this

is partly

historical and partly cultural.
Th~

during

Spanish

created an

indigenous landed

their colonization.

the United States

This class

Survey report in

"the Philippines

traditionally

has

powerful industrial

their lawyers." 3oo
and technical
unable

to

and commercial

Al though

groups
challenge

grew

patron/client

CIA, in

a

dominated

by

a

landholders and a
entrepreneurs, and

the strength of the

managerial

during the

they

prevailing

the

controlled by the elite.301

The

1965, observed that

been

small, wealthy elite, consisting of large
few

was preserved when

became the colonizer. 299

National Intelligence

upper class

1960's,

structure

power

The elite controlled

networks, which

were reinforced

were

extensive
by cultural

practices.
299 Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p.

,

8.

300
CIA,
Philippines:
General
Survey,
National
Intelligence Survey, NIS 99, July 1965 [sanitized copy
released November 19801, pp.
48-54 reproduced by Schimer,
The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.
30l CIA, General Survey, pp 48-54, as reproduced
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp 126-131.
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What

occurred after

however,

was

the

the

selection

imposition
of

certain

aristocracy to

benefit

from Marcos

imposition

martial

law

of

eliminating important

is

Marcos management

there

was

forced to sell through

no

the

With

the

challenge

An example

sugar industry.

Growers were

the National Sugar Trading

Company,

managed by Bobby Benedicto,

a former fraternity brother

Marcos

Law

at

authority
and

the Philippines
to negotiate all

sale. 303

Losses

to

profits to enrich

well as his family.

of the

law,

portions of

patronage.

families and their

Marcos and his cronies, as

of martial

School. 302

He

was

of

given

contracts for purchase, milling
financial

through

and

market

at between 11

manipulation by Benedicto have been estimated

billion pesos and 14 billion pesos (value of the peso ranged
from seven to the dollar in 1981 to twenty in 1985). 304

This

coincided with a world wide downturn in demand for sugar and
the

loss of

their easy
closed;

the U.S.
lifestyle,

half the

quota in

1974. 305 The

and workers

work force was

starved

planters lost
because

on part-time,

mills

and one in

five was unemployed.3 86 Planters also comprised a large group
of the aristocracy which had no reason to love Marcos. While
302 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle , p. 53.
303 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

'

p. 53.

304 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People, p. 54.
305 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle , p. 53.
306 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 54.
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it can be argued
these
the

that the downturn in demand would have had

effects whoever managed
impoverishment

was

the industry,

likely

due

to

the extent of

corruption

and

mismanagemement by Bobby Benedicto.
The

fact that

Marcos assigned

certain parts

of the

economy to friends and relatives was not shocking in itself,
because

there

provided

was

for by

product of
extended

an

expectation

the successful

family

Filipino culture. They
kinship

individual's

group

loyalty,"

as

the

and

that

this

family would
member. This

be
is a

view the family

and the

"primary

of

an

true

for

is

focus

equally

groups. 3o7

In

addition, a system of ritual kinship called compadrazgo,

is

maternal

and

practiced.

paternal

A non-kinsman

extended

kinship

godparent becomes

a

compadre by

becoming the child's godparent at a baptism, confirmation or
wedding. 301
godchild
between

The

relationship

involves reciprocal
true kinsmen, and

are routinely cemented in
or "utang na loob,"
pro

between the

godparent

obligations similar

business or

quo, but instead depends on

to those

political alliances

this fashion. 309

is not reciprocated

and

The

obligation,

in terms of a quid

the recipient's ability to

307
CIA, General Survey,
p.
127, as reproduced by
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.
308 CIA, General Survey, pp. 127-128, as reproduced
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.

by

~ CIA, General Survey, pp. 128, as reproduced
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.

by
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return a favor according to his/her means. llO
patronage relationships has spilled
arena, so. that politics in

This system of

over into the political

the Philippines was

Tammany Hall days in the United States. 311 The
Philippine

politica~

not µnlike

CIA report on

system stated that:

Like
allegiance
to kinsmen,
allegiance
to
political leaders became dependent largely upon
debts of gratitude arising from the ability and
willingness of a leader to confer benefits upon
his followers.
Democracy, however, added a new
element; the followers could discharge their debts
of gratitude with their votes, along with those of
whatever compadres, friends, YJ} tenants they might
in turn be able to influence. 1
Goldstone's

assertion is that

Marcos used

the money

and benefits to reinforce the clientelist relationship,
further

develop

web

the

of

personal

obligation

and
that

neopatrimonial leaders rely on. There is evidence that there
was

widespread official

The documents
before

from

the

corruption prior

to martial

Symington hearings

held

in

law.
1969

Congress were sanitized, but it was clear that there

was widespread crime and official corruption that Marcos was
unable to control. 313

There is also anecdotal

evidence that

310
H. Denton
and Victoria Villena-Denton,
Frank
FiliQino Views of America (Washington, D.c., 1986) p, 3031.

311 CIA, General Survey, pp. 128, as reproduced
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.

by

312 CIA,
General Survey, pp. 128, as reproduced
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131.

by

3l3 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a
Times Books, 1987), p. 73.

Dictator (New York:
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Marcos used
martial

official aid
For

law.

engineering

to

enrich his

example, four

battalions

provided to

of

friends prior

u.s.

the

the

to

equipped

Philippines

as a

result of the 1966 official visit to Washington were used by
Rudolfo Cuenca to execute a highway contract that Marcos had
awarded to him. 314
During the martial law
technocratic class,
at the

period, Marcos created his

and empowered his own

expense of the

Armacost,

former

comments that
within

close associates

established professional class.

the process, he antagonized the traditional
U.S.

to

Ambassador

" ..• one source of

the elite was the

own

elite.
the

In

Michael

Philippines,

resentment against

Marcos

fact that by perpetuating himself

in off ice for twenty years, he had denied many the chance to
get
to

up to the trough. 11315 The President had extensive powers
influence

the

politician. 316 Unlike

success or

failure

the situation

of

in the

any citizen
United

States,

where being a Democrat

during a Republican presidency

not

an

personally affect

success in

the

Philippines

individual's
is dependent

success,
on

the

or

does

business
correct

314 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.53.

315

Michael H. Armacost,
"Philippine Aspirations for
Democracy" in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, edited by
Hans Bennendijk. pp. 296-297.
316 CIA, General Survey, as reproduced

Philippines Reader, pp. 129.

by Schirmer, The
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political affiliation. 3ll

To support the

the Nacionalistas were in power meant
risk.

Martial law exacerbated the

a much wider

control over the

liberal party when

taking a considerable

situation, giving Marcos

economy and thus

the spoils

system.
The military which the United States had participated
in

training through

assistance

was

used

responsible for

the

JUSMAG and
to

enforce

arrest and

Filipinos. When martial law was
between

60,000

and

the provision

75,000,

Philippines

had

to

law,

martial
detention

and

was

of thousand

of

declared, soldiers detained
and

engaged

reportedly

kidnapping, torture and "salvaging. 11318
the

of military

carry

The

out

in

Armed Forces of
enforce

and

law. 319

presidential orders and decrees during martial
aid to the military was construed to be support

all
U.S.

for martial

law and its excesses. The range of repressive activities did
not coincide with the threat as it actually existed; the New
People's Army
to

started to grow in the

martial law

and the fact

1980's, as a response

that there

weren't any other

avenues open for protest or dissent.
In

the

pre-martial

law

period,

the

317 CIA, General Survey, as reproduced

Marcos

regime

by Schirmer, The

Philippines Reader, pp. 129.
318

Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People of the
Philippines (Stanford:Stanford Alumni Association, 1987),
p. 90. Salvaging means shooting a person in the head and
dumping the body.
319 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People,

p. 89.
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benefitted from substantial aid as a reward for allowing the
Clark Air Field and Subic Naval Base to be used as logistics
and supply .centers

during the

Vietnam

war. For

example,

after the 1966 state visit by President Marcos to the United
States, the Philippines was promised $45 million in economic
assistance, $31

million to

settle

veteran's claims,

$3.5

million for Imelda Marcos' cultural fund, and the previously
mentioned

engineering equipment

Philippines

continued

to

for ten

battalions. 328 The

receive substantial

amounts

of

military and financial assistance.
However, the biggest amounts came after martial law was
declared.
Cooperation

In

1973,

the

and Development

Organization
reported

that

flows to the Philippines amounted to $97
1972

and $112

million in

exchange $2 million
country, back
$18.5

million

in 1971, as

to the
in

1973, as

u.s. 321

1972,

net

Economic
financial

million dollars in

opposed to

a negative

capital flowed out

Military
to

for

$45.3

of the

assistance went from
million

in

19 7 3. 322

320 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.53.
321

Organization
for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development, Geographical Distribution of financial flows to
Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1977), p. 186.
322 Figures are taken

from reports from two government
publications, "Military Assistance to the Govt.
of the
Philippines" and report submitted to the Fraser Subcommittee
by the Dept. of State in June, 1975 and "Foreign Assistance
and Related Programs Appropriations, FY 1973" presented in
hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee. They
were reproduced by Walden Bello in "The Logistics of
Repression."
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was

corruption
economy.

the

that

much of the

Since so

States,

rampant

so

belief

that

it

was

early

United

that

destroying

the

from the United

money came

the

the

became clear

and it

law ended,

when martial

1980s,

through

these levels

at

continued

Assistance

States approved

of

martial law gained legitimacy for both government supporters
and would be dissidents.
A

staff report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations is perhaps the best indicator of the U.S. position
towards

martial

law.

Submitted

in

1973,

the

report

discusses the attitude of Americans in the Philippines. They
were generally supportive of martial law

for three reasons.

First, Marcos had promised to open the economy in ways which
were very
were not

attractive to
perceived to

democratic processes.
democratic
However,
that

process

investors. Second, U.S.
be related

Third,
were

there was also

martial

law

might

to

interests

the preservation

the general opinion was
considered

to

be

of
that

deficient.

concern among "American officials"
lead

a

radicalization

of

the

opposition since the only form of protest available would be
violent protest. Also, the Nacionalista party
majority in

both

houses of

the

Philippine Congress,

therefore must bear responsibility for
However, what
preservation of
interests, and

is most striking
democracy
that the

already had a

its ineffectiveness.

is the perception

was not

and

that the

coincidental with

United States was

pursuing a

U.S.
new
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pragmatism. 323

Thus, while

the United States did

acquiesce

to martial law conditions and provided considerable economic
and

military assistance,

guos, in

terms

it

of reform,

was the
which

absence of

dismayed the

quid pro
opposition

rather than the increase in economic assistance.
As

States

was evident from
and

the previous

the Philippines

have a

chapter, the United

history of

close ties

after independence. Also, the amount of U.S. presence in the
country is much larger than

in Iran, from U.S. corporations

to the Subic Naval Base and Clark

Air Base. The bases alone

employ

workers,

approximately

dependents. 324

The

employment, but

15,000
presence

Filipinos

of

have

troops

always

not

counting

has

provided

resented

the

sin

cities which exist around the bases, Olongapo by Subic Naval
Base, and Angeles
here is
make

by Clark Air

that U.S. troops didn't come

a profit but

allowed

by the

Iran, where
paying

Base.

engaged in

government.

The

important point

to the Philippines to

legitimate military activity
This presents

a contrast

thousands of Americans arrived to

technical jobs which

the Iranians

to

work at high

felt should have

been theirs.
323 Staff Report prepared for the use of the U.S. Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines:
November 1972, committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st session,
February 18, 1973, pp. 1-2, 4, 31-33, 37, 41,
45-6,
reproduced by Schirmer, The Philippines Reader.
3
24

Daniel M. Goldstein, U.S. Policy Concerning Renewal
of the
Military Base Agreement
with the Philippines
(Pittsburgh: Pew Charitable Trust, 1988), p. 15.
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Filipinos do
States

not

politics,

Filipinos

are

or

have a
a

simplistic

monolithic

accustomed to

view of

view

of

constant U.S.

their culture and society, and they

United

Americans.

influence over

do not perceive it as a

malevolent one. 325 For example, the expressions of concern in
1985 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were reported
and well received at a time
supporting the
view,

Marcos dictatorship. 326

particularly

prevented
Also,

when many believed the U.S. was

among

urban

long-term bitterness

Filipinos during

organize effective

This sophisticated

intellectuals,
against the

the 1970s

and they were also reportedly effective

have

United States.

and 1980s

opposition groups in

may

were able

to

the United States,
in appearing before

Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In

terms

of

religion,

predominantly Catholic
south.

The role of

the

country, except

religion wasn't

Philippines

is

for Muslims

in the

a

significant during the

tenure period, except that some radicalization of the clergy
did occur during the 1970s,
Vatican II

and

the

formulation

Philippine Catholicism had
on spiritual

and not

priests affected

particularly with the advent of
of

Liberation

been conservative, concentrating

material conditions.

who joined

Theology.

guerrillas or

The number

of

organized their

325 Frank Denton and Victoria Villena-Denton, Filipino
Views of America (Washington, D.C.: Asia Fellows Ltd.,
1986), p. 188.
326 Denton, Filipino Views of America, p. 189.
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own groups
it

did

never large, but

to indoctrinate the masses was

split

directions.

the

church

This split is

hierarchy

two

in

discussed in

different

more detail during

the analysis of the crisis period.

IRAN

Goldberg's

framework doesn't

several reasons. The most obvious
Iran

didn't receive

fit Iran

very well

is that from 1967 onward,

economic aid

from the

United States,

although it did host

a Military Assistance Advisory

which

assist

attempted

utilizing
receive

to

for

the

Shah

with

Group,

planning

and

military purchases and training, and continued to
small amounts

should be divided into

of military

aid. The

tenure period

two phases: pre-1962 and post

1962.

Consolidation of the Shah's power occurred after he declared
the White Revolution in July 1962, and it coincided with the
acceleration of profits from oil production.
In the
the

pre-1962 phase, the Shah attempted

military to

decisive
weaken

reinforce his power.

steps to
the

overthrow.

crush the

National Front,

Tudeh party
he

still

The head of SAVAK, General

sent into exile
him, which he

While

in early 1961
had confessed to

to build up
he had taken

and considerably

was

in

danger

of

Teimur Bakhtiar, was

for plotting a

coup against

Kermit Roosevelt and

Allen
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Dulles in 1958. 327
landlords,

His other source of support came from the

bureaucrats and

upper class

and the

problems such as

entrepreneurs which

aristocracy, since it was easier
for

the

working

class. 328 This

growing middle

the inability to

considerable economic aid to

led

tax the wealthy,

United

States

pull Iran out of

to

landed

to raise taxes on

The

class. 329

formed the

staples
extended

the economic

abyss that AIOC crisis had caused, and had also continued to
cover
the

Iran's budget
status

charges

quo. 330

of

deficits, which
By

corruption

1958,

inevitably maintained

concern was

concerning

the

growing

about

Shah's family

increased repression.33 1 Sam Bowling, the Deputy

and

Director of

Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs at the State Department,
submitted

a

report

to

President

Kennedy

in 1961

which

accurately predicted that traditional leaders, including the
clergy,

would

regeneration
class,

and

provide
of

Shi'a

take

dynamic leadership
Islam,"

over

capture the

Iranian

based

on

urban

politics.332

"the
middle
His

327 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 108.
328 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 71.
329 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 101.
330 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 100.
331 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 101.
332 Political Characteristics of the Iranian Urban
Middle-Class and Implications Thereof for United States
Policv: A report by the Deputy Director of Greek, Turkish,
and Iranian Affairs (Bowling), United States Department of
State to the President March 20, 1961, as reproduced by
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recommendations included "dumping his family, or most of it,
in

Europe,"

examples

as

of

well

as

reducing

ministers,

corrupt

without

some

military,

and

excoriating

lack of social

traditional elite for its
However,

the

type

economic support, the Shah

of

crisis

making

the

res pons ibi 1ity.333
and further

would probably have been

U.S.
unable

to announce the White Revolution.
The

White

Revolution's

goals

certainly impressed U.S. policy

were

makers.

admirable,
However, the

failed to broaden his base of support, and ultimately
up by

mobilizing the rural

fact,

he entrenched the

population into the

elite by

opportunities supported by

and
Shah
ended

cities. In

allowing them investment

heavy state investment,

as well

as opportunities for court patronage. This failure can taken
in the

same context

problem

of rural

as other

developing

migration without

employ new groups, mixed with rapid
unusual. Also, growth of an
denied economic

states, and

the robust

the

economy to

population growth isn't

educated middle class, which is

opportunity through the

dominance of elite

groups is the rule rather than the exception.
severe repression, however, and

The Shah used

was genuinely out of

touch

with how dissatisfied people had become during the 1970s. He
had

concentrated

supporting

the

on

suppressing

military and

the

traditional

intelligentsia,
elites,

and had

Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 322.
333 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 328.
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taken

the

countryside

for

granted,

benefits of land reform had

believing

that

the

permanently endeared him to the

peasantry.
The composition of the elite groups
however

the salaried

service

doubled between 1956

grew phenomenally as
consisted

middle class

well.

was fairly static,

which formed

and 1977, 334
The

of 1000 individuals

and the military

traditional elite in
only, who owned

large commercial farms as well as many of the
in

banking, manufacturing,

urban construction.BS
creating an

foreign

While

educated

middle

the civil

trade,

the Shah

many of the
private firms

insurance

had

class other

Iran

and

succeeded

than

the

in

urban

merchants, bazaaris and clerics, he was unable to completely
dominate the latter group,
them beginning

in 1975.

and in fact gravely
For the

former

antagonized

group, he

didn't

create avenues for political participation, but instead used
SAVAK

to make

sure they

wouldn't become

a threat

to his

regime.
The
States~

over identification
again

can

Revolution phase

and the

Iranian perception
the

Shah

be

in 1953,

of the

looked

at

Shah with
using

pre-White

post-White Revolution phase.

was that the United
and

the

the United

then provided

The

States re-installed
him

with

both the

economic and military wherewithal to consolidate his regime.
334 Abrahamian,

Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 434.

335 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 432.
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The

economy was subsidized

through economic

was trained and initially funded through

aid and SAVAK

military aid. This

is an accurate perception and was consistent with

the goals

of United States economic and military

assistance. However,

what Iranians

easily is

do

demonstrations
have

been

not acknowledge

leading up

completely

support for the

to Mossadeq's removal

generated

by

the

CIA;

distress that Iran was

crisis.

Also, Iranians

Soviet Union and Mossadeq's inability to

the

could not
was

that would

in as a

deeply

that

there

Shah, and probably for anything

end the economic
the AIOC

as

result of

distrusted

the

control the Soviet

backed Tudeh party was frightening for many individuals.
In the post-White

Revolution phase, however,

was increasingly less reliant on U.S.
support, and promoted Iran
1970s, fully

the Shah

economic and military

as a regional superpower in

the

capable of bolstering United

States interests

while pursuing some rapprochement with the

Soviet Union. As

well, Iran was a leader

in OPEC, forcefully pursuing Iran's

interests in terms of oil prices and assuring access
Straits

of Hormuz.

Yet the

Iranians still

United States strongly with the Shah's

to the

associated the

regime, and believed

that he was pursuing policies instigated by the White House.
Part of this perception undoubtedly had to

do with the

massive arms sales which occurred in the 1970s.

While some

U.S. policy makers
purchases,

tried to

impose restraint

this information wasn't

given to

in terms

of

the public at

113

large. Also, the presence of thousands of wealthy Americans,
whose

wealth

was

generated

by

the

arms

trade,

caused

heightened Iranian resentment against the United States at a
time

when many

other

Iranians couldn't

side, the United

the Shah

find employment.

States could only

to be more restrained; by

oil alone
foreign

was vital as the U.S.
sources of oil.

On the

try to encourage

the early 1970s, Iran's

shifted into dependence on

Also, U.S. policy

makers had very

little understanding of the real conditions

of the majority

of Iranians.

The

personnel

to

following

chapter

cessation of

failures of

gather

information

on

A.I.D.

intelligence

the

is

crisis

assistance

in

trying to

improve

meant that

the lives

embassy

documented

period.

longer a group of U.S. personnel who

and

in

the

However,

the

there

was

no

were actively involved

of

the average

Iranian.

There was a huge discrepancy between Iran's wealth from oil,
and

the state

living

of the economy

in urban

diverted

slums or

into

infrastructure
Philippines,
monetarily as

condition of people

rural poverty.

military

spending,

investment
those that

and the

and

Oil

industrial

corruption.

surrounded

oil wealth was used to

wealth was

As

the leader

and
in

the

benefitted

reward followers in a

patronage network.
The

final component

of

over identification

Iranian culture and religion. First, there
national xenophobia which exists as a

involves

is a traditional

remnant of domination
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by the British and

Russians in the late 19th and early 20th

centuries. The United States transgressed
in

Iranian affairs

This meant

with the

that for

distinctions,

few

re-installation of

many Iranians

beyond their -0wn memory; for

into interference
the Shah.

the 1953 coup

extended

them, U.S. behavior was,

analogous

to

British

and

with

Russian

imperialism.
Second, Iran was and
and Islam

is a predominantly Muslim

exists riveted to

the perfect era

state,

when Mohammed

lived in the seventh century after Christ. 336

Western values

and customs

especially

were

religious leaders

perceived with

distrust,

like Ayatollah Khomeini

who advocated

by
a

return to an Islamic state. In Iranian tradition, as well as
in

the

1906

constitution,

religious

authority to declare legislation
Islamic principles. 337
in that there

leaders

Western

culture

Ayatollah's judgements
coincided

one infallible

are infallible. 338 Statements

by religious leaders assume the importance
The

with

from Sunni Islam

are certain principles set by

truth.

given

void if it conflicts

Shi'a Islam differs

imam and his descendants which

are

with

on

of an infallible
the corruption

tremendous

social

of
and

336 Adda B. Bozeman,

"Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the
Tradition of Persian Statecraft" in Orbis, vol. 23, number2,
summer 1979, p. 387.
337

Bozeman,
"Iran:
u. s. Foreign
Tradition of Persian Statecraft," p. 391.
338

Bozeman,
"Iran: U.S. Foreign
Tradition of Persian Statecraft," p. 390.
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economic change, which forced people to
religion as

a focus for their lives.

rely on traditional
For many, other roots

such as village or occupation didn't exist any longer. Since
the main Western
surprising that

presence in Iran

was American, it

the Ayatollah identified

and Shah

who was

trying

enemy.

However, it

to modernize

took a

is not

the United States
Iran, as

decade of

the

evil

economic hardship,

brutal repression by SAVAK and the persecution of the middle
class before

large

numbers

of students,

religious schools would revolt.

outside

of

the

CHAPTER V

THE CRISIS PERIOD: HISTORY AND COMPARISON

The comparison of the crisis
Iran will

focus on the U.S. response

collapse.
each

periods in the Philippines and

This chapter will

state.

The

to regime failure and

document the crisis period in

concluding

differences and similarities of

section

will

explore

the United States

the

response

to the devolution of power of President Marcos and the Shah,
and the ascendancy of the new regime.

THE IRANIAN CRISIS

The revolution in

Iran began with

the riots in

Qom on

January 8, 1978, almost two years prior to the taking of the
hostages on November 4, 1979.

The factors which combined to

cause the revolution had been present

throughout the Shah's

regime,

1970 decade

however,

strains and
state

it was

stresses

tactics used

growing middle

class

during the

of heavy
by

military

SAVAK, and
with

the

no political

that the

spending,

police

mobilization of
outlet

began

a
to

destabilize the country.
The Shah relied on the military to support his regime
and to establish Iran as an independent leader in the Middle
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East.
that

Given these two important roles, it is not surprising
so

much money

was

spent

in military

purchases

sophisticated equipment and weaponry.

The

the

attractive

armed

generous

forces

benefitted

pensions, frequent

facilities, comfortable

from

stores. 339

Despite

purposely

prevented the military

own regime

through

officer corps of

travel abroad,

housing, and

this preferential

several

becoming a

the

Shah

threat to his
The

lines

of

the commanders of

provincial

military units

another. 348

Permission to travel to Tehran or

had to come from the Shah

modern medical

treatment,

authority were structured vertically, and

another

salaries,

low-priced department

restrictions.

had no

of

direct contact

with one

meet with one

directly. 341

Also, there

were restrictions on the type of training allowed: exercises
were limited to daylight

hours, armed battalions could

travel more than 200 kilometers per
maneuvers rather than simulations
conditions

can account

for

not

year, and parade ground
were emphasized. 342

the M.A.A.G.'s

These

understandable

339 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 436.
34o

Ann Schulz, "Military Expenditures and Economic
Performance in Iran, 1950-1980: (Worcester, Mass. : Clark
University, 1980, mimeograph), pp. 20-21 as
quoted in
Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 4 5.
341

Schulz,
Performance," p45.
342

"Military

Expenditures

and

Economic

Schulz,
"Military
Expenditures and
Economic
Performance," p45, and Ball, Security and Economy in the
Third World, p. 45.
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frustration

poor

at

training

and

integration

of

military, since part of the problem was created by

the

the Shah

purposely.
In

terms

of

the

effect

expenditures

overwhelmed the

also

on

intent

modernizing

pursuing

the

on
Shah's

economy,

and

policy

equipment

in

terms

of

trying

to

build

an

A lot of Iran's difficulties are

of rapid
and

experienced

industrialization,

technicians.

modernization

made

a

he was

goals

on excess military spending, however, the
a

military

budget, since

ambitious

infrastructure

industrial base. 343

the

certain

profound

The
jobs

blamed

Shah also pursued
importing technical

rapid

drive

obsolete,

dislocation

as

towards

and

people

opportunities

closed. 344 Modernization was associated with the loss of jobs
as well as

the traditional way of life.3 45

exacerbated by unemployment, and the fact
called

for

technically

skilled

The problem was
that the new jobs

labor,

which

was

not

available. Instead of a growing economy that could cope with
a

growing

population,

large

groups

lost

ground. Wealth

became more concentrated as the decade progressed.
The most prosperous Iranians, who made up 20
percent of the population,received 57.5 percent of
343 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 183.
344 An example is the use of plastic vessels to replace
earthenware ones used for cooling. Once the source of
livelihood for village potters, plastics made the profession
obsolete. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268.
345 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268.
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the income in 1972 and 63.5 percent in 1975. The
share of the middle 40 percent decreased from 31
percent to 25.5 percent over the same period, and
that of the poorest 40 ~ercent declined from 11.5
percent to 11 percent.34
As traditional jobs were
cities

which

Tehran, for

could

not

example,

although Iran's

absorb

tripled

still

them.

years. 347

caused major problems in rural

and malnutrition

economic ills were
While

areas. 349 More than 75

was widespread. 350

reform were good

of

untreated disease

$66 per

These

exacerbated by shortages

the goals of

1971,

23 percent. 348 The majority

was still illiterate, and

of

Also,

between 1962 and

percent of rural families subsisted on an income of
month

the

The population

in twenty

population doubled

employment increased by only
the population

lost, people migrated to

socio-

and inflation.

public relations, the

fact remains that sufficient investment in human capital did
not exist to make them a reality.
Also,

the

purchases of

military

translate into more jobs for Iranians.
sophisticated that it required

equipment

did not

The equipment was so

a highly skilled work

to maintain it which Iran did not possess. Instead,

force
by 1976

there were 24,000 Americans living in Iran and without them,
34 6 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268.
34? Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268-269.
348 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 143.

349 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.186.
350 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.143.
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the
since

Iranian military
it could not

would have

been unable

to function,

own equipment. 351 Although

maintain its

Iranians and Americans worked well together, there was still
resentment

because the American

standard of

living was so

much better, and it was believed that they were
from Iranians. 352

taking jobs

Most Americans lived in special subsidized

housing, bought their goods at PXs,

and sent their children

to separate schools; despite their numbers, they made little
impact on Iranian perception of Americans. 353
economic

While
repression
grown to

conditions

by SAVAK also

worsened

in

1970s,

continued.

The organization had

over 5,300 full time agents

and an unknown number

of informants, and

it had the

power "to censor

screen applicants for government jobs, and to
necessary to hunt down dissidents. 11354 In
the

the

Imperial

Inspectorate kept

guarded against military

SAVAK

the media,

use all means

addition to SAVAK,
under surveillance,

conspiracies and

reported on

the

financial dealings of wealthy families. The J2 Bureau, which
had

been

collected

created in

1933

as part

military intelligence,

of

the

but also

armed forces,
kept an

eye on

351 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.137.
352 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 137.
353 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.137.
354 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 436.
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SAVAK and
relied

the

on

Inspectorate. 355

Imperial

SAVAK

to

maintain

While

control,

the

he was

Shah

obviously

distrustful of the organization, fearful that it might seize
power for itself. SAVAK effectively created
Iranians

were

because it

hesitant

could

be

to

become

dangerous for

a climate where

involved

in politics,

themselves

or

family

members. 356
In 1975, Amnesty International determined that Iran was
a frequent
hearings,

violator
and

of

human rights,

these reports

U.S.

Congress. By the

Arms

Sales concluded that

sell

weapons to a

response, the
the

it was

regime that

worst instances

of the

before the

the Subcommittee on

potentially dangerous to

was so

of torture.

repressive. 357

Three hundred

conditions . 359

355 Abrahamian,

curbed

and fifty-

Commission

twenty prisons. 358 Iranian expert

Richard Cottam reported in 1977 that the Shah was
prison

In

amnestied in February, 1977,

Shah allowed the International

Red Cross to visit

prompted

some liberalization and

seven political prisoners were
and in March the

this

prompted hearings

following year,

Shah allowed

and

The

Iran Between

State

improving

Department's

Two Revolutions,

p. 436-

437.
35 6 Saik al, The Rise and Fal 1 of the Shah, p .19 0.
357 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 500.
358 Abrahmian,
359

Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 501.

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.193.
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congressionally mandated report on human rights
fairly uncritical,

in 1977 was

referring to terrorist activity

and the

pace of economic and social change to justify the repressive
nature

of

the regime,

while

lauding Iran

for

the lower

incidence of torture. 360
However,

the Shah pursued

policies from

that punished groups which had previously
controls.
suffered
course

The middle

a

officially

acquiesced to his

class bazaar merchants, for

widespread intimidation
of

1975 to 1976

campaign

to

and

end

strict price controls and

controls during

inflation

blamed on profiteering.

and

Courts set up by SAVAK

the

shortages

The government imposed

imported large amounts of

undercut local businessmen. 361

sugar and meat to

example,

wheat,

The

issued 250,000 fines, banned

Guild
23,000

traders from their home towns, sentenced approximately 8,000
shopkeepers to prison terms ranging from two months to three
years,

and

brought further

businessmen. 362

This

charges against

campaign

was

180,000 small

executed

against

a

backdrop of corruption at court which was widely known.

The

court

and

could

monetary
Shah's

depend on

rewards,
family and

and

lucrative
investment

salaries, pensions,
opportunities

associates abounded,

as oil

for

the

wealth was

360 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.194.
361 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 498.

36 2 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 498.
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diverted for

personal gain. 363

The Pahlavi

Foundation, for

example, received a $40 million annual subsidy, and operated
as

a tax haven for

Times
as

some Pahlavi businesses.

reported that the Foundation

a source of

funds for the

exerting influence

The New York

"is used in three ways:

royal family; as

on key sectors of the

a means of

economy; and as a

conduit for rewards to supporters of the regime." 364
When Jimmy

Carter

was elected

to

the Presidency

in

1976, his stand on human rights and opposition to arms sales

/

encouraged

the Iranian opposition

to hope

that the United

States would put pressure on him to liberalize the regime.36 5
They

grew

bolder

in

calling

circulated protest letters. 366

for

his relationship

with

and

The Shah also believed

Carter expected him to liberalize,
risk

reforms,

openly
that

and he was reluctant

Washington,

because he

to

still

363 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 437. An
example of this involves the Shah's family borrowing money
from the state banks at favorable terms, reaping the profits
from investments. Also, it has been alleged that oil revenue
--- as much as $2 billion was transferred to secret foreign
bank accounts. While the money transfers left no record in
the state treasury, it did cause discrepancies between what
oil companies paid for Iranian oil and what was documented
by the government.
364 A. Chittenden, "Bankers Say Shah's Fortune Is Well
above a Billion," New York Times, 10 January 1979. As quoted
in
Iran Between Two Revolutions, by Ervand Abrahmian
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 438.
365 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 500.
366 Abrahamian,
502.

Iran Between Two

Revolutions, p.

501-
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relied on

Washington as a source

1977, the regime began
instituted

court

Commission

of

encouraged

the

protests;

of arms. 367

Beginning in

to release political prisoners,

reforms

promised

Juris ts. 368

The

to

International
of

loosening

towards

opposition

the

and

initially

controls
nonviolent

however, by November 1977, students were engaging

in street demonstrations in Tehran. 3'9
The revolutionary movement commenced

with the riots in

Qom at the beginning of the following year. Between
/

six and

one hundred demonstrators were killed in the January 9, 1978
riots,

depending

on

which

accounts

are

credited.

demonstration was in response to an article critical
Ayatollah
controlled

Khomeini

press, and came

Khomeini's son,
by SAVAK. 370
the

appeared

two months

in the

of the

government

after the

death of

who was widely believed to have been killed

This started off a cycle

Shi'ite cycle

ceremony be

which had

The

of mourning

of protests following

which dictates

held forty days after

a death. 371

a religious
On February

21st, riots broke out in Tabriz, where nine were

killed and

hundreds injured. The U.S. consul in Tabriz reported to Gary
Sick,

assistant

to

National

Security

advisor

Zbigniew

367 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.500.
368 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 501.
369 Abrahmian, Iran Between Two Revolutionsi p. 505.
370 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p. 34.
371

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 35.
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Brzezinski,

that the

that the targets

rioters were

of the demonstrations had

Western society such as
On March 29th,
against

On May

religious

and

been symbols of
theaters. 372

social clubs and movie

hundreds were arrested in Tabriz for rioting

the Shah and

Tehran. 373

young, unemployed,

on May 11,

15,

a

demonstrations erupted in

general strike

leaders; however,

was

called

troops patrolling

by

the streets

prevented rioting.374
The

Carter Administration's

didn't concern
appropriate

the
actions

instability
to

concerns
in Iran,

pursue

given

at

this

time

but

rather

the

the

conflicting

imperatives reducing arms sales and the strategic importance
of Iran

for the United States. 3" the debate centered around

the Shah's latest arms request for F-4 aircraft, and whether
they
radar

should be

prepared for

equipment which had

Ultimately,

the

later insertion

not been

pre-wiring was

of sensitive

approved for export. 376

not

approved

despite the

Shah's insistent requests, and the debate

was evidence that

the days of

finished. 377

Ambassador

the blank check
to

Iran,

James

policy were
Sullivan,

also

travelled

372 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 35.
313 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 206.

374 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.206.
375 Sick, All Fall Down, p.45.
376 Sick, All Fall Down, p.45.
377 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 45.
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Washington

that

summer

where

he

Sullivan was preoccupied mostly

met

with

Brzezinski.

with weapons sales to

Iran

which he favored, and was confident of the Shah's ability to
deal with internal disturbances. 378
in

June had been

Also, the demonstrations

relatively peaceful,

the intercession of

probably because of

Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who

at odds with Khomeini's more extreme views. 379
the
false

demonstrations also
sense of

lulled U.S.

security regarding

was often

The timing of

policy makers

into a

the seriousness

of the

demonstrations, and the Shah's ability to

control them. The

Shah

significance

would

demonstrations

have

understood

every 40

days,

the

whereas U.S.

of

policy makers

would not.
The

Shah

moved

towards

political participation

to

greater

calm

August 5, the beginning of Ramadan
promise reforms

and

free

liberalization

the rioters.

He

and
chose

and Constitution Day, to

elections in

1979

which

would

include the opposition. 388

On August 11, however, widespread

demonstrations

in

occurred

Isfahan,

Shiraz,

Ahvaz

and

Tabriz. 381

This was followed by a fire in a movie theater in

Abadan on

August 20, which

killed 377

people, and

rumors

quickly spread that the fire had been started by SAVAK which
378 Sick, All Fall Down, p.46.
379 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 47.
380 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 47.
311 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 206.
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had locked the
and

exit doors resulting

children. 382

incident

The

opposition,

since most

massacre. 383

Meanwhile, the

pursue

he

establishment, and

Shah appointed

acceptable

it was

a premeditated

Jaafar

to

Sharif-

reputation,

the

to

believed that he

credible because of this background. 384
elderly, ineffectual,

government

because he had a pious

be

would

it as

of women

Shah's government continued

The

Emami as Prime Minister
because

intensified

Iranians saw

conciliation.

in the death

religious

would be

more

However, he was also

and had been the head

of the Phalavi

Foundation which was the focus of suspicions regarding royal
corruption. 385
Shariatmadari

and

Sharif-Emami

attempted

other clerics

to

to

persuade

compromise, but

they

demanded that the 1906 constitution limiting the monarchy be
returned, and that Khomeini be allowed to come back into the
country

as conditions of

refused

both

Khomeini,

who

reform. 386

conditions,
subsequently

and

The Shah's government

pressured

settled

in

Iraq
Paris,

to

expel

where

directed events by telephone, cassettes smuggled into

he

Iran,

382 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 207. The movie
theater fire followed five other conflagrations in the
twelve preceding days, which had been set by fundamentalists
opposed to sinful movies.
383 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 207.
384 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.210.
385 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,

p. 210.

386 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 213.
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messengers, and the international media. 387
By

September, the Shah

decided to

pursue a crackdown

policy, with the support of Brzezinski, whose views the Shah
learned of via Iranian Ambassador Zahedi when he returned to
I ran

on September

5. 388

On September

2,000 people were gunned down during

7, between

a previously announced

demonstration in Tehran's Jaleh Square, on
to

as

"Black

expressing his

Friday. 11 319
regret

Carter

at the

700 and

what is referred

telephoned

violence

the

and his

Shah,

continued

support for the regime, while suggesting that liberalization
should continue. 390
the

During

Shah reiterated

democracy,

while

demonstrations

his

the course of the
commitment to

restating

were instigated

taking advantage of

his
by a

liberalization. 391

conversation,

liberalization and
belief

that

small group

the

that was

Despite the evidence

387 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 213.
388 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,
389 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 214.
390 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 214.
391 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 51-52. The Shah had no
record of this conversation with President Carter.
Why the
Shah
forgot the
phone call
completely is
open to
speculation;
it may have been his illness. Gary Sick
believes that the Shah was either in shock or under heavy
medication.
Ten days later, the Shah met with Ambassador
Sullivan who reported that the Shah was positive and
determined, rather than depressed and indecisive.
Sick
believes that part of the reason why the crisis wasn't
perceived as a threat was because rumors that the Shah was
doing poorly mentally and physically were contradicted by
Sullivan, and also because Sullivan never said too much
about the Shah's physical/mental health to Washington.
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that

the

opposed

demonstrations
to

every

mourning

cycle),

support

the

liberalize.
remain

days

40

However, the

Ironically,

followers

of

Ayatollah's

the

within

believing

aloof, refusing

strife.

increasing
the

in

number

traditional

Carter Administration

the

Shah,

were

that

United States

to intervene in
did

this

detachment

mistrust of

not
of

trying

to

also attempted to
internal political

convince

the

anything

Shia

continued to

was

he

(as

Khomeini's

United states;

Western

was too

the

deeply

ingrained to permit trust or compromise.
during~this

Also
President
policy

Carter

issues.

time

were
The

period the State Department

deeply
President

meeting with Menachem Begin and
and Secretary

of State Cyrus

involved
was in

in

and

other foreign

the

midst

of the

Anwar Sadat at Camp

David,

Vance was deeply

involved in

SALT II. As a result, responsibility for handling the crisis
came to Henry Precht at the State Department, Gary Sick with
the National
Pentagon.

Security

None

of

Council
the

and Robert

three

Murray

allegedly

at

the

possessed

the

experience or the authority to express their concerns to the
President as their supervisors could. 392

However, it was the

Jaleh

least Henry

Square

realize

incident

that more than

that

made

at

unrest was occurring,

Precht

and that the

3' 2 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.208.
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regime

serious challenge. 393

faced a

reporting that the Shah's
the
Iran

State Department
was

the

While

army could handle the

believed that

Shah's

the CIA

success

or

situation,

the critical
failure

kept

in

issue in
convincing

opposition leaders that the Shah wanted political reform and
social justice. 394
By

the

political
panics,

end

of

issues

Minister

strikes

were commonplace.HS

widespread

started to send

September,

and

hoarding,

their money out

over

There
wealthy

of the

Sharif-Emami made concessions

return

to

the

newspapers to be published

Islamic

Iranians

country. 396

position. 397

Also the

Prime

settlements,

calendar,

permitting

without censors, proclaiming

the country

if he

Minister of

had

by closing theaters

amnesty which freed prisoners, and finally,
allow Khomeini into

and

were buying

and gambling halls, conceding billions in wage
promising a

wages

an

by promising to

would moderate

the Court

his

Amir Abbas

Hoveyda was removed from his position, prior to a conviction
for practicing corruption in the court and government. 398 The
Shah

also

allowed the

switch

of

$200 million

393 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.

215.

394 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.

216.

395 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,
p.

217.

396 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.

218.

397 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,
p.

218.

398

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 218.
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military

budget to pay for damage done

compensate
fire. 399

the

families

He reportedly

priorities

which

of

those

engaged in

However, at

killed

in the

a painful

the same

cinema

reordering of
spending

military

downgraded

modernization. 4oo

by the riots and to

and

time, he increased

military salaries by 20 percent to ensure the loyalty of the
armed forces. 481
the

When

these measures produced few

results,

Shah pursued a more repressive course, with the support

of Brzezinski conveyed by Ambassador Zahedi. 482
The pattern
liberalization,
occurred.
the

in the ensuing months was
followed by

The reason for

Shah had

that of greater

crackdowns when
the pattern is

alternately good

and bad

more violence

two-fold: first,
days

in other

words, like a lot of seriously ill people, his condition was
unpredictable day
health was failing.

to day, despite the fact that overall his
While these

embassy reports contradicted

rumors reached Washington,

them on several occasions,

so

it was difficult for Washington policy makers to get a clear
picture

of

how

serious

the

Shah's

condition

was. 403

Secondly, in retrospect, it seems obvious that incentives to
compromise would have little

effect on Khomeini, but

399 Sick, All Fall Down, p.56.
400 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 56.
401 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 57.
402 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 219.
403 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 53.
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wasn't any way for the Shah to realize this at the time. For
example, on
1400

October 26, 1978,

the Shah granted

political prisoners, but

workers

went on

strike.

inspiration for
momentum.

The Shah's actions

example, while

also

he

amnestied

whether
crisis

that point,

Khomeini was the

to

take over

leaders

this was

ability to

seems

govern. 404 For

to other

after Black

prisoners

a product of

to be erratic

cities,

major newspapers

and

corruption. 405

for

management; it

law

the

deport Khomeini

political

was acquiring further

were perceived

expanded martial

Iraq to

government

later, Iran's oil

doubts about his

the army

pressured

five days

the revolution which

enough to cause

ordered

At

amnesty to

Friday, he

arrested

former

The speculation

his illness,
evident,

and

is

or simply bad

however,

that

the

opposition wasn't responding to either carrots or sticks.
From October
anti-Shah
television,

movement
radio

6

onward,
from
and

Khomeini

Paris,

was directing

becoming the

newspaper

National Front leaders
movement if

that they would be

they tried to negotiate

subject

reports. 406

advocated anything but a gradualist approach,

the
of

Khomeini

and he warned

ejected from the

with the Shah. 487

The

404 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 519.
405 Abrahamian, Iran

Between Two Revolutions,

519.
406 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.220.

407 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 222.

pp. 518-
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U.S.

had lost two

the

Khomeini

Richard

opportunities to

opposition.

Gary

Cottam's request to

establish contact with

Sick

rejected

assist Khomeini

Professor

to leave Iraq

for Paris (Kuwait refused him entrance and Iraq wouldn't let
him return) 408 , and the State Department refused to meet with
Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, a medical researcher working in Texas who
claimed to be Khomeini's spokesman
It

is difficult

assistance

by

to say whether
the

United

in the United States.409
such a

States

meeting, or timely
have

would

made

difference, but it would have established some good will
relatively little

cost.

At the end

any
at

of October, the Carter

Administration was still giving strong assurances of support
for
,,

the Shah, praising

his efforts

at liberalization, and

proclaiming its confidence in the Shah's

ability to contain

the ever growing violence and rebellion.no
Finally in
earnest

late

October the

and more openly,

weeks

in

of the State

The report's assessment of the

grim: essentially

to establish

debate began

with the completion

Department's report on Iran.
situation was

policy

the

Shah had

legitimate leadership,

only a

or he

few

would be

408 Sick, All Fall Down, p.57.
409 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 57. Barry Rubin alleges that
the CIA also tried to speak with Khomeini in Paris,
establishing headquarters in a house near Khomeini's in
Nauphle-le-Chateau, a suburb of Paris. They only managed to
contact Dr.
Ibrahim Yazdi whose monologues consisted of
explaining the Khomeinist's moderate stance. Rubin, Paved
with Good Intentions, p. 220.
HO Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 223.
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overthrown by the military.HI
the United States follow a
the

Shah,

continued

extent of

advising

The report recommended

tripartite policy of support for

support
the

that

for liberalization

Shah on

domestic

(to

policy),

maintaining strong opposition to military rule.412

the
while

However,

Ambassador Sullivan rejected these suggestions, recommending
that the United States
diplomacy,

and

follow the opposite policy

supporting

the Shah

through

of quiet

his

off ice,

rather than with special envoys and advisors.U 3
The situation in Iran deteriorated with
which began on October 31,
million barrels

per day to

reducing the production from 5.8
1.1 million. 414

December, production would fall to 300,000
l

despite Iran's domestic consumption
day.41 5 Beginning

on November 2,

appointed

Minister.416

General

The speech

By the end

barrels per day,

of 900,000 barrels

per

Iran, and in response,

Gholam Reza

with which

Azhari

the Shah

as

Prime

announced the

appointment of the new Prime Minister was conciliatory In
strong

contrast with

his previous

a

assessments, Ambassador

411 Sick, All Fall Down, p.59.
U2 Sick, All Fall Down, p.59.
413

of

violent demonstrations and

strikes affected the major cities in
the Shah

the oil strike

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 59.

414 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 366.

415 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,367.
416 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.366.
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Sullivan

finally

intimating that

asked

for instructions

the Shah might

on

not whether

At the Special Coordinating Council meeting
it was decided,

2,

the crisis.417
later that day,

with Secretary of State Vance and President

Carter's

approval, to

Sullivan

to

express

have Brzezinski
U.S.

support

instruct Ambassador

for

the Shah

reservation, whatever form of government he
once order

November

was

restored,

the Shah

liberalization. 418 Brzezinski

should

without

chose, and that
continue

with

also personally telephoned the

Shah the following day to reiterate the message.419
Gary Sick,

in his

book All

Fall Down,

discusses the

decisions by U.S. policy makers surrounding the fall
Shah

and the split

between the

of the

National Security Council,

led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the State Department, led by
While

Cyrus Vance.
from the
it

Vance initially

decision-making surrounding the problems

appears

that

he

did

so

because

Brzezinski's position of continued
It

was

disagree

disassociated himself

left to
with the

his

he

in Iran,

agreed

support for the

staffers, such

as

Henry

National Security Advisor's

with

Shah. 420

Precht, to
decision to

support the Shah as the best leader as far as U.S. interests
were concerned.

Sick writes that Precht's position made it

417 Sick, All Fall Down, p.67.
418 Sick, All Fall Down, p.68.
419

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 68.

420 Sick, All Fall Down, p.70.
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impossible for
conversation

them

to work

deteriorated

together,

into

long

since every
laments

incorrect course of policy towards Iran. 421
backing,

however,

Precht

uncoordinated effort
NSC came at a time

couldn't

go

between the State

about

the

Without Vance's
far. 422

very

The

Department and

when each agency and the

overburdened with resolving

phone

the

President were

other difficult foreign

policy

problems. There was only one Policy Review Committee meeting
during

the entire

November

crisis

6; at that

agreed on a

which was

time Vance

chaired

by Vance

on

and Brzezinski essentially

policy of continued

support for the

Shah, and

the need for better intelligence on the opposition. 42 3
On November 5, Tehran exploded with coordinated attacks
on
/

Western symbols

cinemas,

Western

such as

foreign banks,

business

establishments,

hotels. 424 The British embassy
was torched. 425
speech
while

appointing

Minister

to

lead

past

General
a

and

was invaded and the

On November 6, the Shah

acknowledging

liquor stores,

abuses and
Gholamereza

military

tourist
chancery

made a conciliatory
promising
Azhari

government. 426

reforms,
as

Prime

Azhari was

421 Sick, All Fall Down, p.70.
422 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 71.
423 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 77.

424 Sick, All Fall Down, p.74.
425 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 74.
426 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 224.
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elderly and had a serious heart condition, but he also was a
father figure

for the armed

because Khomeini was calling
This

was

a reality

soldiers as

well

maintained

was concern

for the draftees to

the

as the

end

of

homafars,

November,

desert. 427
including

technical experts

who

the sophisticated equipment and who were capable

of sabotaging it. 428
from

by

forces, and there

his home in

On

November 7, the Ayatollah Khomeini,

Paris, declared that

an Islamic Republic

would be established with force if necessary. 4"
Finally,

the

embassy reacted

events which indicated that the
November 9,
entitled
of
/

Shah was losing control. On

Ambassador Sullivan sent

Shah

predicted

Khomeini;

and

that

Westernized

Khomeini

accumulation of

his famous

telegram,

"thinking the unthinkable," analyzing the position

the

crucial

to the

other
the

military,

officers, would
the latter would

in controlling
to

moderate,

forces. 430

political
which

reach

an

was

comprised

accommodation

need the military

the country. 431
relegating

him

Sullivan

with

since it was

This would
to

of

a

force

Ghandi-like

position with a passive and benevolent influence in terms of
427 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 224-226.

428

Many homafars had been held beyond their original
contracts, and so had a legitimate grievance against the
Shah. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 225-226.
429 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.366.

430 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 81.
431

Sick, All Fall Down, p.83-84.
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investing

the new

government with

scenario

proved

incorrect

ability

Khomeini's

and

support

appeal

the

by Brzezinski

moderate opposition

it

because

Sullivan's recommendations were
was no

blessing. 432

his

This

underestimated

of

his

message.

not followed because
or

Vance for

there

supporting

a

at the expense of the Shah, and instead

were interpreted as an attack on existing policy. 433
Also in

November,

Vance,

Brzezinski,

Turner

was leaked

expressed
reporting

his

and

a

note from
CIA

Director

to the press. 434
dissatisfaction

in Iran,

and

general criticism of

President
Admiral

In it
with

the issue

Carter

to

stansf ield

President Carter
the

intelligence

quickly evolved

into a

CIA and forced

a more

Turner and the

general reappraisal of covert operations and intelligence. 435

,

There

were intelligence

failures in

Iran, and

these came

from the insular nature of embassy relations, as well as the
the

restrictions

which

intelligence

gathering.

politics, believes
of the embassy. 436
432

Shah's
James

suspicions

Bill, an

that the problem

placed

on

expert on Iranian

was the "incrustation"

He writes that

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 83-84.

433 Sick, All Fall Down, p.86-87.
434

Sick, All Fall Down, p.90.

435 Sick, All Fall Down p. 90.
436 James Bill, as quoted

in "Revolution in Iran" from
Authoritarian Regimes
in
Transition edited
by
Hans
Binnendijk (Washington D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S.
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American officials knew all the same people. They
were talking to the educated middle classes. No
one was ever really in touch with religious
leaders. Not many Americans were in touch with the
students. Americans did not speak with any of the
people that are now running the government in the
Islamic Republic. They didn't see the present
ruling gro~ taking over; they didn't have contact
with them.
The reason for this

incrustation was the inability of

most

embassy personnel to speak Farsi, but also the all-pervasive
presence

of

SAVAK.

difficult to know
or not; 438 the

When

contacts

Shah actively

his policies.43 9

prevailing
were

/

Also,

of

superpower of the Middle
did
the

begin, it took
seriousness

who disagreed with the Shah

the Shah
they

Shah as

the

was fully

the

in control

correspond

leader

of

unable

maintain

his

East. When the revolution

finally

makers to understand

opposition,

regime.

with

the regional

the

character

Khomeini, and to realize that the Shah was ill,
and

from the

didn't

months for policy
of

was

officials

reports that differed

because

the

it

a SAVAK agent

discouraged embassy

perception that

discounted,

assessments

made,

whether the individual was

from making contacts with those
and

were

Even

of

indecisive,

as the

situation

worsened in November, the embassy communications spent a lot
Department of State, 1989 ?}, p. 11.
437

Bill, as quoted in "Revolution in
Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p13-14.

Iran"

from

438 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 181-182.
439

Henry
Precht,
"Revolution
in
Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p. 10.

Iran"

from
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of effort

in

explaining the

"distortions"

of local

news

reporting in favor of official accounts.
Two special
meet with
Michael

the

envoys went to
Shah about

Blumenthal,

Iran in

the

and

late November

crisis: Treasury

Senate

Secretary

Leader

Majority

to

Robert

and dispirited.441

Byrd. 440 Both found the Shah indecisive

On

November 22, the National Security Council hosted an all day
meeting on

Iran,

at

which all

crucial month. 44 2

December would be the
for

the

people to

demonstrations. 443
respond to

arise
The

continued

celebration

participants

(Moharam)

which

despite

was how

unrest during

a

could

that

Khomeini had called

and unite,

question

agreed

the

the

Shah

month of
easily

ban on
would

religious

evolve

into

political confrontation. 444
As

demonstrations and

states worked
and

Vance.

through a

strikes

continued, the

policy dispute

between Brzezinski

While Brzezinski advocated a hard line approach

of supporting

the

Shah,

fearing that

any

abandoning the him would destabilize other
Middle

United

East. 445

George

Ball,

asked

appearance

of

alliances in the

by

440 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.

Brzezinski
229.

441 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 229.
442

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 97.

443

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 105.

444

Sick, All Fall Down, p. 97.

445

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 235.
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undertake

an

perceived

the Shah

believed that
regency

analysis,
as a

disagreed
weak and

this

assessment,

indecisive leader,

the monarch should be encouraged

council encompassing

factions. 446

with

Ultimately,

players

from

Secretary

of

and

to set up a

the

State

different
Vance

and

President Carter disagreed with both Ball and Brzezinski; in
mid-December, Vance finally weighed
that the

in, stating his

Shah could not survive and

belief

that the best hope for

the United States lay in

supporting a prime minister chosen

by

his

the

Shah

acceptable

to

supporters. 447
Shapour
from the

prior

to

the

departure,

opposition

as

well

This became the official

which
as

would
the

be

Shah's

policy, even though

Bakhtiar, the Shah's chosen successor, was expelled
National

Front

party for

cooperating

with

the

Shah. 448
Despite the fact that

,./'

ouster

from the

overture to
Bakhtiar

Khomeini had dictated Bakhtiar's

National Front,

Khomeini in January

government.

The

President Carter
to accept and

first entailed

made an

support the

a message asking

Khomeini to support Bakhtiar in order to avoid bloodshed. 449
Khomeini replied that Carter must remove the Shah from Iran,

446 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 236.
441 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 237.
448 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.
449

238.

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 240.
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and

not

support

overture was

the

government. 450

Bakhtiar

an attempt

to arrange

a meeting

Inspector General of the Foreign Service
Khomeini;

however, Brzezinski vetoed

the Shah had agreed to it, and it
the President. 451
due

to a

The

second

between the

Theodore Eliot and

the plan

even though

was proposed by Vance and

Again, an opportunity for contact was lost

rigid policy of

supporting the

Shah against the

opposition, excluding any contact which would have given the
appearance of

lessening U.S. support

for the monarch.

one sense, Brzezinski was right, but for the wrong
It was

unlikely that Khomeini

meeting with
extreme.

Theodore

Finally on

Eliot,

would have been
since his

January 16,

reasons.

affected by

position

1979, the

In

Shah

was

so

left for

Egypt at the urging of the United States. He had been unable
to

arrange any compromise

with Bakhtiar

which would allow

December had

been a month full

him even a limited exile. 452

c-

of violence, strikes, and continuing attacks on Americans. 453
This forced the Carter administration to finally support the
Bakhtiar government at the expense of the Shah. The decision
was taken

during

a National

Security

Council meeting

on

January 3, 1989. 454 General Robert Huyser was sent to Iran to

450 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 240.
451 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 240.
452 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 524.
453 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 524.
454 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 131.
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keep

the Iranian

Shah

or instituting

informed
memo,

military from
a military

by Ambassador

that he

rest. 455

either departing
coup, while

Sullivan,

should leave the

After

his

the Shah

relaying a

was

presidential

country for

departure,

with the

a long needed

thousands

demonstrated

joyfully in the streets, unaware that Iran was entering into
a new period of political instability. 456
The

period

between

Shah's

the

severance of diplomatic relations
and

Iran was

one in

departure

and

the

between the United States

which different

opposition factions,

primarily the moderate clerics and the National Front party,
vied

for

control

with

Khomeini's

returned to Iran on January 31, and it
commanded
well

the loyalty of

as the

rank

departing in large
shadow
/

cabinet

legitimacy

and file

of

designating

He was able to mobilize

revolutionary

population as

personnel, who

had already

into demonstrations,

Khomeini

was apparent that he

the urban

military

numbers. He

in France,

Prime Minister. 457
individuals

most of

followers.

named his

Mehdi

own

Bazargan as

large numbers of

strikes, and

tribunals;

were

the

enforce the
latter

sentenced twenty-four individuals to death by March 5. 458

455 Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 131-132.
456 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 243.
457 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 241.
458 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 369.

had
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June,

the

announced

that he

Bazargan

for Prime

only

total led

executions

until

supported

300. 459

National

11, six

Khomeini

Front leader

Minister, Bakhtiar's

February

After

Mehdi

government lasted

days later. 460

It became

apparent that real political power rested with Khomeini, who
was not content with
one Prime

Minister

compromise of any type. He
after

another after

they

sacrificed
became

too

moderate, all the time "restoring" the country to an Islamic
model.

THE PHILIPPINE CRISIS

The Philippine Crisis
Benigno
from the

Aquino on August

began with the
23, 1983.

assassination of

Aquino

was returning

United States, where he had received treatment for

a serious heart condition. His objective in returning to the
Philippines

was to unite

prepare for the legislative

.

,•

as part
two

the opposition groups

elections scheduled for May

of Marcos' liberalization after martial

law.

14
Only

months previously, Aquino had testified before Congress

on the state of politics and repression in
In

in time to

contrast

to

previous

policy,

the Philippines.

Aquino's

assassination

marked the beginning of a more concerted effort to challenge

459

Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 370.

460 Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p.246.
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the Marcos regime. 461
While

the

Nixon

and Ford

administrations

mostly concerned with the maintenance of Clark Air
Subic

Naval Base, President Carter

the 1980s, however,

the

economy was

the NPA insurgency

faltering as

became more commonplace. 465 When
against

the

treatment

Defense, conditions
little real effect
Also,
the

and

..

,

economic excess

the United States protested

prisoners

to

the Ministry

of

but had

on the actions of the Marcos government.
wife Imelda were
some

allege

President Reagan reluctant to

/'

scandals of

was growing and

were occasionally ameliorated,

Marcos and his
Reagan's,

of

the focus

such as torture. 464

was on violations of personal integrity,
By

Base and

had made strong

Marcos government, 463 but

to the

been

had expressed more of a

concern for human rights. 462 Patricia Derian
representations

had

that

personal friends of
this

factor

made

acknowledge the damage Marcos

461 Theodore Friend,
"Marcos and the Philippines" Orbis
Vol. 32, number 4, Fall, 1988, p. 578.
462 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," p. 576.
463

Friend, "Marcos and the Philipinnes," p.576.

464
Armacost, Michael H. "Philippine Aspirations for
Democracy" in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, (Ed) Hans
Bennendijk
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,
Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign
Affairs, 1987) p297.

4'5 Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 298.
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was doing to the Philippines. 466
After the

Aquino

assassination, however,

States embassy effectively pressured Marcos
The

first

objective was

investigation
encourage
Marcos

of

more

was

the

erythematosus;

get

a

the

procedures for
ill

finally,

with
the

recognize the National Citizens

a

and

complete

second

was

succession,

rare

embassy

urged

to

since

disease,

lupus

Marcos

to

Movement for Free Elections

(NAMFREL) which had been created in the 1950s by
States. 467

United

in three areas.

prompt

assassination;

precise

seriously

to

the

The embassy also urged

the United

Marcos to create

a fair

electoral code, and to promote a more independent commission
on elections. 468
NAMFREL was

There

was only

acknowledged, the

partial

success:

while

commission on elections

was

not an independent body.469
The embassy

and the ambassador, Michael

come to the conclusion
only have occurred
the

,,,
I

succession. 470

assassination

Armacost, had

that the Aquino assassination

with the connivance of
Marcos

would make

him a

was

aware

someone close to
that

martyr; ergo,

46 6 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a
Times Books, 1987), p. 337.

Aquino's

someone who

Dictator (New York:

467 Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 300-301.
468 Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 301.

469 Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations,"
470

could

P· 301.

Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 299.
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wanted to get rid of Marcos was suspect.
along with General Ver, Imelda

One theory is that

Marcos and her brother Kokoy

Romualdez conspired to kill Aquino; Marcos was so ill at the
time that
wanted

his

death

to rule

seemed imminent,

the Philippines

and

Imelda

Marcos

his death. 471

after

While

Marcos blamed the assassination on communist insurgents, the
embassy had been immediately sure that the Marcos government
was

involved. 472

President

Six

weeks

cancelled

Reagan

apparently

Philippines,

after
his

the

planned

because

of

assassination,
visit

negative

to

the

domestic

reaction to the assassination; however, he also went to some
lengths

to pacify

itinerary and

Marcos

writing

by cancelling

a personal

note

the

rest of

his

to the

Philippine

alienated

Ambassador

president. 473
While

the

Armacost, the
further

Aquino assassination
growing

alarmed the

Senate Committee

on

strength of

New People's

Reagan administration.
Foreign Relations

report asserting that the NPA
with the armed

the

would

forces within three

In

published

Army

1984, the
a

staff

reach strategic parity
to five

years. 474

The

,/

potential threat
the

was widely reported

United States, which

in the news

affected Congress

471 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,

and the Reagan

p. 349.

472 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,
473 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,
474

media in

p. 351.

p. 352.

Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," p. 579.
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administration, who feared that the Philippines would become
another Vietnam. 475

Moderate Filipinos were

the United

to

States

communism.

see the

Particularly

as reluctant as

Philippines

the

Catholic

threatened

Church,

led

by
by

Cardinal Jaime Sin, walked a fine line between acknowledging
the

desperate economic conditions affecting the majority of

Filipinos
condemning

as

well

as

brutal

those priests and

political
nuns who

repression,

and

openly followed the

Marxist movement, believing in their own brand of liberation
theology. 476 However, he did not condone Marxism or
of

violence.

Cardinal

however, because the
and the Church

Sin's

involvement is

any type
important,

Philippines is predominantly Catholic,

has great ability to mobilize the population

47 5 Fred
Brown,
"Creating the
Environment for a
Transition" in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p. 312.

,.,

41 6 Liberation theology was a product of Vatican II, and
holding that the priest had an obligation to serve the
victims of poverty and oppression, and to address the
salvation of their souls as well their temporal poverty.
Particularly young priests believed that this justified
social protest and agitation, conferring the right and/or
duty to engage in social revolution. The Philippine Catholic
hierarchy had traditionally emphasized attention to the soul
rather than man's temporal condition; those who had been
critical of the hierarchy quickly exploited the opportunity
Vatican II offered to legitimize their views. Cardinal Sin
was forced to appease both conservative and progressive
elements; he refused to censure those openly sympathetic to
Marxists, but also refused to condone violence. He took it
upon himself to complain of military abuses, and even
rebuked Pope John Paul II's criticism of his political
activity by reasoning that since politics was a human
activity,
it therefore involved morality---and no one was
better qualified to explain morality than a priest. William
Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1987), p. 200 and p. 212.
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if

it

so

chooses.

Cardinal

Sin

successfully

channeled

protest into non-violent channels, and it can be argued that
his actions prevented the radicalization of the Philippines.
By mobilizing the church, Marxism was not allowed to

be the

only avenue of protest against the Marcos regime.
The May 1984 elections were a further indication of the
pressure on Marcos to
The

make changes towards

Aquino assassination had

Catholic

Church,

the

to Marcos. 417

opposition
Marcos spent
success of
party,

and

pushed the
business

While

the

Marcos

(approximately

won

one-third

60
of

community

Bagong

seats
the

into

open

and Ferdinand

of money to

own Kilusan

opposition

middle class, the

both Imelda

a considerable amount
the

liberalization.

ensure the

Lipunan

in the
total)478,

(KBL)

legislature
and

was

particularly strong in Manila, much to Imelda Marcos' dismay
since

that was

October 1984

her province.

when

Another setback

the Agrava

Commission,

charged with the investigation of the

occurred in

which had

been

Aquino assassination,

returned a report which concluded that a military conspiracy
existed,
whether

although
it

the commission

included

Chief

of

members
Staff

differed as

General

to

Ver,

who

of Marcos friends

and

,•
;'

commanded the

military and

was one

477 Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p. 275.
418 Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations,"

p. 301.
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close advisors. 479
Also

in 1984,

Mercury-News,

a story was

which won

published in

a Pulitzer

the San Jose

Prize. It

exposed the

extent of Marcos wealth for the first time, pulling together
what a lot of different sources knew about Marcos wealth and
crony capitalism.480
The

Reagan

Administration

was still

distance itself from the Marcos regime.
Study Directive (NSSD) prepared by

not

willing to

A National Security

John Maisto, the head of

the Philippines desk at the State Department, 481 opted
policy of continued
pressure

to

make

support for Marcos with
reforms

transition to a successor. 48 2
the continued

provision

and
The

prepare

for a

an emphasis of
for

a

peaceful

administration argued for

of economic

and

military aid

in

1985, and the Congress did authorize $70 million in military

aid

and $95

million in

economic aid

which would

be sent

through the normal channels in the Marcos government. 483

479

Claude Buss,
Philippines (Stanford:
p. 23.

,.
I

In

Cory Aguino and the People of the
Stanford Alumni Association, 1987),

48 0 John Maisto, "Reform: The Bedrock of U.S. Policy" in
Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p. 318.
481 Mr. Maisto was married to a Filipino from a wealthy
sugar family in Negros, and had considerable familiarity
with the Philippines before martial law through extended
vacations with his spouse.Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,
pp. 344, 362.

482 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 363.
483 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 371.
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keeping with the new policy, however,
visitors in
secretary

January 1985
of state

Marcos received three

alone: Paul

for East

Wolfowitz, assistant

Asia; Richard

Childress, the

Asian expert in the NSC; and Richard Armitage, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
Specifically, the

reforms included

of

revitalization

the military,
markets

allowing

to

monopolization, and

the professionalization
of

freely

the

a presidential

Marcos

such measures,

carrying out

of

the political

election in

was not naive about

through

outside

operate

However, the embassy

meant risking the

economy

the continued opening of

system, culminating in

Affairs. 484

International Security

1987. 485

the prospects for

because it

would have

fortunes of family members and friends in

a market system instead of

a monopolistic one, and

turning

over the military to people who might not be loyal to him. 486
The eventual acquittal in

December 1985 of General

the other 25 defendants for the Aquino
to confirm

this belief,

and

Ver and

assassination seemed

it "tore

the last

respectability from the Marcos version of the

shred of

traditionally

independent judicial system. 114 11
The

Congress,

Relations Committee

in

the

had also

form

of

the

Senate

become convinced

Foreign

that Marcos

,.

484 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,

p. 363.

48S Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 301.

486 Armacost, "Philippines Aspirations," p. 301-302.
487

Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 23.
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was beyond

reform.

z.

named Frederick

1985, a committee staffer

In August of
Brown, who

had travelled widely

Philippines that year reported

in the

that Marcos was unlikely

to

reform and had successfully ignored U.S. pressure because he
felt

confident

regarding

continued access

the

the Philippine

indefinitely,

States

need

Clark and Subic bases. 488

to the

acknowledged that reforms ran
and that

United

counter to Marcos'

president hoped to

without yielding

to the

for

Also, he
interest,

stay in

power

opposition or

U.S.

recommendations. 419
The pressure on Marcos continued, with a visit from CIA
director William
October

in

Marcos

requesting
it

that

Administration's
Philippines. 492

followed by

President Reagan

reforms. 491
was

May,

Laxalt. 496 Laxalt 's

by Senator Paul

convince

mild,

Casey

While the

another

expression
with

concern
Finally, on

the

visit

serious about
may have

of

the

situation

November 3

in

mission was to

was

pressure

a

been
Reagan

in

the

via the television

news program This Week with David Brinkley, Marcos announced
that

he

would

hold

elections,

and

allow United

488 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,

States

P· 379.

48' Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.379.
490 Schirmer, The PhiliQQines Reader, p. 278.
491 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,

492

318.

Maisto, "Reform:

The Bedrock

p. 382.

of U.S.

Policy," p.
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observers to monitor the vote. 493
regarded

as a crucial

pretext to

This move

error, for he

maneuver himself out

has been widely

was unable

to find a

of the elections

once the

date was set. His motivation seems to have been concern over
U.S. perceptions of his legitimacy. 494
Cardinal

was

Sin

disparate opposition

responsible

groups

to

unite in

Corazon Aquino. 495

candidacy of

an effective speaker,

inspiring.

Her

itself

were operated

radio coverage
by

Imee Marcos,

Imelda).4 96 Her speeches
speaking of the national
Philippines

had

engendered by
of

the

Church

showdown.

(all

was evident and
an

interesting

benefit of extensive
3 television

daughter

stations

of Ferdinand

and international shame which
because

the Marcos regime.
proved

She

of

the

the

corruption

also had the support

crucial

during

the

final

At her final rally in Luneta Park in Manila, one-

hal f mi 11 ion people attended. 497
493 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.386-387.
/

and

were clearly heartfelt and sincere,

suffered

which

the

affection; she also

remains

phenomenon because she didn't have the

of

the

Aquino's widow,

whose sincerity

campaign

television and

support

As Benigno

she already commanded great respect and
was

convincing

for

494 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,

p. 388.

495 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle, p.

27.

496 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle,

p. 28.

497

p. 32.

Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle,
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The
Paul

election was held

Lugar,

the

head

of

on Friday,
the

February 7. Senator

Senate

Foreign

Relations

Committee, led a team which observed the elections.

Senator

Lugar suspected fraud and said so early on, to the dismay of
other

members

of

the

team. 498

At

a

meeting

February 9, Ambassador Bosworth informed the
were

reporting

systematic

to

effort to limit

relaying that the voter
of 10 to 40
disagreement

What

walkout, at

government computer workers who
protection

church, where they

been

registration lists had been

regarding how critical

was the

had

in

purged

The team was

in

their statement should
ultimately changed many
great personl risk,

were tallying the vote

Our Mother

spoke with

a

and Lugar concurred,

percent of the electorate. 49 9

members minds

team that they

there

the vote,

be of the election process. 566

They sought

that

Washington

on Sunday,

of

of
501

Perpetual

Help

who came

away

President Reagan,

at a

team members

with a different perspective.502
The

next drama

occurred when

news conference, commented that there may have been cheating
on both

sides,

which

infuriated

Aquino

and

demoralized

08 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 414.

49' Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,
P· 414-415.

500 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 415.

'

501 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 416.
502 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 416.
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embassy personnel. 563 Ambassador Bosworth personally met with
Mrs.

Aquino

to

diplomatically intimate

that

she

should

ignore the President's remarks, and that he would change his
mind.~ 4

On

the same day

as Reagan's remarks,

campaign advisor's was gunned
Mani la. 505
the walk

down by six masked gunmen

This was reported in
out by

the United States,

the computer workers;

also given a

lot of air time, but it

his image. 566

The

Aquino, and

press coverage

Congress

realized

government
their image

that

the

were crucial allies,
in the

U.S. press

sympathetic

press

and the

and both

to

Marcos,

Both Marcos and Cory

by

was

did little to enhance

openly criticize

American

in

as was

Marcos himself

remained

started to

calling for his resignation. 567
had

one of Aquino's

Aquino
American

tried to bolster

hiring American

public

relations advisors. 508
However, the Filipinos
adjust its policy; the

didn't wait

for Washington

to

Catholic Bishop's Conference of

the

Philippines published a pastoral letter which condemned

the

503 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle
Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 423.

I

p.35 and Bonner,

504 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 425.
505 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 422.
506 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 421-422.
507 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 422.
508 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 424.
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electoral fraud, and stated
no

moral basis

nonviolent

because

that the Marcos government

of these

actions

struggle for justice.~ 9

At

and called

had
for

this point, Reagan

dispatched Philip Habib as a special envoy; he met with more
than 100 individuals and came away convinced that Marcos had
little

legitimacy left and

Reagan. 510

The White

was able

House

to convince President

issued a

Habib's return, however, which

statement

prior

conceded that the fraud

to
had

been perpetrated by the ruling party. 511
During the third

week in February, everything

unraveled for Marcos. In four
in

short days, Marcos was routed

a nonviolent demonstration of power.

after notifying Cardinal Sin
ambassadors,
Lieutenant
Marcos

Defense
General

resign. 512

In

On February 22nd,

and the American and

Minister

Fidel

Ramos

Juan

Ponce

demanded

an extraordinary

attempt

on

him

which

Japanese

Enrile

that

and

President

two hour interview,

Enrile confessed to committing election fraud,
assassination

finally

was

and that the
the

original

justification for martial law never existed. 513 Cardinal Sin,
meanwhile, asked Filipinos, via the church radio station, to

509 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 425.
510 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 430.
511 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 431.
512 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle, p. 37.
513

Buss, Cori Aguino and the Peo2le, p. 37.
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go into the streets to protect the rebels. 514

In response to

this appeal,

barracks where

Enrile

crowds surrounded the military

and Ramos

were staying.515

Marcos countered

with

announcing on television that he and the First Lady had been
the

targets of

General Ver

plot.5 16

an assassination

ordered 500 men in tanks

The

next

day,

to attack the rebels;

however, the streets were filled with non violent protestors
from all

armed with rosaries. 511

different classes,

standoff, the tanks retreated. 518 The White
into the

crisis

"overwhelming"

mode, issued

a

responsibility

a

House, now fully

statement which

for

At

fraud

the

to

assigned
ruling

party. 519
As the crisis
joined the rebels. 520
had

dropped

attacked the
p.m.,

continued, more and more of the military
By Monday

grenades

on

government air

the

the 24th, rebel helicopters
presidential

base near

palace,

Manila. 521

By

and
six

the White House issued another statement that was the

product

of

extensive

discussions

earlier

514 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

,

that

p. 37.

515 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 435.
516 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

,

p. 37.

517 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

,

p. 39.

518 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoEle, p. 39.
519 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 437.
520 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.435.
521 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

I

p.40.

day

by
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Reagan's

chief staffers,

Defense

including Chief

Secretary Weinberger,

Secretary of

National Security Adviser John Poindexter;
Michael Armacost, the Chairman
Crowe, and of course
were finally

Regan,

State Schultz,
Philip Habib and

of the Joint Chiefs

Admiral

President Reagan. 522 Habib and

Schultz

able to convince the President that Marcos had

was going to be forced to leave. 523
House

of Staff

issued a statement

military aid if force

Later that day the White

that the United

States would end

was used against the rebels. 524 Reagan

also sent a message to Marcos to ask if he wanted asylum, in
order to
Shah

prevent him from facing the

did, wandering

from

state

same situation as the

to state. 525

On

Monday

morning, in response to an intercepted message which ordered
the armed
issued

forces

to attack

another public

the

statement

rebels, the
calling

White

for a

House

"peaceful

transition to a new government." 52 6
On Tuesday, Marcos succeeded in reaching Senator Laxalt
on the Hill, and asked Laxalt to ask the President if Marcos
could

resign when

his term

expired and

then stay

in the

country. 527 Laxal t promised to check with the President, and

522 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 437.
523 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 438.
524 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator,
P· 438.

525 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 438.
526 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 439.
527 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.439-440.
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then

called

President
asked

Tuesday

on

Reagan wanted Marcos

what Laxal t thought he

to do;

to

grotesque parody, Marcos did
presidential palace;

last television station. 531
surroundings. 532

Ambassador

should do. 528

Laxalt's reply

Clark

At

Air Base,

however,

In a

the

broadcast

of

at
the

captured the

Marcos seemed ill and unaware of

Earlier

9:00 p.m. he

that

day,

he

had

phoned

military escort to leave

was taken by helicopter

where he boarded

a plane,

to

along with his

family and General Ver, for Guam and then Hawaii. 534
point, Ambassador Bosworth

a.m.,

the same at twelve o'clock

Bosworth, requesting a

the palace. 533

what

in response, Marcos

ceremony was knocked off the air as the rebels

his

say

of off ice as President. 53 o

Aquino took the oath

the

unable

to leave. 529 Shortly after 10:00

was to advise Marcos
Cory

morning,

At that

telephoned President Aquino with

his congratulations. 535
Within two hours
State Schultz

read

after Marcos
a statement

departed, Secretary

extending

recognition

528 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 40.
529 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440.
530 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

,

p. 41.

531 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 41.
532 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People, p. 41.
533 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People

I

p. 41.

534 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440.
535 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440.
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President Aquino,

in addition to praise for

President

and

Aquino

the

and visits

from

people. 536

Filipino

followed by assurances of military

the courage of
This was

and economic assistance,

Congressman Stephan

Solarz and

Secretary

Weinberger. 537

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE CRISIS PERIOD

It

is interesting

preceding
similar

to note

the crisis period
in some

downturn

respects.

which was

in

that the

in each
There

part a

immediate events

state were remarkably
was

result

a strong
of world

economic
recession

(complicated by the debt crisis for the Philippines), and in
part

because of grave

the Shah and Marcos
in building

mismanagement of the

had spent considerable time and

up their military establishments,

scale was much

larger in Iran

because of oil

the Shah's

obsession with arms

corruption

among the

acknowledge
was

in

both

the economy and impoverished

In

and

the

Both
effort

although the
revenues and
each state,

problem that

the urban

Iran

occurred to such a

there was further

purchases.

elite was a

and resented by

evidence

corruption

economy.

was widely

middle class. There
Philippines

that

great extent that it damaged
the average citizen. In

outrage at the

waste of oil

Iran,

money which

536 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 173.
537 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 173.
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could

ensure prosperity

state, the
regime;

military

however,

for future

provided

military

generations.

an important

desertions

forced to
was

pursue at least

unable

to

prop

were

component in the downfall of each leader.

In each
for

an

the

important

Finally, each was

superficial liberalization,

enact real

reform

because

it

but

would have

endangered the centralization of power which maintained each
regime.
These commonalities notwithstanding,
these

conditions

affected
States

greatly

the timeliness
was able

differed
of the

to make.

U.S. awareness of

in

each

country

response which

In the

and

the United

Philippines, the United

States embassy had the benefit of being in a state where the
opposition

spoke the same

with embassy personnel.

language and

was eager

to meet

When Aquino was assassinated,

the

embassy could accurately assess the importance of the event,
through contact with Filipino leaders such
and leading
Through
strength

entrepreneurs

these

contacts,

and growth of

from the
the

as Cardinal Sin,

Makati Business

embassy

was

the opposition,

aware

Filipino

the

attitude

opposition.
of

equivalent to "God will

"Bahala

Even
Na,"

of

the

despite the limits

Marcos placed on the press, and the extent to
law intimidated

Club.

which martial

with

the

typical

which

is

roughly

provide," it became apparent

after

Aquino's assassination that the middle class, large sections
of the elite,

and the military had become

more predisposed
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to take

action against Marcos.

the information

which the

In

turn, the importance of

embassy passed

on to

the State

Department was accurately assessed by John Maisto, who had a
personal connection with the Philippines. U.S. policy makers
were able to jump on the bandwagon at the right time because
of this awareness.
This

is

in extreme

contrast

personnel

had,

language.

They associated

for the

most

to Iran.

part,

with

no

the

The embassy

knowledge of

the

same individuals

who

surrounded the Shah, and were unable to make contacts
would have

given them a different view

which

of the strength and

depth of the opposition that was building over the years. In
part, the limits

were imposed by

the sensitivity that

Shah exhibited towards intelligence
States

considered

maintenance of

the

twin

listening

important to jeopardize.
was attempted, the
contact
Also,

was a

posts
Even

gathering.

benefits

of

to the

SAVAK's own intelligence

oil

Soviet

if intelligence

embassy could never be

SAVAK informer,

The

the

United

and

the

Union

too

collection

sure whether the

since they

were pervasive.

gathering capabilities were

admirable; people were frightened to say too much to anyone,
because

SAVAK had

a

way

of

finding out.

All

of

these

restraints combined to make reporting poor.
This led to another deficit, which was an inability on
the

part

disruption

of

the

which

embassy
the

to

Shah's

judge

the

modernization

extent

of

the

program

had
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caused.
and

Academic experts like Richard

James

Bill were

aware

of

Cottam, Marvin Zonis

the dislocation;

but

the

average businessman, technician, or U.S. government employee
had no means

of judging the extent or the

changes in Iranian
indication

of

society.

poverty,

While

it's

large slums are

amazing

subsequent U.S.

administrations from

unaware of

extent

change

the

to which
Perhaps

had occurred.

effects of rapid

to

a good

realize

that

Nixon to Carter

were

social

mobilization

if there

had been

greater

involvement by A.I.D. or other U.S. assistance as there
in the

Philippines,

the assessment

might

and

have been

was
more

accurate.
Finally,
unable

the embassy

and

to

take

the

seriously.

This

was in part

the

religious

administration

aspect

seemed

of the

revolution

because they were

unaware of

the role that Shi'ism played in Iranian culture, but it also
represents a type
militant

of chauvinism. While the resurgence

Catholicism might be

commitment to

Islam on

the

of a

readily understood, the same
part of

Iranians was

somehow

discounted. There was an assumption that modernization meant
secularization; this may have been true for the
the

embassy associated

with, but it

was not

people that
true for the

majority of individuals who were extremely disadvantaged. It
was readily accepted by U.S. policy makers that Cardinal Sin
could be mobilizing the population through
and

church radio,

but the same

credit was

political acumen
never given to
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Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.
Another aspect
about each
change.
had

of the crisis involves

leader,

and

when those

In the Philippines,

an accurate idea

the perceptions

perceptions

began

to

the U.S. Congress and embassy

regarding Marcos

venality after 1984

when the story regarding his personal wealth was reported in
the

San

Jose

Mercury-News.

The

consensus

Department regarding Marcos venality

in the

State

was echoed in Congress

within the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. Also, anyone

with

of the

a passing knowledge

Philippines realized that

Marcos was the last in a long line of corrupt Presidents. It
had become

apparent,

however,

that he

was

possibly

the

winner in that contest; the scale of corruption disabled the
state

in

its ability

to

serve even

a

small

portion of

Filipinos.
In

Iran

the

monolithic

challenged until November 9,
demonstrations

began. Part

image

of

the

Shah

wasn't

1988, eleven months after
of this

was due

Sullivan's poor reporting of the Shah's

the

to Ambassador

condition, since he

was ill with cancer at the time. It was also a result of the
cyclical nature
40 days.

if the

There were periods of calm which made it appear as
Shah had the situation under

alternate
should
the

of the demonstrations, which occurred every

policy

of cracking

have indicated an

down

control.
and

However, the

then liberalizing

indecisiveness which

was part of

Shah's character. One of the valuable aspects of George
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Ball's assistance during the crisis was that his perceptions
of the Shah were formed prior to the Nixon/Kissinger era. He
was

aware of

the assessments

from the

50s and

60s which

recognized the Shah's basic indecisiveness.
Congress also
which

unfolded

was
in

assistance came

much more
the

up

for

involved

in the

Philippines.
review every

Since
year,

economic

Senators

Congressmen were much

more likely to hear criticism

Philippines. 538

was under

despite

Iran

criticism of

no such

arms sales in

posture towards Israel,

its role as

the

Shah's

magnitude

recycled

of

the

1975 and

1976, Iran's

a leader in

OPEC, and
which

purchases

criticism.

Congress didn't appreciate the violence used by

some of the

didn't

students
gain

protesting

a lot

sophisticated

a

of the

restrictions, and

military

eliminated

and

of

Iranian

petrodollars

events

against the

of sympathy,

opposition

lot

which

Shah,

unlike the
Filipinos

and

they

organized and
mounted

in the

United States. 539
Still another difference involved the amount of contact
which the opposition
the Philippine
they

were

Congress

States.

Although

opposition might deplore continued U.S. aid,

also
and

had with the United

familiar

the

enough

executive,

as

with

the

processes

well

as the

of

particular

538

Hans Binnendijk, "Congress---Not an Important Actor"
in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p. 24.
539

p.25.

Binnendijk,

Authoritarian

Regimes in

Transition,
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character

of each

administration to

recognize they

convince some if not all to support them.
followers,

however,

knew

little

could

Khomeini and his

about

the

political

processes of the United States. They had a great distrust of
the United

States

machinations in

Iranian

affairs.

The

opportunities for rapprochement were limited by the cultural
limits of Khomeini's

followers, as

well as

desire for contact with the United States.

their lack

of

All envoys would

be equally deceptive, pursuing an agenda that benefitted the
United States, and
Also,

those

thus could not

who did

appear

opposition to the West

to

be beneficial for
advocate a

Iran.

lessening

were executed, not unlike

of

suspected

royalists during the French Revolution.
Another important aspect to
of

regime

which

compare involves the

assumed power.

While

Khomeini had great legitimacy, Aquino was
while
the

both

type

Aquino and

a moderate leader

Khomeini was a radical one. Aquino was concerned with
practical

realities

of

Philippines, which depends in
support in terms

of trade and

economic

survival

for

large part on U.S.

the

financial

aid. Aquino didn't

preach a

radical agenda, but instead sought to return the Philippines
to

some type

of order

which would

Filipinos, rather than enrich

create

an

Islamic

In
state

goals

political liberties were

contrast, Khomeini's
in

majority of

the Marcos family. Her

of ending corruption and restoring
entirely reasonable.

serve the

Iran,

and

to

goal was

to

do

he

this
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through

radicalized

the

uncertainty

in the government.

the

rise and

left,

population

fall of four

in order

continued

political

He successfully coordinated

prime ministers

to consolidate

his power

after the Shah
and

implement a

theocratic regime.
This leads to another aspect of
character

of each

revolution. While

triumphed in Iran was
was a

disapproval

of

history,

triumphed

over

became

rejecting the
traditional

assumed

and

all

with

other

with

was

modern

and Westernized Iran

The Philippines, on
where

The

approval

and

the clerics

groups.
the

Iranian

Religious
Shah

and

represented. Embracing
of

reaffirming

Shah was

Iranian

the symbol

of the

which benefitted few Iranians.

the other hand,
political

the

part of

ousting

a means

revolution

new group,

revolution

Western influences he

and nationalism.

quo

the

was

secularized

intertwined

Shi'ism

a

Clerical

policies

values

status

sense that
power.

government

political

values

in the

clerics,

government which

the

theocratic in nature, the

political one

radical

comparison, namely the

elites

seemed to return
contested

to a

elections

between themselves. The difference was that the elite with a
conscience finally came into
against

a

particular

power. The Philippines reacted

dictator

and

his

political system that was already corrupt.
of the Philippine revolution were dramatic,
a different scale than that of Iran.

perversion of

a

While the events
it was truly on

These two factors, the

'

type

of revolution

account

for

the

and the type
ability

of
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of leader,
U.S.

may partially

policy

effectively implement a policy which resulted in
good relations.

makers

to

continuing

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The

analysis

differences

in

this

between the

crisis periods.

has

paper

two states

centered

during the

It is evident that the

the

result of

involved,
State

during both time

and greater

Department

Philippines.

There

President to

the

"let go" of a long-time

embassy and

culture

consensus to

this was

personalities

in the

political

was also a

with events in

with the

experience both

with

tenure and

frames. Part of

greater familiarity

the

United States did a

better job of coordinating policy and coping
the Philippines

on

of

the

convince the

friend and U.S. ally.

which united more individuals as the crisis progressed. This
presents

a contrast to

difficult,

Iran where

information about the

policy coordination was
crisis was

President possessed no steadfast position on
pursue.

Both

the

Shah

and

the United

difficult to cope with the revolutionary
followers, believing that
In addition to

poor, and the
what action to

states

found

it

zeal of Khomeini's

they would ultimately compromise.

this assessment, however,

some comment

is necessary regarding the relative importance of the tenure
period relationship versus the crisis management period, and
how

each

affected

the

outcome

of

subsequent

relations
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between

United

the

question

important

identification

States
in

this

Marcos departed.
relative

merits

each

paper

of each leader

affected long

how this

and

is

with the

term relations

Thus, the
versus

country.

the asserted

influence over each regime, and the

of

an
over

United States, and
after the Shah

and

will discuss

the

support

and

conclusion

demerits

Also,

U.S.

effects of its concrete

expression in terms of foreign aid reliance.

TENURE VERSUS CRISIS

In evaluating
difficult

the

tenure and

to assert that

crisis

periods, it

is

one is

ultimately more important

than the other in determining the

varying outcomes. Rather,

the tenure period set certain preconditions in terms of each
relationship and
each

created perceptions that affected

the way

crisis played itself out between the United States and

each state.
The

continuing good

the United States
weight

of

the

type of a

past

colonial

relationship.

the two countries,

and they valued it even though it wasn't perfect.
that occurred with the
they

Filipinos

in relation to the United States as

special friendship between

Filipinos, because

between

and the Philippines is due in part to the

perceived their country
a

post-Marcos relationship

The shift

Aguino revolution was important
acted to

oust

a leader

who

for
the
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United States had approved
military

aid.

and supported with economic

There was a

recognition that

and

the U.S. had

acted in its own primary interests by supporting Marcos, and
not

those

of

relationship.

the

Philippines,

despite

However, the United States

presence because

the Philippines

support and the presence

the

special

remained a strong

relied

on U.S.

economic

of U.S. military personnel

on the

bases. The United States maintains an ubiquitous presence in
Philippine

life which is

difficult to

comprehend from the

other side of relationship.
Also as
subsequent

a

result

closeness,

Philippines

after

of the

colonial

United

States intervention

independence

wasn't

absolutely malign influence as it
was

resented. While

advocated
long

nationalism and

history of

pattern

part of

perceived

in

and
the

as

an

was in Iran, although

it

the Filipino

political elite

self-reliance, the

cooperation with

of reliance and

relationship

the United

group had

a

States. This

cooperation established during the

tenure period helped to moderate the Filipino response after
the revolution. The
of Philippine

Aquino presidency marked

self-government, rather

the assertion

than a rejection

of

the United States.
Iran-U.S.
continuum.

What U.S. policy

Middle East in
than

their

relations were

at the

opposite end

of the

makers generally knew

of the

terms of culture
knowledge

of

and history was
Philippines.

For

much less
Iran's
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revolutionary

policy

were

who

makers,

outside

the

Westernized group around the Shah, the perception was one of
great power. While

traditional Iranian xenophobia towards a
some

moderates

allied

with

had

Khomeini

a

better

understanding of the United States, this wasn't true for the
average Iranian

up

perception for

enduring
the tenure

period

coordinated

in

revolutionary

many Iranians,

was

by U.S.

U.S.

equate

caught

the Shah's

spies.

interference

The

established during

overthrow

It was
with

fervor.

easy

of

Mossadeq

for Iranians

British

and

to

Russian

interference earlier in the century.
In addition,

the United States

picture of

modern, Westernized regional power was created

Iran as

a

by the Shah,

who successfully cultivated the image of an effective leader
through bold foreign policy initiatives and OPEC leadership.
unwilling to alter this

U.S. policy makers were
or

challenge the Shah

for U.S. foreign

too greatly because

policy were too great.

perception

of the benefits
Iranians resented

the well-known U.S. intervention in the 1953 coup, and
had

to submit

to increasingly severe

then

political repression

from SAVAK, which was trained by the CIA. Their pride in the
Iranian state as a regional superpower was tempered with the
costs

of

political

traditional ways
that didn't
Western

at home

and

the

loss of

of life as Iran rapidly modernized in ways

benefit

thought

repression

and

the

majority.

lifestyle

The

wasn't

infiltration
tempered

of

with any
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beneficial intervention by the United States, except perhaps
U.S.

intervention

War II. In
limited

during the Azerbaijan crisis

this manner, each
perceptions,

relationship, there

and

after World

side suffered from
the

unlike

wasn't any residue

false and

U.S.-Philippine

of goodwill created

during the tenure period towards U.S. involvement in Iran.
The second
between

observation concerns the change in leverage

the United

image, imagine

States and each

country.

a see-saw which is weighted

In a simple

on side A. This

represents the United States, which prior to the martial law
rule

of Marcos

and

the Shah's

Revolution, maintained
each

leader in

This was
budget

declaration

a certain amount

terms of reforms

continued

and

in

the

of influence

and other

expressed in the provision of
deficits,

White
over

quid pro quos.

foreign aid to fill

Philippine

maintenance of trade.

of the

However,

case

also

the

both Marcos and

the Shah managed to shift some of that weight towards side B
as

they

consolidated

power

within

their

Increasingly, the United States percieved each

regimes.

man as being

in control of domestic reforms and policies. This perception
had

the effect

of

making U.S.

less willing

to criticize

internal developments.
Also, some of the weight
as the United States came

slid towards the other

to rely more on foreign oil

side,
from

the Middle East and the strategic importance of the military
bases in the Philippines increased. The

United States found
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Soviet presence

in

Cam

Ranh Bay

disturbing,

seeing Soviet attempts at expansion. Iran
oil supplier, but more
in

OPEC, where

changes

needed an

foreign policy

again

was a significant

importantly, the Shah was

Western states

in U.S.

once

important

ally.

outlook also

Finally,

allowed some

weight to shift after

the repercussions of withdrawal

the

The

Vietnam

crisis.

interested in making the

United

States

was

no

from
longer

necessary investments to influence

events in other states, instead following a hands-off policy
unless directly threatened.
The
that
the

effect of

this cumulative

shift in

the U.S. found itself over-reliant
Shah's leadership,

influence the
either

Shah

revenue

prestige;

and gradually

towards

he only

benefitted the U.S.

or

needed weapons
to supply.

that even if the U.S. had

on Iranian oil and
lost the

reform. He

assistance

leverage was

no

ability to

longer

international

political

and equipment,

which it

Although it can

be argued

pushed for reforms the Shah would

not have pursued it, the perception of the United
the

eyes of

Iranian

many

Iranians would

disappointment

through on

his

human

needed

over

have

Carter's

rights rhetoric

States in

been much
failure
caused

better.

to
a

follow
loss

of

credibility in the eyes of the opposition.
The gradual loss of
affected

the U.S.-Iran

leverage during the tenure
response much

more than

period

the U.S.-

Philippine response because not as much leverage was lost in
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the

Philippines. Partly this

provision

of foreign aid,

was because

of the continued

but it was also

a result of the

long-term relationship that the U.S. and the Philippines had
maintained.

Also, the United States relied on Iran

Shah's willingness to help
U.S. foreign

policy.

and the

manage a tempestuous region

These

elements combined to

for

create a

greater loss of leverage in Iran.

OVER IDENTIFICATION

To say that military and economic
leaders
the

in power ends up as

relationship

change

between

is often

foreign

aid

assiduousness

an oversimplification. Just as
economic

indirect, so

and

regime

with which

aid maintained these

change

is the

political

relationship between

maintenance.
each leader

and

However,

the

pursued foreign

aid

when the perceived need was there dovetailed with U.S. goals
in the Cold

War.

relationship
emerged.

Iran was out of

after 1967,

This probably

while

the foreign aid reliance
the Philippines

accounts, in

independence from the United

part, for

has never
the Shah's

States, despite the fact

he still needed the U.S. as an arms supplier.

that

Neverless, he

still remained over identified with the United States in the
minds

of

many

Iranians,

even

though

his

regime

was

maintained through political repression and oil revenues.
Two facets of the

foreign aid relationship with

these
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states

are important

and have bearing

overidentification. First,
was used

on the

question of

it is alledged that

foreign aid

to further the political ends

of each leader, and

the United States used foreign aid to keep these individuals
in

power.

anecdotal;

The

evidence

there

is

in

the

Philippines

acknowledgement that

is

mostly

corruption

was

widespread, and certainly aid flows after the declaration of
martial law increased. While Filipinos expected U.S. support
of Filipino presidents, they resented U.S. support of Marcos
during

the martial

consensus is

that

law period. In
U.S. aid

terms of

supported

the Shah, the

the government

and

covered existing budget deficits at a time when the Shah was
struggling to assume control,

subduing the Tudeh party

and

weakening the National Front, allowing him the

time to gain

control and develop

U.S. aid was

supplied at a
power.

SAVAK.

The point is that

time when each

leader was consolidating

While foreign aid continued on a long-term

the Philippines

as opposed

to

Iran, this

his

basis in

may not

be

as

important as the fact that U.S. support ennabled each leader
to stay in off ice long enough at a
centralize control
Iranians and
these

around themselves.

Filipinos

"turning

crucial point in time to

points"

seemed to
it

was

allowed them to consolidate their

While large portions

support
continued

each leader
U.S. aid

at
that

positions afterward. This

is when over identification occurred.
Second,

the United States

seems to have

been unable to
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influence reform in any significant way. The value of reform
wasn't

questioned and

U.S. policymakers

dictatorships were not a good
the original end
as

economic

Although
and

long-term situation. However,

was to keep states from becoming communist

development

each leader

create

acknowledged that

corrected

social

promised to improve

greater

economic

inequities.

living standards

equity,

they

instead

consolidated power, and elite groups became more entrenched.
The

United States

foreign

aid,

accomplished
ameliorated,

had

but

many ideas

wasn't

with

it.

the lack

of

realistic
While

change is

with the

Thus foreign

aid

leader loyal

to

need for

the

what

conditions

the result

of
was
were

of stated

prosperity and education

patronage

accomplished

the efficacy
about

some

foreign aid goals such as economic
clashing

about

and centralization.

the goal

United States,

of

but

keeping

fostered

each
little

internal political reform.

FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

If
center

recommendations for the
around U.S.

future are

attitudes toward

in order, they

Third World

While accurate intelligence is vital to

leaders.

U.S. assessments of

political change in developing states, so is the realization
that no leader is permanent. Although
Shah bought

support

during his

strong support of the

regime,

there wasn't

any
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planned response as to what would happen if he
The

assumption

erroneous,

so

that
an

any

regime

is

understanding

of

should fail.

stable
the

is

simply

opposition

is

necessary.
Second, even if the U.S. is perceived
a

repressive leader

by opposing

mitigate the effects

to be supporting

groups, U.S.

of regime abuses,

pressure to

such as torture

or

political repression, would engender more long-term goodwill
with groups that might eventually
States does

assume power.

have the leverage to do

this with most states,

and it constitutes better long-term planning.
policy makers

something to refer

The United

It also gives

back to, and

creates the

perception that the U.S. is committed to the state,

not the

particular leader which governs that state.
Finally, foreign

economic and

used much more cautiously.
efficacy

of foreign aid

development in an

military aid

should be

Views have changed regarding the
to create economic

ever upward spiral.

and

political

However, the

view

that economic development and growth will foster more benign
political conditions in Third

World states still exists

some degree. Aid isn't politically neutral

to

in these states,

and it should be given with that understanding. As economies
mobilize,
wealth

may

themselves
have

a greater rather
occur.

than a

Concurrently,

many

strengthened rather than

effects opposite

of those

lesser concentration of
elites

may

find

weakened. Thus aid may

intended, and

U.S. policy
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makers should be prepared for this outcome.
For future research, it would be interesting to look at
a larger group of states.

By enlarging the sample, patterns

may become evident which are not possible to observe
comparison of two states alone. Another suggestion
the

dynamics between

national security
downfall in

the executive, state

concerns

department, and

apparatus in confronting crises of regime

these states.

administrations, but
similar would be

with a

the

Reactions probably
degree

interesting.

scope of this paper,

to which

Although

vary between

they

might

it was beyond

the Carter and Reagan

be
the

administrations

seemed to handle these crises quite differently. It would be
interesting

to

note

reactions

administrations during different crises.

among

different
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